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Abstract 
Some early boards help startups achieve exponential high growth, whereas 
others leave founders and shareholders perplexed on how to get any value 
from them. Whilst over the past ten years the research on ventures and their 
boards has grown considerably, very little is still known about the inner 
working of boards, especially during the critical early stages of startup 
development. What seems to be missing, is the understanding of a complex 
interplay between directors’ attributes and behaviours, board role and 
processes, and venture performance in the context of unique challenges 
faced by high growth early ventures. 
This study uses a classic grounded theory method to explore the experiences 
of directors on early boards of investor-backed tech startups in the UK. The 
investigation is done from the perspective of Venture Capital directors, which 
is then contextualised by looking more widely at experiences of Founders 
directors and independent Non-Executive directors. Altogether, data was 
systematically collected via interviews with 24 directors, representing 
experiences on boards of an estimated couple of hundreds of the UK early 
ventures. 
As a result, the study developed a substantive grounded theory of Optimising 
for Growth. The findings suggest that directors on early venture boards 
engage in a complex process of optimising of board and director attributes, 
such as structures, processes, mindsets and adding value behaviours, 
against growth performance criteria of the next investment round. This 
process takes place over two stages: Evaluating and Structuring Stage and 
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Behaving Bigger Stage, transforming the founder, the board and the 
company from a startup into a high growth venture. The developed grounded 
theory has also uncovered that the process of optimising is the first step in 
the boards’ longer-term efforts to professionalise startups into companies 
capable of delivering exit to investors via Initial Public Offering, thus providing 
a deeper understanding of what happens on early venture boards in context. 
Having captured variations and the relationship between director attributes, 
board roles, board processes, value adding behaviours and company 
performance, the theory of Optimising for Growth also explains the 
differences in director experiences on early venture boards. The findings 
suggest the key differences arise when the early venture boards are fit for the 
purpose of monitoring as opposed to providing strategic help. 
This study contributes to the corporate governance literature by proposing a 
substantive grounded theory as a novel integrative theoretical framework of 
the relationship between director attributes, board roles, board processes and 
company performance. The offered contribution integrates previously distinct 
perspectives from corporate governance, corporate finance and cognition, 
whilst also enriching the research on venture boards. 
The thesis also contributes to practice by offering the theory of Optimising for 
Growth as a diagnostic tool for early venture directors. The tool can be used 
to understand, reflect and consider how to structure, align and develop the 
relationship between Founders and their boards. 
Keywords: venture boards, director behaviour, board processes, growth  
vi 
 
Acknowledgements 
Embarking on this Professional Doctorate five years ago, little did I know at 
the time that the completion of this research was going to be a single most 
challenging project ever. It tested my physical and mental capacities to the 
limits I did not know I had. Not for one second I can imagine that I could have 
done it alone, and I am truly fortunate that I did not have to.  
There have been many people along the way who inspired me, cheered me 
on to keep going and encouraged me to follow my dream. Top of the list are, 
of course, my two supervisors, Dr Nicola Patterson and Dr Karim Sorour. 
Huge thanks to you, Nicola and Karim, for guidance, encouragement and 
always making me feel better when I needed it most. Together, you gave me 
the intellectual support, nurtured my learning and provided critical, but 
friendly and much needed feedback, just at the right points through the very 
difficult journey that I have had. Thank you, Nicola, for mentoring and 
supporting me through ups and downs. I could not have wished for a more 
patient, compassionate, kind and encouraging supervisor. Thank you, Karim, 
for helping me get to grips with the grounded theory method and, most 
significantly, find and keep the focus on what was most important. Your deep 
knowledge of corporate governance and ability to conceptualise from data 
have been very motivating. 
This work could not have been possible without Venture Capital investor 
directors, Founders and Non-Executive directors, who gave up their time to 
participate in interviews with me. Thank you for being open to such 
exploratory research and for your honest, in-depth insights into early venture 
boards and director inter-relationships. You made this project possible to 
vii 
 
explore and explain what makes better boards better. I am also evermore 
grateful to several anonymous VC investors, venture Founders and NEDs for 
lending me their ear, so I can test out my early research findings and 
conclusions in a safe and friendly way.  
To paraphrase a famous quote, women who support other women have a 
special place in today’s society, and in my heart. I have been incredibly 
fortunate to find a group of women leaders who have been very generous 
with their time and supported me not only through this journey but also 
through several career changes over the past 5 years. So, my very special 
thanks go to Patricia, Lucy, Anne and Gillian, for always encouraging me to 
dream big and play even bigger. 
Whilst on this doctoral journey, I have also become a coach to teams of 
student entrepreneurs. Unexpectedly, this has been the most rewarding 
experience of my entire career. I would like to thank team Younite, namely 
Cole, Joey, Robert, George, Josh, Ben, Lewis, Jack and Chris. Your ability to 
have fun while learning has been contagious and invigorating. I am 
enormously proud of what you have achieved as a team and your successes 
after the University. I believe that without you my doctoral journey would not 
have been as enjoyable, and I would not have discovered I had another 
vocation – coaching. 
Finally, I reserve my deepest and most heartfelt thanks to my husband, 
Jimmy, for always believing in me, and supporting all my dreams and 
projects. 
Thank you all for being a part of my epic doctoral journey.  
viii 
 
Contents 
Chapter 1 Introduction .................................................................................... 1 
1.0   Introduction ............................................................................................................... 1 
1.1   Professional Motivation.............................................................................................. 3 
1.2   Research Opportunity ................................................................................................ 5 
1.3   The Research Aim, Objectives and Research Question ............................................. 8 
1.4   The Non-Traditional Structure of the Thesis ............................................................. 11 
1.5   Chapter Summary ................................................................................................... 15 
Chapter 2 Early Venture Boards in Context .................................................. 16 
2.0   Introduction ............................................................................................................. 16 
2.1   Formation and Distinct Features of Early Boards ..................................................... 18 
2.1.1  Venture Board Formation ...................................................................................18 
2.1.2  Directors Characteristics ....................................................................................21 
2.1.3  Unique Issues of Alignment and Conflict ............................................................24 
2.2   Venture Boards’ Unique Operating Context ............................................................. 27 
2.2.1  Venture Lifecycle ...............................................................................................27 
2.2.2  Distinct Challenges of Early Stage......................................................................31 
2.2.3  National Context ................................................................................................34 
2.3   Recent Trends and Issues ....................................................................................... 35 
2.4   Chapter Summary ................................................................................................... 37 
Chapter 3 Research Methodology ................................................................ 38 
3.0   Introduction ............................................................................................................. 38 
3.1   Interpretivist Philosophical Underpinning ................................................................. 40 
3.1.1  Relativist Ontology .............................................................................................41 
3.1.2  Subjective Epistemology ....................................................................................42 
3.2   Classic Grounded Theory as Method for Data Collection and Analysis ..................... 43 
3.2.1  Rationale for Adopting Grounded Theory Method ...............................................43 
3.2.2  Considering Distinct Strands of Grounded Theory Method ..................................49 
3.2.3  Rationale and Consequences of Adopting Classic GT ........................................58 
3.2.4  Outline of Classic GT Procedures.......................................................................59 
3.2.5  Restatement of the Research Question ..............................................................61 
3.2.6  Evaluative Framework ........................................................................................63 
3.3   Gaining Access ....................................................................................................... 68 
3.4   Ethical Considerations ............................................................................................. 72 
3.5   Pilot Study ............................................................................................................... 76 
3.5.1  Pilot Participant Selection ...................................................................................76 
3.5.2  Pilot Interviews ...................................................................................................80 
3.5.3  Review of Pilot Study .........................................................................................85 
ix 
 
3.5.4  Using Pilot Data ................................................................................................. 91 
3.6   Data Collection ........................................................................................................ 92 
3.6.1  Concurrent Data Collection and Analysis: Summary ........................................... 92 
3.6.2  Participant Selection .......................................................................................... 95 
3.7   Interviews................................................................................................................ 97 
3.7.1  Initial Interviews ................................................................................................. 98 
3.7.2  Interviews via Theoretical Sampling ................................................................. 100 
3.8   Chapter Summary ................................................................................................. 101 
Chapter 4 Data Analysis ............................................................................. 102 
4.0   Introduction ........................................................................................................... 102 
4.1   Stages of Data Analysis ........................................................................................ 104 
4.2   Open Coding Stage ............................................................................................... 107 
4.2.1  Initial Generation of Open Codes and Properties .............................................. 108 
4.2.2  Identifying the Main Concern ............................................................................ 114 
4.2.3  Discovering Core Category .............................................................................. 121 
4.2.4  Generation of Open Codes .............................................................................. 135 
4.3   Selective Coding Stage ......................................................................................... 143 
4.3.1  Initial Selective Codes ...................................................................................... 145 
4.3.2  Theoretical Sampling ....................................................................................... 148 
4.3.3  Final Set of Selective Codes ............................................................................ 153 
4.3.4  Unused Codes ................................................................................................. 177 
4.3.5  Revisiting Research Question .......................................................................... 178 
4.4   Theoretical Coding Stage ...................................................................................... 179 
4.5   Summary of the Emergent Theory of Optimising for Growth .................................. 183 
4.6   Chapter Summary ................................................................................................. 185 
Chapter 5 The Emergent Theory Within Extant Literature .......................... 187 
5.0   Introduction ........................................................................................................... 187 
5.1   From Substantive to a More Formal Grounded Theory .......................................... 189 
5.1.1  Integration of Emergent Theory with Extant Literature ...................................... 191 
5.1.2  Organising Relevant Extant Literature .............................................................. 191 
5.2   More Formal Substantive Theory ........................................................................... 243 
5.3   Chapter Summary ................................................................................................. 249 
Chapter 6 Conclusions ............................................................................... 251 
6.0   Introduction ........................................................................................................... 251 
6.1   Review of Aims and Objectives ............................................................................. 252 
6.2   Summary of the Thesis Argument ......................................................................... 255 
6.3   Contribution to Knowledge .................................................................................... 259 
6.3.1 Contribution 1 – Optimising for Growth as Integrative Model.............................. 264 
6.3.2 Contribution 2 – Optimising For Growth as the First Stage of Professionalising . 264 
x 
 
6.3.3 Contribution 3 – Novel Board Attributes and Their Fit with Board’s Role ............266 
6.3.4 Contribution 4 – Linking Value Add and Venture Challenges .............................268 
6.4   Contribution to Practice ......................................................................................... 269 
6.4.1 Contribution 5 – Optimising for Growth as a Diagnostic Tool ..............................269 
6.5   Evaluating Theory of Optimising for Growth ........................................................... 272 
6.5.1 Fit .....................................................................................................................273 
6.5.2 Relevance .........................................................................................................274 
6.5.3 Workability ........................................................................................................276 
6.5.4 Modifiability .......................................................................................................277 
6.6   Limitations ............................................................................................................. 280 
6.7   Opportunities for Future Research ......................................................................... 282 
6.8   Chapter Summary ................................................................................................. 285 
References ................................................................................................. 286 
Appendices ................................................................................................. 302 
Appendix 1 Ethical Approval Email ................................................................................ 302 
Appendix 2 Organisation Informed Consent Form ......................................................... 303 
Appendix 3 Participant Consent Forms .......................................................................... 304 
Appendix 4 Interview Guides ......................................................................................... 305 
Appendix 5 From Data to Concepts ............................................................................... 314 
 
  
xi 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1. Key Variations between GT Strands ............................................... 50 
Table 2. Linking Evaluative Criteria and Research Stages ........................... 66 
Table 3. Pilot Participants Profile Overview .................................................. 79 
Table 4. Pilot Interview Questions ................................................................ 83 
Table 5. Overview of Data Collection linking to Data Analysis and Coding .. 94 
Table 6. Main Study Participants Profile Overview ....................................... 96 
Table 7. Open Coding. Illustration of Initial Generation of Codes ............... 109 
Table 8. Illustration of Developing Open Categories and Properties .......... 111 
Table 9. Emerging Main Concern ............................................................... 120 
Table 10. Emerging Themes of Open Codes ............................................. 124 
Table 11. List of Open Categories .............................................................. 136 
Table 12. Initial Set of Selective Codes ...................................................... 147 
Table 13. Requirements for Theoretical Sampling ...................................... 150 
Table 14. Additional Selective Codes ......................................................... 152 
Table 15. Evolution and Abstraction of Selective Codes ............................ 154 
Table 16. Main Concern Category - Growth ............................................... 158 
Table 17. Stage 1. Evaluating and Structuring Stage ................................. 163 
Table 18. Gaps ........................................................................................... 165 
Table 19. Fit for Purpose Board .................................................................. 168 
Table 20. Fit for Purpose Board: Effective vs Ineffective Early Boards ....... 168 
Table 21. Stage 2. Behaving Bigger Stage ................................................. 172 
Table 22. Venture Challenges .................................................................... 176 
Table 23. Unused Codes ............................................................................ 177 
Table 24. Overview of Relevant Literature. ................................................. 193 
Table 25. Contribution to Professionalising Literature ................................ 211 
Table 26. Contribution to Corporate Governance and Entrepreneurship 
Literature. ................................................................................................... 228 
Table 27. Value Add Activity Link to Venture Challenge ............................. 237 
Table 28. Contribution to Corporate Governance Literature on Value Add . 242 
Table 29. Summary of the Contribution to Knowledge ................................ 260 
Table 30. Evidencing Evaluation Criteria .................................................... 278 
  
xii 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1. Stages of Data Analysis ............................................................... 105 
Figure 2. Open Coding Stage ..................................................................... 107 
Figure 3. Illustration of Initial Memo and its Development .......................... 113 
Figure 4. Memo Discovering the Main Concern of Participants .................. 114 
Figure 5. Emerging Categories with Perceivable Beginning and End ......... 127 
Figure 6. Uncovering the Core Category .................................................... 134 
Figure 7. Selective Coding Stage ............................................................... 143 
Figure 8. Unsaturated Areas in Relation to Core Category ......................... 151 
Figure 9. Theoretical Coding Stage ............................................................ 180 
Figure 10. Emergent Substantive Theory of Optimising for Growth ............ 182 
Figure 11. Emergent Substantive Theory of Optimising for Growth ............ 192 
Figure 12. Model of Board Attributes and Roles ......................................... 245 
Figure 13. More Formal Substantive Theory............................................... 247 
 
1 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.0   Introduction 
This doctoral study explored the experiences of directors on boards of early 
ventures in the UK. Ventures are understood as “privately held 
entrepreneurial firms with significant external equity investment from 
professional investors” (Garg, 2013, p.90). Their boards are usually formed 
as a result of the investment and they are “a primary governance 
mechanism” with a potential to “significantly affect firm performance (Garg, 
2013, p.90). Through a systematic exploration of director experiences, this 
study developed a grounded theory of Optimising for Growth, offering a 
deeper understanding of the complex interplay between directors’ attributes 
and behaviours, board’s role and processes, and venture performance 
during the critical early stages of development. 
This inaugural chapter sets the foundations for the study. The first section 
discusses the professional history of the author. As an ex-manager of 
venture capital investments and experienced board observer, the author has 
a degree of insight into experiences of directors of early venture boards. This 
insight has influenced not only the choice of the research area, but also 
provided a strong motivation for this project to contribute to the professional 
practice of venture board directors. 
The second section identifies the research opportunity as relevant and 
important in relation to the literature. This is followed by the third section with 
an outline of the aim, objectives and the research question. 
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The fourth section summarises the non-traditional structure of this thesis. 
The section introduces classic grounded theory as a chosen method for this 
study. Grounded theory is a systematic method for data collection and 
analysis, which allows an in-depth exploration of previously little researched 
areas, and it also enables the researcher to shift from a simple description to 
a theoretical explanation (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Studies employing this 
method follow an unconventional research process with two key distinctions 
from a traditional approach First, data is collected and analysed concurrently, 
through three stages of open coding, selective coding and theoretical coding 
(Urquhart, 2013). Second, the role of the literature in this process is to refine 
and extend the theory developed from data as opposed to locating the 
research area prior to the fieldwork (Glaser, 1978). Consequently, the 
structure of this thesis reflects this unconventional process, as opposed to 
following a typical outline. Thus, the first chapter concludes by summarising 
the thesis structure. 
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1.1   Professional Motivation 
This study was motivated by the professional background of the author. As 
an ex-manager of investments at two of the UK-based Venture Capital (VC) 
funds, the author was involved with boards of twelve investee companies 
over a three-year period, noticing her experiences varied significantly from 
board to board. It seemed that over time, some boards were much better 
than others at helping startup ventures and their founders to reach potential. 
However, it was not at all apparent how and why these boards were different. 
Some factors were obvious, for example, certain board structures and 
processes did not meet the need for up-to-date reporting and communication 
in the context of rapid changes during the early stages of venture 
development. This observation was also made by several prolific venture 
capital investors, with Brad Feld (2011, p.1) among others, calling “the 
default structure of a startup board… an artefact of the past 40 years”. 
However, other factors, were not as straightforward: all boards had 
experienced chairs and Non-Executive directors, as well as skilful Founders, 
all directors had a strong interest in the success of the startup, all twelve 
boards prioritised strategic discussions at meetings and added value either 
through introductions, Founder mentoring or industry knowledge. Yet, within 
three years, half of these companies have shut down.  
This experience has made the author curious not only about the ‘what’ of 
better early boards, i.e. boards’ structures and processes, but also about the 
‘how’ and ‘why’ some boards and some directors were better at getting early 
ventures to growth than others. Consequently, this research project was 
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conceived with an intention to better understand what was happening on 
early venture boards and to explain the differences in own experiences. The 
personal background has also acted as a strong motivator to make specific 
contributions and recommendations to the professional practice of venture 
board directors. 
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1.2   Research Opportunity 
Board research is located in a research field of corporate governance, a field 
of rich theoretical traditions boasting well-established views on the 
relationship between board and director attributes, and company 
performance. Whilst this field possesses highly influential literature which has 
affected company governance regulations and director guidelines world-
wide, much of the research has concentrated on mature public firms and, 
unfortunately, it produced inconclusive and contradictory results on the 
relationship between board’s attributes and the company performance 
(Durisin and Puzone, 2009). Therefore, two major opportunities remain: 
researching boards of companies other than mature public firms (Dalton et 
al., 2007), and investigating the work of boards in their entirety, i.e. 
considering structural, processual, cognitive, behavioural and performance 
attributes as a whole (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004). This study of early venture 
boards helps to address the two opportunities. 
The opportunity to research different types of companies comes from the 
foundation of the current literature on a single company context – boards of 
mature large public firms (Dalton et al., 2007). As it currently stands, the 
corporate governance field lacks insight from company context other than 
mature public firms, even though research of boards in other contexts, such 
as family firms, startups and non-profit organisations, as well as different 
geographies, other than the US and Europe, is growing. Researching boards 
of ventures have been recognised as an important priority for the field, 
especially since ventures themselves have become “economically relevant” 
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(Garg and Furr, 2017, p. 326) “crown jewels” of many countries (Gilson, 
2003, p.1068). Examples of such ventures include companies, such as 
Airbnb, Uber and Deliveroo, which have not only redefined traditional 
industries, but also, become central to employment policies and economic 
growth across continents (Achleitner and Klockner, 2005, Audretsch and 
Keilback, 2006, Brown and Mason, 2014).  
The opportunity to investigate the work of boards in their entirety has arisen 
from many calls for understanding and theorising about the relationship 
between how different board and director attributes interact with company 
performance (Pye and Pettigrew, 2005, Roberts et. aI., 2005). As it was 
briefly mentioned above, voluminous board studies have produced 
inconclusive and contradictory results (Durisin and Puzone, 2009). This is 
largely due to their emphasis on separately researching board attributes, 
such as board structures, board roles, processes or a single board activity 
against their effect on company performance, as opposed investigating the 
work that boards carry out in their entirety (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004). 
Arbitrary inferences have been made to connect boards structures, roles and 
processes and company’s outcomes (Pye and Pettigrew, 2005). There 
seems to be a neglect of the bigger picture: the fact that boards carry out 
multiple roles at the same time, and their structures, processes and purposes 
are inter-changeable in their nature, as well as over time, often reflecting, 
among other things, context, industries, stage of development and type of 
challenges faced by the companies (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004, Kaufman and 
Englander, 2005). For example, boards of publicly trading mature 
corporations are mostly structured, organised and function to be effective 
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monitors of the CEO and performance, and they are legally responsible for 
that (Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 2005), whereas boards of startups tend to 
be structured and organised to offer valuable strategic advice and other 
resources, although investor-directors also monitor performance (Garg and 
Furr, 2017). Thus, it appears that boards of directors, their roles and the 
relationship with the company performance, are more complex in nature than 
traditional corporate governance literature argues. As the 2008 financial 
crisis and corporate scandals have so painfully illustrated, there is a need for 
research into better understanding of boards as a whole, as opposed to 
prescribing which structural or process characteristics lead to which specific 
outcome (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003, Durisin and Puzone, 2009). This 
study of early venture boards helps to address that. 
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1.3   The Research Aim, Objectives and Research Question 
Having established the research opportunity, the aim of this study is two-fold: 
first, to understand what happens on early venture boards, and second, to 
develop a theoretical framework for the complex relationship between 
directors’ attributes and behaviours, board’s role and processes, and venture 
performance during the critical early stages of development. 
To explore what happens on early venture boards, a classic grounded theory 
method was adopted. Grounded theory is a well-known method used in 
situations where little is known about the area of interest (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967, Glaser, 1978). The research focuses on the substantive 
population of directors on venture boards in the UK. It explores VC Investor 
Directors perspective and contextualises it by looking more widely at 
experiences of Founders Directors and independent Non-Executive 
Directors. 
When using the classic grounded theory method, the aim of the research is 
typically achieved by understanding the key issue of concern of the 
substantive population, in this case directors on venture boards, and how this 
issue is being resolved (Urquhart, 2013). The key issue and how it is being 
resolved are two key concepts within classic grounded theory research 
process. They are known as the main concern and core resolution category, 
around which the theory is developed from data (Glaser, 1978). Thus, the 
method helps to arrive at a substantive theory about what is happening in the 
substantive area of interest. 
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Specific objectives of the research study have been defined as follows: 
1. To understand what happens on early boards by allowing for the 
emergence of the main concern of directors on early venture boards; 
2. To learn how directors go about resolving their main concern, thus 
discovering the core category; 
3. Based on the emerged concepts and the relationships between them, 
to develop a substantive theory explaining how directors are resolving 
their main concern; 
4. To clarify how the emerged theory explains variations in experiences 
of directors on early venture boards; 
5. To contribute to the knowledge base and the director practice in the 
context of early venture boards. 
According to the guidelines of the method, the research question in a 
grounded theory study is emergent in nature (Glaser, 1978). It identifies the 
substantive area, but it does not define the phenomenon, thus allowing for 
open exploration (Urquhart, 2013). This is especially useful in this study, 
since the area under investigation has not been previously researched much. 
Thus, using the guidance from the classic grounded theory method, the initial 
research question has been set out in two parts, as follows: 
• What are the issues that directors face on early venture boards?  
• How are these issues being resolved?  
10 
 
The emergent nature and the evolution of the research question is discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 3. The chapter demonstrates how in this study the 
initial research questions had been developed further and emerged as 
follows: 
• How does the process of Optimising for Growth explain the 
variations in experiences on early venture boards? 
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1.4   The Non-Traditional Structure of the Thesis 
The purpose of this section is to explain and outline the non-traditional 
structure of this thesis. Adopted in this study grounded theory method is 
quite distinct in its approach to research and, therefore, this is reflected in the 
presentation of the thesis (Urquhart, 2013). As it was briefly mentioned 
above, there are two key distinctions from the traditional research process. 
First, data collection and analysis are carried out simultaneously, through 
three stages of open coding, selective coding and theoretical coding 
(Urquhart, 2013). Second, data collection and analysis precede the literature 
review. The role of the literature, therefore, is different in this process. 
Conventionally, the literature plays a key role from the outset, helping to 
locate the research area within the theoretical diaspora of disciplines, so that 
a study is able to address a gap, or to build on the existing knowledge 
(Silverman, 2006). In designing a grounded theory study, however, 
researchers are encouraged to begin investigating without an extensive 
review of the literature (Glaser, 1998). This is done to aid the exploration, to 
keep an open mind and to guard against forcing pre-conceived or borrowed 
from the literature knowledge about concepts and their relationships. Instead, 
the researchers draw the concepts directly from the collected data (Urquhart, 
2013). Thus, the literature becomes key towards the end of the research 
process, it is engaged with when substantive theory has emerged from data. 
The role of literature in a grounded theory study is, therefore, to refine and 
extend the emerged theory by exploring points of divergence and 
convergence between the findings and the extant knowledge. Consequently, 
it is normally presented towards the end of the thesis, after data collection 
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and analysis. Overall, the literature helps to abstract the emerged theory, 
making it more formal, thus shaping the contribution to knowledge (Urquhart, 
2013). 
This thesis reflects the non-traditional grounded theory research process and 
it is structured as such. 
This inaugural Chapter 1 reveals the motivation for the study, which is rooted 
in the personal experiences of the author in the professional practice of early 
venture boards. It discusses how this research is relevant and important to 
the wider literature on corporate governance. Introducing the classic 
grounded theory method as a method for this study, the chapter outlines the 
study’s aim, objectives and the research question, culminating in an outline 
of the non-traditional structure of the rest of the thesis. 
The purpose of Chapter 2 is to provide further background and discuss the 
distinct context of early venture boards, thus setting the stage for the study. 
Consideration is given to the formation of first venture boards, including the 
usual composition and demographic characteristics of directors. Further, a 
typical life cycle of a venture – from startup to IPO or sale, is discussed, 
providing a wider context. It is argued that early venture boards and their 
directors deal with a significantly different challenges compared to later stage 
boards. To complete the picture, the chapter highlights recent developments 
in the substantive area of interest which resulted in the rise of unique and 
complex set of governance challenges and their effects. Overall, the 
outcome is a contextual background foundation for the subsequent chapters. 
13 
 
Chapter 3 presents the methodology for the research. In a classic grounded 
theory study, data collection and analysis take place concurrently, however, 
it is useful to separate and summarise the approach to collecting data in a 
thesis in order to ensure clarity, and so this chapter also does that.  
Thus, the study is positioned as a classic grounded theory investigation 
underpinned by an interpretivist research philosophy and designed as a pilot 
and a main study. Here, ethical, access and practical considerations are also 
discussed. Presenting the pilot study, the chapter reviews its results and 
lessons for the main study. The chapter culminates with a summary of how 
the main study’s data was collected, including the approach to selecting 
participants and interviewing. 
The purpose of Chapter 4 is to give an account of the process of data 
analysis, clearly demonstrating the emergence of the grounded theory of 
Optimising for Growth from data. The grounded theory of Optimising for 
Growth is the main finding of this study. Its emergence from data is 
showcased, as far as possible, by illustrating how codes and categories were 
initially generated from data, and then developed further using open, 
selective and theoretical coding, as well as employing techniques of constant 
comparison, memo taking and theoretical sampling. Thus, the process of 
conceptualisation is shown, leading to the development of the grounded 
theory about the substantive area of early venture boards. 
The chapter also presents and interprets the results of data collection 
analysis, i.e. the emerged theory of Optimising for Growth. The theory is 
offered as a process involving two stages: Evaluating and Structuring Stage 
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and Behaving Bigger Stage. Here, it is also explained how the emerged 
theory accounts for variations in director experiences on early venture 
boards. 
Chapter 5 refines the emerged theory and locates it within extant literature 
with a goal to abstract it and arrive at a more formal substantive theory. 
Thus, the theory has been located across multiple disciplines including 
corporate governance, corporate finance, entrepreneurship and relational 
leadership. The relevant literature has been reviewed with a purpose to 
refine and extend the knowledge, discerning specific contributions for the 
literature. The result is a more formal theory of Optimising for Growth. 
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis. It summarises the research and reflects on 
its conclusions. It proposes the research’s contribution to knowledge and 
practice. Considerations are given to the study against the evaluative criteria 
of classic grounded theory method, demonstrating that the developed 
substantive theory has achieved fit, relevance, workability and modifiability 
(Glaser, 1998). The chapter closes with a discussion of limitations and 
opportunities for further research. 
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1.5   Chapter Summary 
Having originated from a professional practice, this study investigated what 
happens of early venture boards. It developed a grounded theory of 
Optimising for Growth, contributing to a better understanding of boards in 
their entirety and explaining variations in the director experiences in context 
of early venture boards.  
This chapter set out the foundations for the study. It introduced the 
motivation for the study to inform the knowledge and practice on early 
venture boards. It also set out the aim of the research to develop a 
substantive theory explaining variations in director experiences. Further it 
explained the non-traditional structure of the rest of the thesis. 
The following chapter will set the stage further by critically discussing the 
distinct context that early venture boards exist in.  
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Chapter 2 Early Venture Boards in Context 
2.0   Introduction 
Typically, early ventures are striving to become public firms via IPO (Garg 
and Furr, 2017). Their boards, similarly to the boards of public firms, “exist in 
a complex network of relationships” between directors, systems, processes 
and their market environment (Pye, 2004, 63). However, the features and 
context of early venture boards are rather distinct from the boards of public 
firms, which are also the most traditional type of companies for board 
research. They differ in ways they are composed; their directors have very 
different attributes and characteristics, and they face very different issues 
internally and externally (Garg, 2013). In order to understand what happens 
on early venture boards, it is important to understand those distinct features 
and issues. This chapter considers venture-specific concepts and context 
with a purpose to provide background for the study, setting the stage for the 
subsequent chapters. 
Thus, the first section critically discusses the different features of early 
venture boards compared to boards of public firms and shows how they give 
rise to unique sets of conflicts among directors (Pollman, 2019). 
The second section considers the unique operating context for ventures. 
Here, typical life cycle of a venture – from startup to IPO is discussed, 
providing a larger picture context (Filatotchev, Toms and Wright, 2006). At 
different stages of life cycle, ventures and their boards face an idiosyncratic 
set of circumstances and challenges (Pollman, 2019). This section discusses 
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specifics of these during the early stages of venture development. Since this 
study investigates boards within the legal systems of the UK, this section 
also has a brief discussion of the two systems, which share many similarities 
(Guest, 2009).  
The third and final section highlights recent trends in the substantive area of 
interest, such as, for example, staying private longer instead of doing an IPO, 
which produced unique and complex set of governance challenges (Pollman, 
2019). This brings into a sharp focus the need for a better understanding of 
what happens in early and even nascent venture boards, in order to have a 
more informed view of their micro-foundational role in company’s growth and 
governance.  
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2.1   Formation and Distinct Features of Early Boards 
2.1.1  Venture Board Formation 
There are two significant differences in board formation between early 
venture boards compared to boards of public firm. Together they create 
unique relationship dynamic on early venture boards from the start. 
First, startup boards are usually formed as a result of early equity investment 
from a professional investor, such as a venture capital fund, business angels, 
a corporate investor, or a mix (Pollman, 2019). Having a board seat in 
investee startup is a standard term of investment from venture capital firms 
on both sides of the Atlantic (Garg, 2013). Once formed, it is not unusual for 
first startup boards to remain small, usually between 3-5 members, 
consisting of just founders and investors’ representatives (Fried, Bruton and 
Hisrich, 1998).  
Since the first investor is almost always a de-facto board member, this raises 
a very interesting issue about whether startups have much choice over who 
sits on their board. Founders are regularly advised to choose carefully their 
VC investors, since they get board seats and much control over what 
ventures can and cannot do (Pollman, 2019). This means obtaining 
references on how VCs work with their investee boards and obtaining 
several investment offers from different VC firms. In practice, these options 
are quite problematic. This is because venture boards, same as any 
company board, operate behind closed doors and very little reference data is 
available about them (Garg and Furr, 2017). Also, in seeking investment, 
many startups simply do not get the luxury of choosing between terms and 
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VC firms, since obtaining venture capital investment during early stages is 
extremely difficult and not every startup can get several investment offers 
from VC firms to choose from (Feld and Ramsinghani, 2013). Furthermore, 
some VC firms have a portfolio monitoring approach preferring to take an 
observer monitoring role with the investee company from the outset 
(Macmillan, Kulow, and Khoylian, 1989). Such investors would typically seek 
to appoint a non-executive director to represent them on boards instead of 
taking up the board seat themselves or they take part as board observers 
(Rosenstein et al., 1993, Lerner, 1995). In any case, the formation and the 
composition of boards in early ventures is strongly linked to the investor, and 
it is arguable whether the choice of board members is therefore a free choice 
early on. 
Second, investment terms and agreements, play a very important role in 
specifying not only startup board formation, but also the appointment of 
investor directors or their representatives, and specifying rules for any further 
board appointments1. What is more, investment agreements play a 
significantly bigger role than merely composing the board and securing a 
board seat for the investor. In fact, they also shape the conduct of the board. 
This suggests early venture boards and their conduct are also “negotiated” 
as part of the investment contract (Pollman, 2019, p.23). Thus, upon closer 
examination, investment agreements set out boards processes, such as 
frequency of board meetings, and board reporting information, such as rights 
to monthly accounts (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003). Furthermore, they also 
                                                   
1 Example Investment Agreements have been published online by several early stage VC 
firms, including Passion Capital in the UK, http://www.passioncapital.com/ 
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outline the rights of investors to vote or veto the important decisions about 
company development, for example, decisions about adopting budgets, 
taking out business loans, increasing founder salaries, etc., would all require 
a formal approval from the investor (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003). 
Significantly, this means having investors with rights to approve important 
company decisions places them above the board in the decision-making 
hierarchy. In contrast, in traditional corporate setting of public firms, boards 
have the ultimate decision-making power on such matters (Garg, 2013). This 
issue creates a separate dynamic, where decisions could be delayed until 
investor approval is received. Thus, investment agreements shape and limit 
early venture boards and their conduct. 
Overall, compared to boards of public firms, early venture boards are formed 
to include the first investor de-facto, their conduct is shaped by investor 
agreements and is restricted by investor rights to approve all important 
company development decisions.  
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2.1.2  Directors Characteristics 
In traditional large corporate boards, two types of directors are usually 
present: executive and non-executive. Executive directors are full time 
employees of the business. For example, a Chief Executive Officer (CEO), 
Finance Director, Marketing Director or Operations Director, could typically 
be found as executive directors on corporate boards. Non-executive 
directors, also known as external or outside directors, do not have an 
operational role in the company and are not employees. Non-executive 
directors are also known as independent directors (McNulty and Pettigrew, 
1999). 
In contrast, venture boards are usually characterised to include three types 
of directors: Founder Director, VC Investor Director and a Non-Executive 
Director (NED) (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003). Although Founder Directors 
can be classified as executive directors since they have a full-time role in the 
business, and others can also be classified as non-executive directors, as 
they do not have an operational role, recognising three director types helps 
to better understand the substantive area, as each of these three types of 
director has distinct demographic characteristics, including a stake in the 
ownership, which in turn, add to the dynamic of early boards. 
Thus, Founder Directors are usually the originators of the idea behind the 
startup (Garg, 2013). They are typically young individuals with first time 
experience founding and running a company as a CEO, often having an in-
depth technical knowledge but lacking market, sales and marketing expertise 
(Sapienza and Gupta, 1994, Sapienza, Manigart and Vermier, 1996). This 
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profile is in stark contrast to the typical profile CEOs of public corporate 
boards, individuals with much experience not only in the market and as a 
CEO (Rejchrt and Higgs, 2014). There are, of course, variations to a typical 
first-time Founder profile. Thus, other types of Founders include individuals 
with previous industry, startup and exit experience, as well as experience 
running a company as a CEO (Hsu, 2007, Zhang, Baden-Fuller and Pool, 
2011). Unlike executive directors in large public firms, however, Founder 
Directors have a significant shareholding at early stages of company 
development, and at the time of board formation (Wasserman, 2006, 
Pollman, 2019). Executive directors in traditional corporate boards could 
have some shareholding but it is unusual for it to be a large shareholding, 
especially when they first join the company.  
The second type of director on early venture boards is a VC Investor 
Director. This is a direct representative of the VC investment firm 
(Rosenstein et al., 1993, Lerner,1995). Their profiles are usually 
characterised by having current experience on large number of boards, 
including startups and growth companies. VC Investor Directors may also 
have industry experience since many VCs specialise in investing in specific 
industries (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). Unlike outside directors on public 
firm boards, VC Investor Directors have strong and personal financial 
incentives directly linked to the VC fund they work for, which are typically 
received when investors exit from portfolio investee firms (Sahlman, 1990, 
Garg and Furr, 2017). Thus, similar to Founders, VC Investor Directors also 
have a personal stake in the success of companies.  
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Although it is not unusual for venture boards to be composed of just Founder 
and VC Investor Directors, early ventures may also appoint Non-executive 
Directors, the third type of a director on venture boards (Fried, Bruton and 
Hisrich, 1998, Garg, 2013). Individuals appointed as NEDs would usually 
have a significant amount of experience in the relevant markets and 
industries, undoubtably an additional resource of value to first time Founder 
Directors (Lerner, 1995). Furthermore, attracting experienced NEDs from the 
industry often gives a signal of startup high value and repute to the market 
(Chen, Hambrick and Pollock, 2008). Since startup boards are negotiated, 
NED appointments require investor approval. In some cases, both parties, 
i.e. Founders and VC Investors, may negotiate to appoint a representative 
NED each (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003). Since early on startups might not 
have revenues and much available cash, it is also not unusual to incentivise 
NEDs with shares and stock options rather than cash payments. Although it 
can be advantageous to attract experienced NEDs to startup boards, the way 
NEDs are appointed and incentivised influences their independent status, 
which contrasts with public sector boards where NED independence is a 
primary concern (Garg and Furr, 2017).  
Overall, compared to public boards, venture board directors have 
idiosyncratic demographic characteristics, they are also quite small in size 
(Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003). However, although they lack diversity and 
independence, these features also make them “conducive” to be more 
engaged in startup’s development (Fried, Bruton and Hisrich, 1998, p.499). 
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2.1.3  Unique Issues of Alignment and Conflict 
Previous sections critically discussed formation and director characteristics 
of early venture boards compared to board of publicly trading corporations. 
These distinct features of venture boards give rise to unique conflicts of 
alignment and interest among venture directors vis-à-vis each other and the 
venture which do not exist in public boards. The sources of divergence of 
alignment and conflict are quite complex and, as they evolve over time, they 
are not always apparent during the early stages (Garg and Furr, 2017).  
Existing from the outset, one of such sources of divergence lies in the  
Founder’s psychological and ownership connection to the venture. During 
early stages, Founders are typically considered to be well aligned with their 
ventures and investors (Wasserman, 2006, Garg 2013). As originators of the 
idea and the vision for the startup, they tend to have a very strong 
psychological attachment to it, even when first VCs come in (Pierce, Kostova 
and Dirks, 2001). As majority shareholders at that stage, Founders also have 
financial incentives linked to the success of their venture (Garg and Furr, 
2017). The company inevitably requires more funding, and it is not unusual 
for Founders to recede the majority ownership to investors on the second or 
a third round of funding. Since Founders also have to take on many new 
responsibilities within a growing company, psychologically they might also 
become less attached as a result (Arthurs and Busenitz, 2003, Garg, 2013). 
Nevertheless, investors are well aware of these issues, and they typically 
address Founder misalignment with incentives during new financing rounds, 
or by altogether replacing Founders with professional CEOs (Admati and 
Pfleiderer, 1994, Arthurs and Busenitz, 2003). 
25 
 
Another significant source of divergence is so-called VC investors’ ‘dual’ 
fiduciary duty (Pollman, 2019). As legal directors of companies, VC Investor 
Directors are a subject to laws and regulations governing company directors’ 
duties and responsibilities. As such, directors are legally required to act in 
the best interests of all shareholders (Bochner and Simmerman, 2016). At 
the same time, VC Investor Directors also have duties to the investment fund 
they manage (Pollman, 2019). These duties require them to produce a return 
on invested funds within a limited timescale, typically 5-7 years (Salhman, 
1990). The funds contain several investee ventures at different stages of 
development.  The ‘dual’ fiduciary conflict comes up broadly in two situations. 
First, if a portfolio company emerges to have a low likelihood of reaching a 
large exit, VC Investor Directors tend to lose interest in it and instead, focus 
on the better performing ventures, thus safeguarding the interest of their fund 
as a whole (Cable, 2015). Second, if VC fund is under liquidity pressure, the 
timing and form of exit from portfolio companies would be subservient to that 
pressure, as opposed to being in the ultimate interest of all shareholders of 
any particular investee company (Garg and Furr, 2017).  The most notable 
example of this situation where VC Investor Director duties were at odds is 
the court case of In re Trados, a VC-backed software company. VC Investor 
Directors sold the company the moment the offered price gave their funds 
anticipated return, even though that price meant minority shareholders 
received nothing (Epstein, 2018).  Although in this case, the courts stressed 
that “fiduciary duties of directors of venture-backed companies are owed to 
the corporation”, it is widely acknowledged that VCs on venture boards 
remain conflicted (Epstein, 2018, p.8, Jones, 2017, Pollman, 2019). 
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Whilst founder’s misalignment and inherent VC dual fiduciary are the most 
notable unique conflicts on venture boards, there are several others. 
However, they tend to arise in much later stages of venture development 
(Pollman, 2019). For example, new financing rounds often bring several new 
VC investors with different liquidity timescales. Inevitably this means an 
increasingly complex shareholding and incentivisation structures, reflecting 
preferences of multiple investors and new ways to ensure founders remain 
aligned. Different interests of investors means there is always an inherent 
risk that in their role as directors they would “take actions that would harm 
other shareholders or make inefficient decisions that fail to maximize 
aggregate welfare” (Pollman, 2019, p.177). In regard to the Non-Executive 
Directors on venture boards, as it was discussed earlier, they are often 
appointed by the VCs or Founders to act as their representatives, which can 
also make them conflicted (Rosenstein et al., 1993, Lerner, 1995). Since this 
study is interested in a context for early stages of ventures, these types of 
issues and conflicts typical for later stages, have not been discussed in much 
detail in this thesis. 
Overall, directors on venture boards experience issues of misalignment and 
conflicts that simply do not exist in the context of boards of public firms. 
Although many of these conflicts arise at later stages of venture development 
with the arrival on new investors, founder misalignment and VC dual fiduciary 
are inherent from the start.   
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2.2   Venture Boards’ Unique Operating Context 
2.2.1  Venture Lifecycle 
From formation to exit, ventures evolve through well-established but 
“dramatically different business phases” (Wasserman, 2006, Pollman, 2019, 
p.27). This evolution is known as company development lifecycle, “the notion 
that the firm’s strategic dynamics, such as competitive challenges, 
opportunities and strategy responses, vary across the different” periods in 
time (Filatotchev, Toms and Wright, 2006, p.257). 
With global professionalisation of tech startup support, accelerator 
programmes and funding, it is now considered that the business phases, or 
the lifecycle, of venture startups tend to evolve quite predictably (Pollman, 
2019). The stages vary in names, but in context of VC-backed tech ventures, 
generally, three phases have been recognised. These are startup or early 
stage, transitional stage and mature stage (Wasserman, 2012). Each stage 
is characterised by a distinct set of challenges that ventures must deal with. 
Early stage is the most uncertain stage of the lifecycle as majority of 
ventures fail here and do not progress to the next stage (Pollman, 2019) This 
stage is distinguished by simultaneous technological and commercial 
challenges as founders attempt to develop a technical product and validate 
its fit for markets (Marmer et al., 2011). At the same time, early ventures 
have significant resource pressures because they often consist of just 
founders and rarely have large teams from the outset. Critically, funding is 
required to succeed in this stage. If startups succeed, they move into a 
transitional stage, where they test sales, distribution and product 
28 
 
development in order to grow as quickly as possible and scale processes, 
revenues and profits at lower costs (Marmer et al., 2011). During this stage it 
is not unusual for the venture to also grow the number of people it employs 
(Garg, 2013). At mature stage, ventures evolve as complex business 
operations, however, at the same time, they face significant pressures from 
their investors to exit either via IPO or sale (Pollman, 2019). Unmistakably, 
each stage is dramatically different in its challenges for the venture board. 
The transition between stages in venture lifecycle are clearly separated by 
strategic thresholds (Filatotchev, Toms and Wright, 2006). Thus, the 
changeover from early stage to transitional is indicated by startup’s ability to 
raise further large funding from professional investors, whereas exit 
pressures as a signal of maturity (Aghion, Bolton and Tirole, 2004). At each 
threshold, company structures and resources, such as people, processes 
and systems, get re-organised and rebalanced (Filatotchev, Toms and 
Wright, 2006).  
Boards, their composition, attributes and function, also change when 
ventures transition from stage to stage. It is well known that the arrival of new 
investors and unique business challenges of each stage are the main factors 
that influence board changes (Pollman, 2019). In a venture context, this is 
because investors bring new terms and get board seats (Garg and Furr, 
2017). As it was discussed above, venture boards frequently start small, 
consisting of only Founders and their first investor, where Founders often 
retaining majority shareholding, but, at the same time, where investors may 
have powers of decision veto. Transition from early stage means an increase 
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in board size and a shift of ownership from Founders towards VCs (Kaplan 
and Stromberg, 2003, Garg, 2013). As complexities of the business 
environment and the internal organisational context grow, this transition is 
often accompanied by an introduction of a professional CEO and a change in 
company control from founder/CEO to VCs (Daily and Dalton, 1992, 
Wasserman, 2006). Although  recent trends indicate that Founders of 
particularly high growth ventures, such as Uber, Airbnb and Facebook, 
managed to maintain board and company control as far as the mature stage 
(Jones, 2017).  
The issues of board member alignment and conflict also tend to multiply as 
venture goes through its lifecycle (Pollman 2019). This is because the 
relationship dynamic gets influenced by an increased number of investors, 
much wider variety of terms, and conflicting interests. Overall, when ventures 
transition from stage to stage, their boards change and their challenges 
become more complex. However, at the same time, they are also subject to 
a somewhat predictable pattern, as discussed above (Pollman, 2019). In 
contrast, changes in boards of public firms are not as predictable. 
Whilst board changes follow a pattern as ventures progress through the 
business phases, very little detail is, however, known about board processes, 
director behaviours and actions, and how they differ throughout the duration 
of each stage (Jones, 2017). These differences, while so apparent, are rarely 
studied closely and specifically in context of challenges presented by each 
stage of the lifecycle (Lynall, Golden, and Hillman 2003, Pye and Pettigrew, 
2005). This study does that for the early stage. 
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In summary, tech ventures follow a well-established lifecycle. Each stage is 
characterised by distinct business challenges and increased complexity. 
Venture boards also change with each stage. Although little detail is known 
about board operations during each stage, they are significantly influenced 
by the stage-specific challenges. The next section therefore discusses the 
distinct challenges facing ventures during the early stage, the stage relevant 
to this study, in order provide a better understanding of the context of 
substantive area of interest. 
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2.2.2  Distinct Challenges of Early Stage  
As highlighted above, early stage is the most unstable stage in the venture’s 
lifecycle. It is characterised by uncertainty of survival and rapid changes in 
the business (Garg and Eisenhardt, 2017). Uncertainty and changes touch 
all aspects of the business, including, but not limited to internally - product, 
technology, team and processes, and externally – venture’s customers, its 
market and the competitive landscape (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994, Santos and 
Eisenhardt, 2009). There are also several distinct and complex challenges 
that set the early stage apart, compared to the later stages or public firms 
(Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009, Davis, Eisenhardt, and Bingham, 2009, Garg, 
2013). These include achieving a product-market fit, having limited 
resources, unpredictability of performance against plan and an ever-present 
pressure to raise further funding (Garg, 2013, Garg and Eisenhardt, 2017). 
Ventures are known to develop innovative or completely new tech-based 
products (Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009). These are either offered to create 
new markets or disrupt established markets, such as, for example, AirBnB 
disrupting the travel market (Pollman, 2019). The success of the product 
depends on the ability to position it within a market, thus finding customers 
(Zott and Amit, 2008). In contrast, ventures in later stages and larger 
companies have more established products, existing markets and therefore 
have a customer base (Garg, 2013). Transforming a tech-based nascent 
product into a commercial and profitable offer, that is in demand with 
customers, leads to achieving a product-market fit. This is notoriously hard to 
achieve, due to lack of previous relationship with customers, uncertainty 
about the best market for the product and, therefore, about competition 
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(Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009). At the same time, it is not unusual for 
startups to frequently change their target market, business model and 
product, a strategy known as pivoting, in order to find success (Argeaga and 
Hyland, 2013). 
Early ventures are also characterised by small teams, and their human 
resource have very little “slack” or spare capacity (Garg, 2013, p.93, 
Wasserman, 2006). Due to high propensity to fail and lack of spare funding, 
attracting the right skills and experiences is often a huge challenge for early 
ventures, as opposed to more established firms (Garg, 2013). Therefore, in 
the context of uncertainty and the need for pivot, early ventures must 
manage their team resource very carefully and masterfully. 
Another effect of operating in uncertainty is the unpredictable nature of early 
venture’s performance against plan. This challenge arises because of the 
high level of experimentation and pivoting required in order to attain the fit 
between products and markets. Therefore, traditional accounting measures 
of company performance, such as turnover and profit, do not fully represent 
the actual achievements under such challenging conditions (Garg, 2013). 
Thus, early ventures often develop and use more subjective measures of 
performance, such as for example, number of product users, percentage of 
monthly growth in revenue, and the stage of development of their tech 
products among others (Fried, Bruton and Hisrich, 1998). In order to perform 
their duties effectively, early boards, must, therefore, have a deep 
understanding of the nature of performance at this stage and how it could be 
measured effectively.  
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At the same time early ventures exist under an ever-present pressure to 
raise “sequential rounds” of funding to support their growth (Pollman, 2019, 
p.17). It is not unusual to go through multiple rounds of raising more 
investment even just during the early stage (Sahlman, 1990, Forbes 
Korsgaard and Sapienza, 2010). This adds an additional challenge on the 
venture team and its board to constantly search for new investors, and to be 
ready to meet their expectations for a new funding round, which usually boil 
down to having achieved growth, however it is measured. 
Overall, the challenges of early stage are inter-dependent and stem from 
uncertainty and change. Most importantly they are distinct from other stages 
and therefore form part of the uniqueness of the context for researching early 
venture boards. 
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2.2.3  National Context 
As discussed above, the formation, composition and operations of venture 
boards are governed by investment agreements (Pollman, 2019). However, 
in the eyes of the law, venture boards are not distinct from any other 
company board and, therefore, they are also subject to a national company 
law (Graebner and Eisenhardt, 2004). In the UK, there is no requirement for 
private companies to form boards, but all company directors are a subject to 
the UK legal framework, as there is also no distinction between Executive 
Directors, i.e. directors that work full time in the business, and Non-Executive 
Directors, i.e. directors that are not employees of the company, and so all 
types of director must comply with legal duties (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999, 
Renneboog and Zhao, 2011).  
The majority of corporate governance research, including research on 
venture boards, has been conducted in the US setting (Guest, 2009). 
However, “the US and the UK governance systems are a common law 
systems and they share many similarities”, such as absence of the distinction 
between executive and non-executive directors mentioned above, and a high 
protection of minority shareholders, among others (Guest, 2009 p.1). 
Therefore, researching early venture boards in the UK context would add to 
the understanding of venture boards also in the US context.  
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2.3   Recent Trends and Issues 
Venture capital has been supporting startups and their growth since the 
middle of the 20th century, however the latest decade has seen some 
significant new trends (Harrison and Mason, 2019, Pollman, 2019). 
On the one hand, there has been a “rapid emergence” and 
professionalisation of startup support across the world (Fehder and 
Hochberg, 2014, p.1). Almost every region in the UK and the US has 
developed accelerators, i.e. training programs for startups. However, 
although their number is increasing, there is an insufficient evidence on the 
success of accelerators and their impact on the entrepreneurial ecosystems 
(Fehder and Hochberg, 2014). This is illustrated by the fact that the failure 
rate of startups is still “famously” high (Pollman, 2019, p. 11). However, such 
programmes and the data they captured, have helped contribute to better 
understanding of the nature of the wider economic challenge. It is evident 
now that the rate of growth, or so-called scale-up effort transforming startups 
into growing companies, is the key challenge in replenishing jobs, as 
opposed to the rate of birth of new companies (Harrison and Mason, 2019). 
In other words, the ‘scale-up problem’, i.e. startups’ difficulty to grow and 
transition from the early stage, is the key challenge world-wide. Therefore, it 
is imperative to better understand how some early boards propel startups to 
growth and others fail (Garg, 2013).  
On the other hand, whilst there has been a discovery of the ‘scale up 
problem’, contrarywise, there has also been a dramatic increase in the 
number of ventures reaching a unicorn status world-wide (Harrison and 
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Mason, 2019, Pollman, 2019). In fact, over the past six years alone, the 
number of unicorns, i.e. private companies valued at $1bn or more, has 
increased ten-fold with many of them reaching “the 10-year mark” (Pollman, 
2019, p.3). Notably, however, unicorns and several large venture-backed 
companies have been delaying their IPOs preferring to remain privately 
owned for longer (Jones, 2017, Pollman, 2019). The significance of this 
recent trend cannot be underestimated especially in the view of new global-
scale scandals about ventures and their conduct, for example Uber, Zenefits 
and Theranos (Pollman, 2019). The main consequence of remaining private 
longer is the so-called ‘governance trap’, i.e. the lack of public accountability 
by companies that have transformed major industries world-wide caused by 
the lack of pressure to professionalise operations and governance (Jones, 
2017). Investors and stakeholders are finding themselves powerless in 
influencing such ventures’ IPOs (Pollman, 2019). More significantly, when it 
comes to venture context, it has also now been suggested that “longstanding 
theories of corporate ownership and governance” are failing in their 
predictive and explanatory power because they do not adequately capture 
theoretically the special features of ventures, such as, for example, the 
imbalance of director attributes, lack of separation between shareholders and 
managers, unique features of board composition, and inherent fiduciary 
conflict among shareholders and directors (Pollman, 2019, p.1).  
Overall, these recent trends and issues indicate an urgent need to better 
understand venture boards at different stages in the lifecycle in general, and 
during the critical early stages, in particular (Garg and Furr, 2017, Pollman, 
2019).   
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2.4   Chapter Summary 
The world-wide increase in Venture Capital funding over the past twenty 
years has resulted in the emergence of highly innovative, technology-driven, 
fast growing global companies which have disrupted many industries. 
Startup ventures have become important drivers of innovation and 
economies. Whilst the knowledge and literature on venture boards is 
increasing, illuminating on the complex board features, distinct context and 
unique governance challenges, the knowledge of early venture boards 
remains scarce. Since the failure rate of startups is still “famously” high 
(Pollman, 2019, p. 11), such knowledge can help better understand the 
relationship between director attributes, board role, value adding activities 
and venture performance. 
This chapter showcased that early venture boards operate in a distinct and 
rather complex context, a necessary backdrop to understand when 
researching early venture boards. The next chapter argues philosophical, 
method and research design choices to study the experiences of directors on 
early venture boards. 
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Chapter 3 Research Methodology 
3.0   Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the methodological approach 
adopted for this research study. The approach is positioned as a classic 
grounded theory investigation, carried out from an interpretivist philosophical 
perspective, and designed with ethical, access and practical considerations 
in mind. 
Thus, the first section discusses the adoption of an interpretivist 
philosophical perspective to carry out this study of director experiences on 
early venture boards. It explains researcher’s relativist ontological and 
subjective epistemological position.  
The second section outlines the rationale for the adoption of the classic 
grounded theory as a method for data collection and analysis. Here, the key 
variations between several emerged schools of grounded theory are critically 
discussed. The case is made for employing the classic, or Glaser, grounded 
theory method and its specific foundational procedures are then outlined. 
Research Question is revisited and formulated according to the guidance 
provided by the method. The section concludes with an overview of the 
grounded theory own evaluative framework. 
The following third and fourth sections discuss the important access and 
ethical issues. Access in board research is notoriously difficult and, having 
reflected on key practical challenges and strategies to overcome them, the 
research was decided to comprise of a pilot and a main study. 
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The next, fifth section offers details of the pilot study and its results. Having 
experienced fewer issues of access than anticipated, it is proposed to 
approach the data collection first from the perspective of VC Investor Director 
and, then, seek additional views from other type of directors, including 
Founders and Non-executive Directors, in line with the procedures of the 
grounded theory. 
Finally, the chapter concludes by summarising the process of collecting data 
as part of the main study, including an approach to selecting participants and 
to interviewing. 
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3.1   Interpretivist Philosophical Underpinning 
This research investigation adopted interpretivist philosophical perspective 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979). This means drawing upon the understanding of 
reality as multiple and “socially constructed” (Leitch, Hill and Harrison, 2010, 
p.68). By recognising multiple social realities and relationship between them, 
the researcher, therefore, is able to reveal the “underlying patterns and order 
of the social world” (Morgan, 1980, p.609). Accordingly, the researcher 
captures a complex and multi-faceted view of the issue under investigation, 
whilst studying a variety of actors in a specific organisational context 
(Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2007). Thus, adopting the interpretivist 
philosophical perspective means the researcher is concerned with 
“uniqueness of a particular situation, contributing to the underlying pursuit of 
contextual depth” and commits to reflecting “on the layered complexity of the 
phenomenon at hand” (Kelliher, 2005, p.123). Consequently, the knowledge 
created from the position of interpretivist philosophical perspective is “relative 
to particular circumstances – historical, temporal, cultural, subjective – and 
existing in multiple forms as representations of reality (interpretations by 
individuals)” (Benoliel, 1996, p.407). 
Adopting interpretivist philosophical position is a product of researcher’s 
reflections on assumptions about nature of reality (ontology), and the nature 
of knowledge about the reality (epistemology) (Lincoln and Denzin, 2000, 
Holton, 2008).  
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3.1.1  Relativist Ontology 
Reflecting on ontological perspective means considering the researcher’s 
view about “the nature of reality and the nature of human being in the world”, 
whether it exists independently from the social actors or indeed in the 
consciousness and “only through experience” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005, 
p.183).  
This study explores the experiences of directors on boards of early stage 
technology-based ventures. Such directors tend to work informally in order to 
help their ventures grow, as opposed to rigidly following rigid board 
procedures existing in other contexts of boards, such as, for example, more 
mature companies or public corporations (Graebner and Eisenhardt, 2004, 
Bingham and Eisenhardt, 2011). The internal processes of early boards are 
also rather informal and very much relative to the context of the reality of 
early ventures and the uncertainty about their future, especially in regard to 
the market adoption of the product (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009, Garg, 
2013). 
In regard to this study, therefore, the researcher views the reality of early 
venture directors as “not distinguishable from the subjective experiences of 
it” within specific context (Guba and Lincoln, 2005, p. 176, Levers, 2013). 
Drawing on such understanding of reality, the ontological perspective of this 
study is, therefore, relativist (Guba and Lincoln, 2005). 
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3.1.2  Subjective Epistemology 
Epistemology considers the nature of knowledge (Lincoln and Denzin, 2000). 
Reflecting on the epistemological perspective means the researcher 
considers “a way of understanding and explaining how I know what I know” 
(Crotty, 1998, p.3). For this study, the choice of the subjective 
epistemological positioning is reflected in claims made about the study’s 
contribution to knowledge (Symon and Cassell, 2012). Subjectivist 
positioning means the new knowledge and understanding comes from an in-
depth exploration, shaped by attributed meanings by the participants and the 
researcher, and that it is situated in a specific context (Saunders, Lewis and 
Thornhill, 2016).  
Overall, adopting the interpretivist philosophical perspective discussed above 
as relativist ontology and subjective epistemology, brings an important 
alignment with the aim of research to understand what happens on early 
venture boards, because it helps the researcher to understand “the meaning 
of human experiences and actions” (Levers, 2013, p.3). 
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3.2   Classic Grounded Theory as Method for Data Collection 
and Analysis 
One of the steps in the inter-connected decision-making process of 
evaluating the rationale for philosophical, method and research design 
options is to choose an appropriate method for data collection and analysis. 
Method for data collection and analysis is regarded to be “the strength of 
qualitative research” and its fit is vital to ensure methodological congruence 
among all fundamental components of a doctoral research study (McNulty, 
Zattoni and Douglas, 2013, p.190). 
This section provides a rationale for adopting the classic grounded theory 
(GT) as a method for data collection and analysis (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, 
Glaser 1978). The rationale is argued by reviewing the three distinct strands 
of GT against the aims of the study. Then foundational procedures of classic 
GT are outlined. The section concludes with restating the research question. 
3.2.1  Rationale for Adopting Grounded Theory Method 
The study has adopted grounded theory (GT) as the method for collecting 
and analysing data. GT is a theory-building method for data collection and 
analysis (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). It allows to systematically derive a 
conceptual view of what is happening in the area of interest, and to shift it 
from a simple description to a more abstract and theoretical explanation 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967, Holton, 2008, Ralph, Birks and Chapman, 2015). 
In particular, GT is quite powerful when an insight or a theoretical 
explanation is sought about human experiences, interactions and behaviour 
(Benoliel, 1996). 
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In this research, GT has been used because it is compatible with the 
interpretivist philosophical standpoint adopted for this study, allows an in-
depth exploration of previously little-known processes on early venture 
boards, supports theory-building through collecting data by speaking with 
participants about their experiences, enables a flexible research design, and 
it is proven to provide practitioner-oriented insights (Jones and Noble, 2007). 
To consider each point of the rationale in more detail: 
• Firstly, GT is compatible with a wide range of philosophical standpoints, 
it, in fact, is well known for its “methodological dynamism” (Ralph, Birks 
and Chapman, 2015, p.1). This means that as long as the researchers 
examine, reflect and develop their own “strong ontological and 
epistemological self-awareness”, they can use GT method to support 
the interpretation and conceptualisation of what is happening in the 
substantive area of interest (Charmaz, 2000, Ralph, Birks and 
Chapman, 2015, p.2, Holton, 2008).  
As discussed earlier in the chapter, this study was carried out from 
interpretivist philosophical perspective. Such positioning considers the 
knowledge about the phenomenon inseparable from people’s 
experiences and therefore advocates for a naturalistic data gathering 
method, such as interviews, a way to enable the researcher to elicit 
participants’ accounts of their experiences (Bryman and Bell, 2012). 
Accordingly, GT is also an appropriate method for data analysis within 
this research philosophy as it can show how analytical concepts are 
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developed and expressed using participants’ own words, meanings and 
perspectives (Suddaby, 2006, Bryman and Bell, 2012). 
• Secondly, GT allows for in-depth exploration of the substantive area of 
interest, in this case, the area of early venture boards. Surprisingly, 
very little is known about director behaviour and inter-relationships – 
boards are often referred to as a ‘black box’ by corporate governance 
researchers (Huse, 2005, Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 2005, Pye and 
Pettigrew, 2005, Zona and Zattoni, 2007). Most of the theoretical 
knowledge and policy recommendations that have been built up in this 
space, seems to be constructed with very few empirical studies into 
what actually happens on boards, i.e. relationships, actions and 
interactions, as well as behaviours of directors in and around 
boardrooms (Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 2005, Pettigrew, 2008). 
Recent global board-level scandals of Oxfam, Carillion, Theranos and 
Uber have strengthened the case for explorative studies of inner-
workings of the boards (Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 2005, Garg and 
Eisenhardt, 2017, Garg and Furr, 2017). Using GT would allow for this. 
• Thirdly, GT supports a way to collect data by speaking with participants 
about their experiences. This study is exploratory and there are several 
possible methods that could be used for gathering a variety of data, for 
example, interviews, or observations, or a mix of those. However, it is 
important to consider that most of the corporate governance research 
has been carried out without “talking to a single director, or anyone else 
in the corporate governance” (Tricker,1994, p.2, quoted in Stiles, 2001, 
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p.631). This remains as an “obvious problem” (Stiles, 2001, p.631, 
Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 2005, Eisenhardt, Graebner and 
Sonenshein, 2016) and several seminal papers called for researchers 
to “engage directly with actors and settings of governance, as 
qualitative inquiry can help to open up the black box of boards in order 
to shed light on director behaviour, relationships and effects” 
(Pettigrew, 1992, p.191), and use “inductive methods such as theory 
building from cases, interpretivist studies, and ethnography” in order to 
“powerfully address grand challenges while also developing strong and 
insightful theory” (Eisenhardt, Graebner and Sonenshein, 2016, 
p.1113). 
The field of corporate governance research is at “a crossroads” (Daily, 
Dalton, and Cannella, 2003, p.371) and “multiple perspectives are 
required to fully understand the nature of board activity” and most 
importantly, in order to gain a better understanding of the nature of 
boards, researchers “must have reports from directors themselves” 
(Stiles, 2001, p.631). One of the strengths of choosing GT as a method 
in this study is because it allows speaking with participants about their 
experience as part of the in-depth exploration of the phenomenon 
(Glaser, 1998). This provides rich descriptions and context-specific 
insights, and such ‘board stories’ help with building much-needed 
critical mass of all types of qualitative knowledge in the field of 
corporate governance dominated by quantitative knowledge (Stiles, 
2001). However, several prominent academics in this field note that 
what the field of corporate governance would most benefit from is in 
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fact qualitative research which extends the existing theories or develop 
alternative theories and models in order to “effectively uncover the 
promise and potential of corporate governance” (Daily, Dalton, and 
Cannella, 2003, p. 375, Eisenhardt, Graebner and Sonenshein, 2016). 
This study’s ambition is to make such contribution and, therefore, GT 
as the selected method for analysis and collection of data would 
empower theory building. 
• Fourthly, GT supports a flexible research design. Difficulty of accessing 
board directors for interviews is often cited as one of the key reasons 
for the lack of qualitative corporate governance studies (Leblanc and 
Schwartz, 2007, McNulty, Zattoni and Douglas, 2013). Access has 
been a major unknown and a cause for concern at the beginning of this 
study. In the UK, high quality research in the field of corporate 
governance using interviews with directors involved either a major 
government initiative, for example, the Higgs review of corporate 
governance (Higgs, 2003) carried out by Roberts, McNulty, and Stiles 
(2003) or has been carried out by experienced academics through a 
long-standing relationship with the industry. This is not just an issue of 
gaining access. Even if access is granted either through introductions 
or persistence, it is still also unknown whether the interview answers 
would in fact be in-depth, as there are issues of confidentiality which 
can preclude directors from sharing their experiences, going in depth 
and providing specific examples of behaviours and inter-relations. 
Navigating these potentially significant barriers means the selected 
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method for data gathering and analysis should support a flexible 
research design. 
• Fifthly and finally, GT enables the researcher to inform practice (Glaser, 
1978). The aim of this research is to inform practice – the conduct of 
boards in early stage, investor-backed and tech-based companies, by 
developing practical recommendations and helping directors with their 
efforts to get the best out of their early boards. The selected method is 
known for helping the researcher to develop actionable practical 
recommendations (Jones and Noble, 2007, Urquhart, 2013). 
These above points, when combined, innately lead to considering grounded 
theory as the most appropriate method for collecting and analysing data for 
this study. 
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3.2.2  Considering Distinct Strands of Grounded Theory Method 
GT method originated by the seminal work of Glaser and Strauss (1967) 
researching awareness of dying in hospitals (Levers, 2013). Since the 
introduction of the method nearly 50 years ago, it has been through several 
transformations (Jones and Noble, 2007). Most notably, one of the authors, 
Strauss, has developed his own distinct strand, which he then also 
subsequently updated (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
Although Strauss’ intention was to provide more detailed guidance on 
procedures of GT, so the method could be used more easily and widely, it 
resulted in a decades-long a dispute between him and his co-founder, Glaser. 
In essence, Glaser criticised Strauss’ approach as producing a conceptual 
description, as opposed to a grounded theory (Glaser, 1992). To date, these 
two distinct strands are referred to as the Straussian and Glaserian (or classic) 
schools of grounded theory method (Urquhart, 2013). More recently, a third 
strand has emerged, developed by Charmaz (2008). This strand is 
underpinned by a philosophically distinct position as constructivist, suggesting 
that GT meaning is co-constructed by the interaction between the researcher 
and the participants. Since the philosophical position of this third school is 
incompatible with the philosophical positioning of this study, it has not been 
included into a consideration as a suitable method for this study. 
The Straussian and Glaserian strands diverge across four issues: the role of 
the literature, formulation of the research question, analysis procedures and 
approach to theory development. These are summarised in Table 1 and then 
discussed in more detail. Such discussion is important to include because 
understanding the variations between these schools not only helps to grasp 
50 
 
the value of the key principles of the method but also navigate the researcher 
to make an informed decision about which school to employ in their study 
(Urquhart, 2013). 
Table 1. Key Variations between GT Strands 
 Glaserian GT  Straussian GT  
The Role of 
Literature 
Reading of the literature is either 
absent or very broad during the 
early stages of the research 
process (Glaser 1978) 
Focused reading of the literature 
takes place at a later stage, the 
field of literature is guided by the 
emerged theory rather than the 
researcher’s prior knowledge and 
assumptions (Glaser, 1992) 
Specific understanding and the 
literature reviews are permitted 
in order to stimulate the 
research question and 
theoretical sensitivity (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1990) 
 
Research 
Question 
Formulation  
Initial research question is broad, it 
must identify the substantive area 
but must not identify and specify 
the phenomenon (Urquhart, 2013) 
Research question is, therefore, 
emergent throughout the study 
(Glaser, 1992) 
Research Question is 
influenced by prior knowledge 
and literature, it specifies the 
phenomenon to be studied 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990) 
Analysis 
Procedures  
Constant comparison (Heath and 
Cowley, 2004). Open, selective 
and theoretical coding, theoretical 
sampling (Glaser, 1978) 
Refitting and integrating theory 
around emerging core category 
Theoretical codes emerge, multiple 
paradigms suggested as 
illustration (Glaser 1978, 2005) 
Open, axial and selective 
coding (Strauss and Corbin, 
1990). Category development 
and integration around the 
chosen phenomenon 
A single axial paradigm is used, 
however modified method later 
dropped this (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998) 
Analysis is dominated by logical 
deduction and verification 
(Heath and Cowley, 2004) 
Theory 
Development 
(Emergence) 
vs Theory 
Construction 
(Forcing) 
The resulting emerged substantive 
theory is “A set of integrated 
conceptual hypotheses organised 
around a core category” (Glaser, 
1998, p.2) 
Evident theory parsimony, scope 
and modifiability (Heath and 
Cowley, 2004) 
The result is a theoretical 
formulation, elaborate 
description or conceptual 
ordering (Strauss and Corbin, 
1990, 1998) 
Source: Table developed by the Author, 2020 
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Thus, as Table 1 illustrates, GT method can be used to investigate an 
unknown phenomenon, or a phenomenon formulated by previous 
understanding or the literature (Glaser, 1992, Strauss and Corbin, 1990). 
When following data collection and analysis procedures, the researcher 
could either systematically develop the theory through emergence or select a 
flexible mix of applicable coding and analysis methods to suit their aims 
(Glaser, 1992, Strauss and Corbin, 1998, Heath and Cowley, 2004). The 
outcome of GT research method could range from an inductively developed 
theory about a core category, or a constructed causes-consequences 
framework, or a model with illustrative dense description but without a theory 
(Glaser, 1992, Strauss and Corbin, 1990, 1998, Heath and Cowley, 2004). 
Altogether, the choice of any particular strand of GT to carry out the research 
depends on the consideration of the study’s aims against these key 
variations, which are considered in detail in the following sections. 
3.2.2.1  The Role of Literature in GT Strands 
The two GT strands differ in the role they assign to the literature, even 
though both Glaser and Strauss accept that no researcher is a blank slate, 
but is a someone with some prior understanding of the issue under 
investigation and some perspective to be able to see relevant data (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967).  
Glaser instructs for the reading to be wide in the beginning of the research 
process in order to get sensitised to a broad range of possibilities (Glaser, 
1978), while at the same time warning that literature “might contaminate, 
stifle or otherwise impede” the generation of categories (Glaser, 1992, p.78). 
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When following the Glaserian GT, focused reading of literature takes place 
only when theory has been sufficiently developed (Hickey, 1997). Thus, the 
emerged theory determines the relevance of the literature (Heath and 
Cowley, 2004). 
In contrast, the Straussian GT encourages the research to use the literature, 
as well as past experiences, to influence the shaping of the research in the 
early stages, and then again in the later stages, in order to stimulate 
theoretical sensitivity (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). 
3.2.2.2  Formation of the Research Question in GT Strands 
GT method was created to help uncover the unknown and new (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967). Glaser maintains that researchers should enter the field with 
only a general idea of the substantive area because “when we do not know 
what we are looking for when we start, we simply cannot say prior to the 
collection and analysis of data what our study will look like” (Glaser 2001, p. 
176). Therefore, if little is known about the substantive area or the 
phenomenon within it, the research question simply cannot be structured in a 
way that would define the phenomenon. Thus, the Glaserian school 
advocates for using an initially broad research question: What are the issues 
experienced by participants and how are they being resolved? (Glaser, 
1992). The nature of the research question is therefore also being 
discovered as it emerges through the process (Jones and Noble, 2007).  
The Straussian school argues GT method could also be used to investigate a 
pre-determined research topic (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Researchers are 
encouraged to define and identify the problem, issue or the phenomenon to 
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be studied either by using prior personal experience or indeed, the literature, 
thus adopting a more “interventionist” influence of the data (Jones and 
Noble, 2007, p.24). 
3.2.2.3  Data Analysis Procedures and Techniques in GT Strands 
Both Glaser and Strauss agree that GT involves several non-optional data 
analysis procedures (Jones and Noble, 2007). For Glaser, they include open 
coding, selective coding, theoretical coding and theoretical sampling (Glaser, 
1992). Throughout the analysis, constant comparison technique is employed 
to compare data incidents to data incidents, thus grounding the emergent 
concepts in the original data.  
For Strauss, the procedures include open coding, axial coding and selective 
coding, which reduce and cluster codes and categories into provided axial 
paradigm model (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). In addition to constant 
comparison, Strauss suggests using a supplementary analytical technique to 
“open up the data: think of potential categories, their properties and 
dimensions” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p.77). For example, Strauss 
encourages researchers to ask basic questions such as “Who? When? 
Where? What? How? How Much? And Why?” in order to generate logically 
elaborated dimensions and sub-dimensions of categories and their 
properties (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p.77). He argues such techniques 
increase the density of concepts and the resulting theory (Jones and Noble, 
2007).  
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However, it can also be argued that generating ideas from the data and 
logical elaboration on them results in deductive reasoning (Heath and 
Cowley, 2004). Therefore, instead of developing theory from concepts and 
from data, the researcher effectively uses prior knowledge and looks for 
verification of it rather than creating theoretical sensitivity.  Thus, Glaser 
argues that using such additional analytical techniques lead to forcing as 
opposed to emerging of theory since verification means “looking for data 
rather than at it” (Heath and Cowley, 2004 quoting Robrecht, 1995).  
The argument about forcing vs emerging of the theory approach has become 
one of the key points of contention between the two schools, which is 
discussed separately in the next section. 
It must be noted, however, that the Straussian school has later modified its 
position on the use of those analytical techniques. In later guidance, it 
recommends the researcher is “allowed to pick and choose between various 
procedures, choosing some, rejecting others and blending of own” (Jones 
and Noble, 2007). Therefore, since the researchers are encouraged to treat 
the guidance on procedures “as items on a smorgasbord table from which 
they can choose, reject, and ignore according to their own tastes – and 
rightly so… some will blend our techniques with their own”, the techniques 
have become somewhat optional (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, pp.8-9).  
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3.2.2.4  Theory Development (Emergence) vs Theory Construction 
(Forcing) in GT Strands 
Emerging, i.e. constructing theory from concepts firmly grounded in gathered 
data, is a central tenet of the Glaserian GT school (Jones and Noble, 2007). 
Glaser advocates for organic emerging of every component of the research, 
including the research question, the issue of concern for participants, 
concepts, categories and the relationships between them and thus the 
resulting theory (Glaser, 1992). Glaser GT is particularly uncompromising on 
the emergent nature of development of the theory. For Glaser, the theory 
must be emergent, it should never be put together, it should be generated 
systematically and thus can only shaped by the substantive area under study 
(Jones and Noble, 2007). Nevertheless, the early the Straussian GT school 
stipulates a specific framework, called paradigm model, on how to fit 
concepts and categories together and, as such, the resulting “theory is 
constructed under the control of a specified framework that now dictates 
coding to produce a linear model of causes, intervening conditions and 
consequences that explain the phenomenon, context, actions and 
interactions” (Corbin and Strauss 1990, Heath and Cowley, 2004, p.146). On 
the one hand, the use of paradigm model could fit well with the nature of 
phenomenon where it was pre-determined that the relationship between 
concepts is somewhat causal. On the other hand, it is not unusual for 
researchers using this approach, to realise that causes-consequences 
framework to organise codes does not always work as resulting model fails 
to reflect some key insights into relationships that emerged from the data 
(Urquhart, 2013). Here, it can be argued that the theory becomes “created 
56 
 
rather than creative” (Heath and Cowley, 2004, p. 146). It is therefore not 
surprising that the Straussian school has later moved away from imposing 
the single axial paradigm, to a more flexible approach of constructing the 
relationships as they are indicated by the data (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
The different use of coding and analysis procedures by the two GT schools 
suggests since these methods are used differently, they generate different 
types of theory (Kendall, 1999). For Glaser, the grounded theory’s resulting 
product is “a set of integrated conceptual hypotheses organised around a 
core category” (Glaser, 2001, p.2). Glaser suggests several coding 
paradigms indicating how coded data might get organised around the core, 
including the causes-consequences framework favoured by the Straussian 
GT school, however these coding families come with a caveat that they are 
flexible and the researcher should be able to generate their own (Glaser, 
1978, 2005, Urquhart, 2013). The theory in the Glaserian school claims to 
have parsimony, i.e. ability to explain complex issues with simple concepts, 
scope and modifiability, demonstrating that theoretical sensitivity can be 
achieved without thick details (Heath and Cowley, 2004). 
For Strauss, the grounded theory is a theoretical formulation conceptually 
ordered around a phenomenon of interest emphasizing density of categories 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990). The Straussian school also advocates that GT 
method should be used for generating and analysing themes and developing 
grounded concepts, not just for theory development, i.e. discovering the 
relationships between concepts (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, Jones and 
Noble, 2007).  
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This distinction is one of the main points of contention between the two 
schools since Glaser does not accept constructing and forcing of the theory 
development in any way (Glaser, 1978). Thus, it appears Glaser rejects the 
Straussian school’s claim to be able to produce inductive grounded theory 
instead labelling it a conceptual description (Glaser 1998). 
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3.2.3  Rationale and Consequences of Adopting Classic GT 
The choice of GT strand depends on its alignment with the aims of the study 
(Urquhart, 2013). This study is investigating what is happening on venture 
boards, a relatively unknown phenomenon which has not yet been fully 
conceptualised by extant literature. It does so by examining the experiences 
of directors on venture boards, specifically issues and concerns they are 
dealing with in order to uncover and conceptualise patterns of actions, 
processes and behaviour used to alleviate and resolve those concerns. The 
aims are to understand what happens on early venture boards, and to 
develop a theoretical framework of the relationship between directors’ 
attributes and behaviours, board’s role and processes, and venture 
performance during the critical early stages of development. Since the aims 
include developing a theory about a little understood phenomenon, the 
Glaserian (classic) GT school is the most aligned method for this study.  
Adopting the classic GT method has had the following implications on the 
study, its design and presentation: 
• The literature review was delayed until the theory was developed; 
• The research question was emergent in nature, starting out broadly 
and developed through analysis; 
• Open, selective and theoretical coding were employed to analyse the 
date, aided by constant comparison, memo taking and theoretical 
sampling; 
• The developed theory was a substantive theory about the area, 
developed systematically through emergence. 
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3.2.4  Outline of Classic GT Procedures 
Glaser strand is notable for its “rigorous procedures”, which “are followed in 
order to generate theory that fits, works, is relevant and readily modifiable” 
(Glaser, 2005, p.14). The defining procedures of the classic GT that were 
followed by this study, can be summarised as follows: 
• Simultaneous collection and analysis of data, meaning that as soon as 
data is collected or interview is finished, it gets analysed (Glaser, 
1978); 
• Coding uses constant comparison, i.e. occurrences of data incidents 
are constantly compared to each other to form codes and then 
emerge into concepts and categories (Glaser, 1978). Thus, categories 
and relationships between them as well as resulting propositions are 
constructed from their occurrence in the collected data as opposed to 
being influenced by literature or logically formulated by deduction; 
• Capturing details of interpretations, questions, ideas and the evolution 
of codes and categories through regular memo-writing. This enhances 
knowledge and understanding of concepts and relationships between 
them. Captured ideas must be verified by data. Categories and 
relationships are constantly refitted via ongoing comparison. Memoing 
helps to keep auditable track of the complex evolutionary process of 
the theoretical codes (Glaser, 1998); 
• Sampling theoretically to progress with the theory construction 
through each cycle of data collection and analysis. Selective coding 
60 
 
and sampling means coding only for core category and categories 
related to it, abandoning irrelevant categories (Glaser, 1978); 
• Saturation is attained by inter-changeability of indices, i.e new data 
incidents no longer add new meanings or properties (Glaser, 1992); 
• Further data collection is sampled theoretically. Researcher collects 
data relevant to core and related categories from the best source of 
such data, which rise from analysing in memos (Glaser, 1998). 
Theoretical sampling is also based on saturating categories and 
relationships between them.  
• Once categories are saturated, memos approach their theoretical 
completeness and can be sorted. Theoretical sorting of memos 
involves arranging the memos in theoretical outline or code. This is an 
essential preparation step for the write up (Glaser, 1998).  
• Engaging with the literature begins once theory is formulated. The 
relevance of the literature to engage with is determined by the 
emerged theoretical formulation. Literature is effectively ‘folded in’ 
using the already familiar method of constant comparison, in this case 
of literature to the data, leading to identifying point of convergence 
and divergence (Glaser, 1998). 
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3.2.5  Restatement of the Research Question 
Classic GT advocates for approaching the study with a broad and open 
research question (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, Bryant, 2002, Urquhart, 2013). 
This creates flexibility and freedom when investigating a phenomenon which 
has been relatively unexplored. Given limited number of empirical studies on 
director behaviours, this feature of the classic GT is particularly enabling for 
the researcher to be open to discovery when investigating early venture 
boards. Though the method advocates for the research question to be rather 
broad, it specifies that the question should identify the substantive area and 
population but not make any assumptions about the phenomenon of interest 
(Urquhart, 2013). The initial research question for this study can therefore be 
simply crafted consisting of two parts as follows: 
• What are the issues that directors face on early venture boards?  
• How are these issues being resolved? 
The substantive area of interest of this research study has been identified as 
boards of early stage investor-backed technology-based ventures within the 
UK. Technology-based ventures develop and bring innovative technological 
products to market across multiple industries (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009). 
Typically, they are characterised by rapid product development cycles, 
scalable business models and the need for substantial Venture Capital 
investment to fund its high growth ambitions (Garg, 2013). Such ventures are 
usually founded by first-time entrepreneurs and their boards are normally 
formed as a condition of investment from the fist VC investor. 
The substantive population of this study has been identified as venture board 
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directors. Chapter 2 highlighted that there are three types of directors on 
early boards – Founders, independent Non-Executive Directors and VC 
Investor Directors, representatives of the investor firms (Garg and Furr, 
2017). Sometimes an early board also includes a Business Angel, a private 
investor, they would take on a Non-Executive Director role or even become a 
board Chair. It is not unusual though for early boards to consist of only 
founders and VC directors (Garg, 2013). VC directors are therefore deemed 
to play the most crucial role in adding value to startup company (Aksu and 
Wadhwa, 2010).  
In situations where multiple types of participants are present, GT 
recommends collecting from the perspective of a single type of participant to 
identify their main issue of concern, since it is unknown whether the different 
types of participants would share the same concern (Glaser, 1992). The 
issue of concern is typically resolved via an interaction with other types of 
participants and other parties and so viewpoints of others are also collected 
and analysed as part of the study, however this typically occurs during the 
process of theoretical sampling (Glaser, 1978). 
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3.2.6  Evaluative Framework  
As with any type of research, it is necessary to discuss an evaluative 
framework from the outset. Research evaluative frameworks “depend on who 
forms them and what purposes he or she invokes”, as suggested by 
Charmaz (2008, p.182). This study takes, as evaluative framework, the 
criteria for assessing a grounded theory first proposed by Glaser and Strauss 
(1967) and then further detailed by Glaser (1978, 1998). As such, the 
purpose of Glaser’s criteria is to consider how the developed substantive 
theory depicts and reflects the data collected (Charmaz, 2008). Since the 
study adopted Glaser grounded theory approach to data collection and 
analysis research, Glaser’s framework is, therefore, appropriate to commit 
and adhere to throughout the research duration.  
Glaser’s evaluative framework consists of four criteria: fit, relevance, 
workability and modifiability (Glaser, 1978, 1998). Thus, to achieve fit, the 
research must demonstrate how codes and categories have emerged from 
the collected data incidents. Since codes and categories are developed by 
constant comparison and using three coding techniques of open coding, 
selective coding theoretical coding, the fit is achieved gradually. Glaser 
argues that “fit is another word for validity” (Glaser, 1998, p.18) as fit proves 
a close connection between the raw data incidents, the pattern they form and 
appropriateness of conceptual naming of patterns. Codes and categories 
“must be readily (not forcibly) applicable to and indicated by the data under 
study” as well as they “must be clear enough to be readily operationalized in 
quantitative studies when these are appropriate” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, 
p.3). The lack of fit is obvious, as it arises when codes and categories are 
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borrowed from literature or are forced from pre-conceived knowledge rather 
than adequately reflecting what is actually going on in the data. 
A relevant study “deals with the main concerns of the participants involved” 
(Glaser, 1998, p.18). Therefore, relevance, as a criterion, is demonstrated by 
the process the researcher goes through to determine the main concern of 
participants and provides details of its emergence. Achieving relevance 
means the study is valuable to the substantive population. Therefore, it has 
practical value, a necessary ingredient for a DBA to demonstrate a 
contribution to practice (Holton and Walsh, 2016). To demonstrate relevance, 
Glaser (1978, p.100) speaks about the theory evoking instant conceptual 
“grab”, meaning it has “significant explanatory power” of what is happening in 
the substantive area of investigation and it is useful and resonant to the 
participants (Schreiber, 2001, p.74). 
To demonstrate grounded theory’s level of abstraction, the framework uses a 
criterion of workability. Workable grounded theory explains how participants 
resolve their main concern with as fewer categories as possible. To meet this 
criterion, the development of core category, a category by which participants 
resolve their main concern, should be carefully documented. This process 
must demonstrate how core category accounts for much of the variations in 
patterns of data and how its sub-categories and the relationships between 
them have been abstracted. An unworkable grounded theory would consist 
of an excessive number of top-level categories. 
Modifiability refers to the capacity of the grounded theory to reflect the 
dynamic nature of social reality (Lomborg and Kirkevold, 2003). A modifiable 
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grounded theory has a capacity for being altered if and when new relevant 
data is sought. According to Glaser (1998, p.18) “Modifiability is very 
significant. The theory is not being verified as in verification studies, and thus 
never right or wrong. …it just gets modified by new data to compare it to.” 
Modifiability demonstrates how study can be extended into other contexts or, 
if necessary, used to move from a substantive theory to a more formal 
theory. 
The four criteria for evaluating a grounded theory “are based on achieving 
skill at each stage of the grounded theory package” (Glaser, 1998, p.17). 
Table 2 summarises the criteria and links it with stages in the research 
process. 
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Table 2. Linking Evaluative Criteria and Research Stages 
Criteria Demonstration as part of 
Research Process 
Link to Data Analysis 
and Coding Stages 
Fit 
“Does the theory fit 
the substantive 
area?” (Glaser, 
1998, p.17) 
 
Demonstrate how codes 
emerge from collected data, 
not literature, using constant 
comparison and memoing 
Fit is achieved gradually - 
use of three coding 
techniques of open, 
selective and theoretical 
coding 
Open coding stage 
(chapter 4, section 4.2) 
Selective coding stage 
(chapter 4, section 4.3) 
Theoretical coding stage 
(chapter 4, section 4.4) 
Relevance 
“Does it have 
relevance to the 
people in the 
substantive field?” 
(Glaser, 1998, p.17) 
Demonstrate the process of 
determining the main 
concern of participants, 
detail its emergence 
Demonstrate how the theory 
explains what is happening 
in the substantive area  
Open coding stage 
(chapter 4, section 4.2) 
demonstrates the 
emergence of main 
concern  
Theoretical coding 
(chapter 4, section 4.4) 
shows how the theory of 
Optimising for Growth 
explains what is happening 
in the substantive area. 
Chapter 5 adds to the 
explanation  
Workability 
“Does the theory 
work to explain 
relevant behaviour 
in the substantive 
are of research?” 
(Glaser, 1998, p.17) 
Demonstrate the resolution 
of the main concern with as 
fewer categories as possible 
Demonstrate how core 
category accounts for much 
of the variations in patterns 
of data  
Demonstration the 
abstraction of categories 
Selective coding (chapter 
4, section 4.3) shows the 
resolution of the main 
concern using 6 categories 
Appendix 5 From Data to 
Concepts illustrates 
variation captured within 
categories 
Chapter 5 section 5.4 
further abstracts the theory 
in light of the integration 
with the extant literature  
Modifiability 
“Is it readily 
modifiable as new 
data emerge?” 
(Glaser, 1998, p.17) 
Demonstrate capacity for 
being altered if and when 
new relevant data is sought 
Demonstrate how study can 
be extended into other 
contexts or, if necessary, 
used to move from a 
substantive theory to a more 
formal theory 
Codes and categories are 
modifiable throughout all 
three coding stages, open, 
selective and theoretical, 
as the new data emerged 
(chapter 4)  
Chapter 6, section 6.7   
Opportunities for Future 
Research discusses how 
the theory is likely to apply 
to board contexts other 
than ventures 
Source: Table Developed by the Author based on Glaser (1998) 
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In summary, the researcher has committed to comply with Glaser’s 
evaluative framework throughout the research process, as discussed above. 
This entails following the tenets of the grounded theory procedures, and 
transparently presenting the results of the analysis and coding procedures, 
which is done in chapters 4 and 5. The evaluation of the study’s grounded 
theory against the criteria of fit, relevance, workability and modifiability, is 
included in chapter 6. 
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3.3   Gaining Access 
To design the research it is necessary not only to consider the philosophical 
foundation and method, but also to weigh up practical aspects of the field 
work. These aspects include time available to carry out the study, availability 
of different types of data and the degree of difficulty of gaining access to 
research participants.  
Since much of theorising in corporate governance derived quantitatively from 
published corporate information about companies and directors of large 
public firms, it is well established that the field would benefit significantly from 
qualitative research that engages directly with boards and the individuals 
sitting on boards (Stiles, 2001). As discussed above, such benefits would 
include, for example, a better understanding of the nature of boards, provide 
context-specific rich insights into board activity and expand the field with 
knowledge of much sought after behavioural perspective (Pettigrew, 1992, 
Huse, 2005, Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 2005, Pye and Pettigrew, 2005, 
Zona and Zattoni, 2007). Ultimately this would help to effectively extend 
existing board theories and models and thus revealing the full potential of 
corporate governance (Daily, Dalton, and Cannella, 2003). 
However, it has also been widely acknowledged that direct access to boards 
and specifically those sitting on boards is very difficult, if not “virtually 
impossible” to achieve (Leblanc and Schwartz, 2007, p. 843). Boards by 
nature are elite and closed work groups that come together intermittently, 
typically once a month, to face complex strategic tasks and decisions 
(Forbes and Milliken, 1999). There are two access points that are typically 
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used by qualitative researchers to ascertain what happens on boards. One 
way involves directly attending board meetings and/or obtaining board 
meeting proceedings. Observation and longitudinal studies can provide a 
very rich source of data (Starks and Brown Trinidad, 2007). There are 
already longitudinal studies of US-based venture boards, such as Garg 
(2013). Practically however, the researcher would need to attend at least one 
year’s worth of board meetings (10-12 meetings) to gain enough data, get 
understanding of actions on boards and observe a change in the venture 
performance. This is because investment is typically sought to last 12-18 
months, so the company has time to experiment with getting to market or 
building its technology. At the end of the period the company would either 
need for a follow-on investment to keep growing or if it fails to gain traction, it 
needs to consider closing down. Accessing board data via observation at 
board meetings would have an impact on the choice of method and 
objectives of the study. Such a study would typically be a longitudinal study 
of most likely just one company. For the purposes of completing this study, 
attending regular board meetings has been considered impractical as it 
would present a logistical difficulty for the part-time researcher. Additionally, 
given the high risk of failure not only of delivery of the strategy and the 
business plan, but also of the entire business, it will simply be not possible to 
select a startup company where it could be predicted with certainty that the 
company survives over the period of the research. Therefore, committing to a 
longitudinal observation of a venture board is extremely risky. Time 
constraints and uncertainty about the survival of startups meant that 
ethnography and longitudinal approaches were not feasible.  
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Boardrooms, of course, are not the only place to study boards (Roberts, 
McNulty and Stiles, 2005). Most importantly, when researching patterns of 
behaviours and processes, the selection of participant directors does not 
need to be linked to the data of a specific company they are on a board of. 
Therefore, the second way to access this data is by speaking with individual 
board members, using interviews. This is a well-tested type of access utilised 
by qualitative researchers in corporate governance (Stiles, 2001, McNulty, 
Zattoni and Douglas, 2013).  Although interviewing directors might present 
other types of challenges to consider. For example, directors are bound by 
confidentiality, fiduciary duty and legal responsibility to act in the interest of 
company shareholders (Leblanc and Schwartz, 1997, Forbes and Milliken, 
1999). Therefore, there is a risk the quality of information might not be 
sufficiently in-depth as directors might protect against increased scrutiny 
(Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003). Another example of a challenge is 
director consideration of liability from exposure for director mis-behaviour. 
This challenge has been reflected upon in parallel with the ethical 
consideration of bringing no harm to participants. 
Directors are also corporate elites characterised by high power and lack of 
time (Mikecz, 2012). The high-power position is not only relative to their 
expert status but also vis a vis a novice researcher. Elites are well-
recognised in research as a type of a participant and interviews with them 
have to be aligned with their diary availability and location (Conti and O’Neil, 
2007, Stephens, 2007). Preparation ahead of the elite interviews is also vital 
(Berry, 2002, Harvey, 2011, Thuesen, 2011). This in turn has an impact on 
the research design strategy and how interviews will be conducted, face-to-
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face or via telephone. Since access to directors is so rare, and the costs of 
travelling for interviews are so high, research design must be flexible to 
accommodate this. However, on a positive note, venture directors, especially 
investor directors, would typically have a disproportionally large number of 
board appointments, and therefore a very well placed to speak about 
patterns of processes and behaviours across many experiences they have. 
Moreover, founder directors are typically quite open to share their 
experiences with others. Speaking with directors about their experiences is 
well aligned with the purpose of this research. 
In summary, although the problem of access to boards is well recognised, it 
is not completely impossible and interviews with individual directors as a 
method of accessing boards and an approach to primary data collection is a 
credible method among qualitative corporate governance research and it 
also fits with the practical constraints and timescales of this study. Access to 
directors on boards of early ventures, will, however, remain a significant 
concern until the field work starts. The research design of the study will, 
therefore, include a pilot study to test access to early venture directors. The 
outcome and learning points from the pilot will determine the feasibility of the 
study.  
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3.4   Ethical Considerations 
This study has complied with Northumbria University’s Research Ethics and 
Governance Policy. The Faculty’s Ethics Committee has granted its approval 
for research on the 30 January 2017 (as shown in Appendices). However, 
upholding the integrity of the research stems not only from complying with 
policies but also from careful considerations of ethical issues throughout the 
research process (Silverman 2006, Symon and Cassell, 2012). These issues 
converge around four themes: a careful consideration of causing no harm to 
participants, gaining informed consent, analysing and reporting the data 
honestly and taking responsibility for the findings (Bryman and Bell, 2012, 
Urquhart, 2013).  
Firstly, considering the issue of causing no emotional, physical or 
commercial harm to participants is addressed by taking care to protect the 
identities of individuals and organisations as well as any personally or 
commercially sensitive data at every stage, including findings and publication 
of the research (Bryman and Bell, 2012). In this study, directors have been 
interviewed about their experiences on venture boards. In the UK, a free 
national database owned by the Companies House, a government 
organisation responsible for the registration of all companies and their 
directors among other things, allows to easily identify all directors in any 
company or all directorships an individual might have. Furthermore, since the 
Venture capital industry is quite small, individuals and companies might be 
easily identifiable by knowing just the location, director gender, or details 
technology or a market sector. Therefore, extra steps have been taken to 
73 
 
protect the identities of participants, their companies as well as their 
interview accounts. This means only a general profile of participants is 
provided. The names of participants were kept separately from the interview 
audio and transcript files in a password protected database. No third parties 
were used to transcribe the interviews, the researcher personally transcribed 
the audio files. Any reference to the names, locations, companies, pertinent 
technology or market sector information and any other detail that might lead 
to identification of the participants, have been removed from transcripts prior 
to analysis. Transcripts were given a number as identifier; this identifier was 
used to keep a record of data incidents when they have been used to build 
concepts. Furthermore, this research only uses selected and limited 
quotations in text to show the grounding of findings in the primary data and 
no extended quotations or transcripts sections are included in the thesis.  
Secondly, the ethical issue of gaining informed consent from participants is 
addressed by letting the participants know about the purpose of the 
research, what kind of data is being collected, how it is stored, used and 
published (Bryman and Bell, 2012). Providing this range of information allows 
participants to make an informed decision about taking part in the study. As 
part of this research, when approached, participants were emailed a brief 
about the purpose of the research, the interview themes asking for 
permission to audio record the data and to use it in the publications. It was 
specifically emphasized that this research is not about writing up vignettes or 
case studies of any individuals, boards, VC firms or startups but to identify 
patterns of processes and director behaviours that are common across early 
venture boards. The University’s Informed Consent Form was used to gain 
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the agreement in writing. Participants were also advised they could have a 
copy of the transcript and could amend or change their account or indeed 
pull out at any time during the research process. Brief details of the research 
process, including how the data will be published, have also been outlined 
since most participants were quite interested in being informed about the 
results. 
Thirdly, the issue of representing the data honestly is approached by a 
personal value commitment to complying with the techniques for gathering 
and analysing the primary data (Symon and Cassell, 2012). This study 
follows the canons of the classic grounded theory and this involves a high 
level of transparency in reporting how concepts and findings have been 
developed from directly from the primary data. 
Finally, research findings have potential to instigate a wide variety of change 
ranging from practical recommendations, to theoretical extension of 
knowledge (Urquhart, 2013). Therefore, the researcher needs to anticipate 
the consequences of the potential impact of their findings, contribution and 
recommendations (Tarling, 2006). When researching a problem in a specific 
context, such as this study exploring early venture boards in the UK, the 
researcher should be particularly conscious of presuming that findings from 
this one context could be generalised onto other, for example here, 
extending the findings from early venture boards to boards of family-owned 
firms or larger corporations that are trading on Stock Exchange. Therefore, 
findings, contribution and recommendations from this research study have 
been explicitly discussed in Chapter 6.  
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In summary, ethical considerations are not a separate one-off reflection at 
the beginning of the study, but a matter of attention and thought throughout 
the entire duration of the research project (Humphries and Martin, 2000, Sin, 
2005). In this research study, ethical issues have been anticipated and 
considered as discussed above. 
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3.5   Pilot Study 
Due to significant concerns about access to venture directors, this study began 
with a pilot. The objectives of the pilot study were as follows: 
1) To test access for an in-depth interview with different types of early venture 
board directors; 
2) Based on the outcome, to consider on the level of homogeneity of 
issues of concerns among different types of directors, i.e. Founder, VC 
Investors or NEDs, thus deciding whether main study should start the 
field work from a perspective of any particular director type. 
This section provides details on the selection of participants as well as the 
approach to interviews for the pilot study. It also reviews the pilot and 
discusses how its outcome influenced the data collection of the main study. 
3.5.1  Pilot Participant Selection 
As it was previously discussed, at top level the substantive population 
consists of two types of directors – Executive Directors, i.e. Founders or 
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and Non-Executive Directors, which can be 
further classified as independent Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) and VC 
Investor Directors, representatives and appointees of investors (Garg and 
Furr, 2017). Sometimes venture boards also include a Business Angel as 
Investor Director or NED. However, it is not unusual for venture boards to 
comprise only of founders and VC Directors (Garg, 2013). The basic criteria 
for selecting participants for this study was therefore a current or a recent, 
within 12 months, venture board appointment. 
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As part of the pilot, eleven interviews have been conducted between August 
2017 – June 2018. To gain access, the researcher reached out to own 
network of investors, venture advisors and non-executive directors, asking 
for introductions to target participants. This approach to gain access is 
common in the research community when access is difficult and direct 
access to boards in the field of corporate governance research is well-
documented as being problematic (Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995). The 
eligibility of potential participants was verified before carrying out the 
interview. Also, in cases where direct introductions were being made, it was 
ensured that both introducer and the introduced were aware of the ethical 
implications of not being able to provide full anonymity to participants in 
situations of introductions and to ask them to respect each other’s 
anonymity. 
The eleven participants included a range of different types of board venture 
directors and comprised of 2 Venture Capital Investor Directors, 5 Founder 
Directors, 1 replacement CEO, 2 independent Non-Executive Directors and 1 
Angel Investor Director.  
The VC Investor Directors had over 10 years of experience in Venture 
Capital. They were at Partner or a Senior Director level at VC firms with 
funds that specialised in investing in early stage tech startups. Both had 
multiple current experiences on boards of investee companies, taking either 
a board seat or an observer seat. Their experiences included working at 
different stages of company development, from very early startups to rapidly 
growing ventures as well as several experiences of venture failures. 
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The independent Non-Executive Directors (NED) were both very 
experienced NEDs, with previous CEO experience and several venture 
board experiences including a current position.  
The Angel Director had over 10 years of experience investing as a Business 
Angel and held several Angel Director positions, including a current one. 
The Founder Directors were from companies in early stages of development 
in their company lifecycle, at the date of the interview their companies were 3 
years old or younger since the formal incorporation date. 4 Founder Directors 
were in the CEO role and 1 in the CTO role. All were first time founders. 
Additional interviewed participant was a replacement CEO, as opposed to a 
Founder CEO, this company was over 6 years old, however it was still in 
early stages of development and the CEO was a first time CEO. The 6 
ventures were backed by either a Venture Capital firm or by a syndicate of 
investors including a VC firm. The investment received was up to £1.5m. 
They were all first-time CEOs/CTO, including the replacement CEO, and 
their companies had the formal board of directors for at least 12 months. 
Table 3 provides a summary of pilot participant profiles. 
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Table 3. Pilot Participants Profile Overview 
 Director Type  Profile Summary 
1.  VC Investor Director • Over 10 years of experience in at least 2 Venture 
Capital firms investing in early stage tech ventures 
• Over 10 Investor Director and Observer board 
appointments 
• Board experience includes very high growth 
companies and failed ventures 
2.  VC Investor Director 
3.  Founder, CEO  • First-time founders, CEOs, board experience 
• Ventures in early stages of development in their 
company lifecycle, 3 years old or younger  
• Received up to £1.5m investment 
• Had formal board of directors for at least 12 
months prior to the interview 
4.  Founder, CEO 
5.  Founder, CEO 
6.  Founder, CEO 
7.  Founder, CTO • First-time founder, CTO, board experience 
• Ventures in early stages of development in their 
company lifecycle, 3 years old or younger  
• Received up to £1.5m investment 
• Had formal board of directors for at least 12 
months prior to the interview 
8.  Replacement CEO • First-time CEO, no founder experience 
• Replacement CEO, first time board experience 
• Venture in early stages of development in 
company lifecycle, 6 years old 
• Received up to £1.5m investment 
• Had formal board of directors for at least 12 
months prior to the interview 
9.  Independent NED • Very experienced NEDs 
• CEO experience  
• Several venture board experiences 
10.  Independent NED 
11.  Angel Investor 
Director and NED 
• Over 10 years of experience investing as a 
Business Angel 
• Previous CEO experience 
• Held several Angel Director positions 
Source: Table Developed by the Author, 2020 
Overall, the 11 participants represented a broad range of venture director 
types. Such diversity provided a solid base to consider the feasibility of the 
main grounded theory study (Eisenhardt, Graebner, and Sonenshein, 2016). 
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3.5.2  Pilot Interviews 
In anticipation of access problems, the participants were approached for a 
one-hour interview at their convenience. Contrary to the expectations of 
some reluctance to take part in a research interview, everyone who was 
approached had agreed to participate. Led by the participants’ preference, 
majority of pilot interviews were conducted face-to-face with two done over 
the telephone and one over video skype. The actual interview duration 
ranged between 35 and 90 minutes, averaging at 49 minutes. All interviews 
were digitally audio recorded having obtained a consent. Extensive notes 
were also taken during the interviews. 
Interview Guide is available in Appendix 4 Interview Guides. The pilot 
interviews were structured into four broad parts as follows: 
Part 1. Introduction and general background of participant and their role in 
the venture. 
Executive Directors (CEOs/CTO) spoke about their own venture and 
its growth journey so far including milestones and investment. 
Non-Executive Directors spoke about their experiences on boards 
whether as investor or an independent NED, including elaborations on 
skills and experiences they bring. 
Prompts were given to provide specific examples. 
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Part 2. Issues of concern about the company in their role as director. 
 Examples of issues they dealt with as board member. Prompts to 
speak about issues of importance and significance. 
Asking for examples of actions, interactions and behaviours on how 
these were addressed by the participant or their fellow board 
members. Inviting to describe the board dynamic at the time.   
Prompts to provide specific examples of circumstances surrounding 
the events as well as reactions of other board members. Additional 
prompts about decisions made. 
Part 3. Board – what happens on boards, interactions, communication and 
contribution.  
Executive Directors spoke about their own board. 
Non-Executive Directors spoke about their experiences on boards 
whether as investor or an independent NED, with prompts for specific 
examples. 
Prompts to give examples of a typical board meeting, agenda, 
preparation for it and actions after. Additional prompts to explore 
communication among board members during and between board 
meetings.  
Asking for examples of contribution by board members. Executive 
directors were asked if they solicited board’s help, examples of that, 
how they went about asking for it, what kind of contribution they 
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received and what they did following this contribution.  Non-Executive 
directors were asked to provide examples of contribution they made or 
have been asked to make, similar prompts were given to elicit details.  
Part 4. Lessons from experience and wrap up  
Directors spoke about key take-aways from their experience and they 
affected their view on venture boards and why. 
Prompts to describe the most important lessons they learnt through 
experiences on venture boards. Asking for details on how these were 
discovered and if their views changed over time. 
Additional prompt for anything of importance that we didn’t talk about 
that appeared relevant and anything they thought the researcher  
should know to better understand what happens on venture boards.  
Since all Founder Directors were first time CEOs/CTO and had no previous 
or any other board appointments, they were asked about their experiences 
on boards of their own venture. VC Investor Directors, independent Non-
Executive Directors and Angel Director were asked about their current board 
appointments and past experiences.  
Table 4 summarises the interview structure and lists interview questions 
used. Interview Guide is also available in Appendix 4 Interview Guides. 
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Table 4. Pilot Interview Questions 
Interview Part Example Interview 
Questions 
Example of Relevant 
Prompts 
Part 1. Introduction 
and general 
background of 
participant and their 
role in the venture 
To start with, could you please 
give me an overview of your 
background and what you do? 
 
To set out the context for our 
conversation, could you please 
tell me about your board 
experiences so far? 
Prompts were given to 
seek specific examples: 
Could you please tell me 
about the journey of 
company growth? 
How is your board 
structured and 
organised? 
In your role as a director, 
please give example of 
what do you get involved 
with most? 
Part 2. Issues of 
concern about the 
company in their role 
as director 
In your role as venture 
director, what seems 
important and significant to 
you? 
Please tell me how these 
issues were resolved?  
Please describe the board 
dynamic at the time. 
 
Prompts to seek specific 
examples about issues of 
importance and 
significance. 
Prompts to seek specific 
examples of 
circumstances 
surrounding the events 
as well as behaviours, 
actions and reactions of 
other board members.  
Part 3. Board – what 
happens on boards, 
interactions, 
communication and 
contribution 
Please describe an example 
of interactions of directors 
during the board meeting 
and outside the board 
meeting. 
Could you please describe 
any significant actions you or 
your fellow board directors 
took to facilitate growth of 
the company? 
Could you recall any 
significant decisions that 
your board had to make? 
Please give me an example 
of director interactions or 
behaviours that help facilitate 
growth? 
From your experience, could 
you tell me about changes in 
director behaviour over the 
course of investment? 
Additional prompts about 
decisions made. 
Additional prompts to 
explore communication 
among board members 
during and between 
board meetings.  
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Interview Part Example Interview 
Questions 
Example of Relevant 
Prompts 
Part 4. Lessons from 
experience and wrap 
up 
Could you describe key 
learning points from the 
board experiences you had 
so far? 
How would you describe an 
effective board and why? 
Is there anything of 
importance you would like to 
add? 
Is there anything we didn’t 
talk about that appears 
relevant? 
Is there anyone you think I 
should be talking to about 
venture boards? 
Is there any feedback you 
would like to give me? 
Prompts for details on 
learning points, how 
these were discovered 
and if their views 
changed over time. 
 
Source: Table developed by the Author, 2020 
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3.5.3  Review of Pilot Study 
The pilot study allowed the researcher to investigate access to participants, 
the issue of huge impact on carrying out a grounded theory study using 
interviews in the substantive population of venture board directors. First, the 
study would not have been possible if the researcher was not able to get 
access to interview venture directors. Second, equally, if the data from 
interviews lacked examples of situations illustrating what happens on venture 
boards, the study would not have been viable. Thirdly, it was pertinent to 
understand whether different types of directors had similar or different 
concerns since the first step of GT study was to identify the main concern of 
participants and how they resolve it. If different types of directors had 
different concerns, then the GT study would be required to start the study 
from a perspective of a single director type. The pilot allowed to review these 
concerns thus establishing the feasibility of the study. 
Contrary to the expectation of access problems so widely acknowledged in 
qualitative corporate governance literature (Leblanc and Schwartz, 2007), 
the researcher has not experienced any issues with accessing directors. Not 
a single director that was approached refused to take part in research 
interviews. Only on one occasion an interview had to be rearranged 3 times 
and took several months to find a suitable date. All interviews were arranged 
based on the availability and preference of participants and to suit their 
diaries. The mode of the interview, i.e. face-to-face or digital, was also 
chosen to suit the participant. 
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All pilot participants were accessed via researcher’s own network and 
personal introductions and this worked really well as access strategy. No 
difference in gaining access was observed depending on the type of director 
approached, whether it was a Founder, NED or a VC director, all equally 
agreed to take part.  
Generally, company directors are bound by confidentiality and so there is 
always a risk that data obtained through interviews might not be sufficiently 
in-depth for a theory-building study (Leblanc and Schwartz, 1997, Forbes 
and Milliken, 1999). For example, an interview which lacks depth would be 
characterised by general accounts and sweeping statements such as ‘what 
we do in such situations is…’, ‘we tend to act as…, ‘you will find that…’, 
‘when we are working on…’. Although this type of data has been usefully 
defined by Glaser (Glaser, 1998, p.9) as “vaguing out” and is an acceptable 
type of data for building a grounded theory, it is just one type of data and it 
becomes problematic to generate insight-led concepts if such vaguing out 
occurs consistently across many interviews.  
During the pilot, the researcher was aware of the signals and was ready to 
prompt for specific examples. Only during one interview an account of 
experiences contained many general statements. Most other participants 
provided examples of situations, director interactions and behaviours based 
on specific experience they wanted to illustrate, often there was no need for 
naming names or provide any information that could be considered 
confidential. Since this issue has been observed only on one interview, it was 
reasonable to conclude that going forward the depth of data would not be a 
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major issue. Additionally, there was no apparent difference in depth of data 
whether interview was conducted face-to-face, via video skype or telephone. 
Both face-to-face and digital interviews had examples of a duration range at 
the extreme opposites, i.e. interviews lasting 90min and interviews lasting 
30min. One instance of ‘vaguing out’ occurred in a face-to-face interview.  
Grounded theory is used to explore previously under-researched areas of 
substantive interest. To explore the unexplored, a classic GT study begins by 
identifying the main concern of participants and the process through which 
they resolve it. As such, the grounded theory is then built around the 
relationship between the two (Glaser, 1992, Urquhart, 2013). The concept of 
the main concern emerges through constant comparison technique and 
development of codes and categories. When substantive area of population 
has different types of participants, such as different types of venture 
directors, researcher must consider the degree of homogeneity of concern 
among different types of participant since the main concern may differ 
significantly among types of participant. Identifying the main concern and the 
process for its resolution is the first stage of GT data collection and analysis 
and therefore if participants have significantly different perspectives, 
identifying a common main concern, and moving to the next stage, could be 
problematic. For example, in their study of Awareness of Dying, Glaser and 
Strauss (1965) have collected data from terminally ill patients, nurses, 
doctors and other types of participant in the substantive population. 
However, they approached the fieldwork by beginning to follow “personnel 
around the service” for terminally ill, expanding it to other staff members, 
patients and the context of different hospital wards (Strauss and Glaser, 
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1965, Preface). The emerged theory provided “an eye-opening view of how 
patient care was affected by the awareness level of the dying process by 
nurses, physicians, and patients” (Andrews and Nathaniel, 2015, p.3). 
Strauss and Glaser (1965) claimed that patterns of interactions among the 
substantive population were not occurring accidentally, but predictably, and 
therefore the knowledge of such patterns would help the hospitals and staff 
in their care for dying patients (Strauss and Glaser, 1965). 
As discussed previously, the substantive population of venture directors 
broadly consists of three different types of participants: Founder Directors, 
Investor Directors and independent Non-Executive Directors. Post pilot, the 
researcher considered differences of participants’ experiences and insights 
they provided during the interviews. Not surprisingly, the experiences of 
different types of participants were quite distinct. For instance, interviewed 
Founders only had just one board experience. Their single experience was 
also limited to director interactions during early stages of company 
development. Conversely, the interviewed VC Directors had multiple board 
experiences, their data stood out because they were in a unique position to 
contrast and compare their different experiences, provide multiple examples 
to illustrate behaviours of different directors in different ventures under 
similar or different circumstances. Most interestingly, VC Directors have 
experienced the full cycle of company development, growth and failure, 
multiple times and therefore gave examples of a wider variety of situations. 
Similarly, NEDs had multiple board experiences across different stages of 
company development cycle. They also provided very interesting in-depth 
examples of various situations. However, one issue stood out: other 
89 
 
participants, i.e. Founders and VC Directors, very rarely mentioned NEDs in 
their interviews. This reflects the existing literature (Garg, 2013) that post-
investment during early stages, venture boards are typically constructed of 
just founders and investor directors. This observation implied that if NED’s 
perspective is selected to begin the GT study, the researcher might run into 
difficulty getting access to interview enough NEDs.  
Given that Founders had a single board experience which was limited to 
early stages of company development, it was rational to choose perspective 
of VC Investor Director as a starting point for data collection of this study. 
Together, these considerations have shown that VC Directors were in a 
unique position of having an unusually high number of director appointments. 
This allowed them to draw on a vast range of situations to illustrate board 
experiences. The data they provided was remarkably rich comparative data 
(Hallen and Eisenhardt, 2012). This type of data showed potential to most 
likely to deliver on obtaining the variance in behaviours and interactions of 
directors on venture boards. Since the goal of GT is to “generated a theory 
that accounts for the patterns of behaviour which are relevant and 
problematic for the participants”, VC Director perspective emerged as most 
promising starting point (Glaser, 1998, p.117)  Thus, the quality of data, its 
potential to deliver on variance in behaviour and availability of access 
steered the decision to start data collection from the perspective of VC 
Investor Director. This approach is in line with Glaser’s guidance to “begin by 
talking with the most knowledgeable people to get a line on relevancies and 
leads to track down more data and where and how to locate oneself for a rich 
supply of data”. (Glaser, 1978 p.45). 
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It is important to highlight here that the aim of the study was not to focus on 
any specific type of a director but to discover the emergent problem for the 
substantive population of directors on early venture boards and its resolution 
(Glaser, 1978). In grounded theory, the emergent problem discovered in one 
context from a certain perspective, eventually transcends that context by 
comparing data incidents obtained via theoretical sampling of data from other 
sources and contexts (Glaser, 1998). Thus, the problem gets conceptualised 
and attains a “conceptual generality” (Glaser, 1998, p.125). 
In summary, the discussion of pilot outcomes has confirmed the feasibility of 
a GT study in the substantive area of interest using interviews. It also 
provided a rationale to start data collection from a perspective of VC Director. 
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3.5.4  Using Pilot Data  
Despite the fact that the researcher has not experienced access issues 
during the pilot, access to directors for interviews is problematic, relatively 
uncommon and widely acknowledged as being difficult in the literature 
(Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995). The interview data itself is data about director 
interactions and behaviour, it is unavailable from other sources, unusually 
rich comparative data and, in fact, quite rare (Hallen and Eisenhardt, 2012). 
Glaser’s basic tenant of grounded theory is that “all is data” and advocates 
for the researcher to “only see what incidents come his way as more “data” 
to constantly compare, to generated concepts and to induce the patterns 
involved” (Glaser, 1998, p.8). Since pilot data has been collected directly 
from the substantive population of venture directors about the area of 
interest, i.e. boards, it is therefore an appropriate data for this study of 
venture boards, and it is justifiable to use this data source for analysis. In 
fact, Glaser encouragingly supports a “secondary analysis of data already 
collected for other purposes” emphasizing that such data is valuable to the 
researcher to theoretically sample from at an appropriate stage of research 
(Glaser, 1998, p.9, Andrews et al., 2012). More recently, theory-building 
research in the field of corporate governance also supports and advocates 
for using multiple sources of data and using previously collected data as part 
of the systematic analysis to generate theory (Hallen and Eisenhardt, 2012, 
Eisenhardt, Graebner, and Sonenshein, 2016). Therefore, it was considered 
that pilot data would be used during selective coding and theoretical 
sampling stage of the main study. 
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3.6   Data Collection 
In a grounded theory study data collection happens concurrently with data 
analysis, moving from the data to empirical conceptualisation and to theory 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967, Heath and Cowley, 2004, Urquhart, 2013). Thus, 
as soon as the first piece of data is collected from the substantive population, 
it gets analysed and the outcome then determines what data needs to be 
sampled next and the best source of such data (Urquhart, 2013). In a GT 
thesis, the evolution and results of this iterative process are usually 
presented together and can be found in the next chapter. This section, 
therefore, simply summarises the process and highlights the approach to the 
data collection, including an approach to selecting participants and to 
interviewing, for the purposes of clarity and transparency.  
3.6.1  Concurrent Data Collection and Analysis: Summary 
In line with the tenets of the classic grounded theory, the process of 
simultaneous data collection and analysis in this study took place over three 
stages (Glaser, 1998):  
1. Initial interviews with participants and open coding to identify their 
main concern and core category; 
2. Selective coding from pilot data and further interviews guided by 
theoretical sampling around the core category; and  
3. Further interviews guided by theoretical sampling, coding 
theoretically for relationship between categories. 
  
93 
 
During the first stage, the goal was to identify participants’ main concern or 
basic social problem (Glaser, 1992, 2001). Knowing the participants main 
concern and identifying patterns of behaviour adopted to resolve it, is the 
basic premise of classic Glaser grounded theory method (Glaser, 2001, 
Jones and Noble, 2007). The data collection an analysis process 
commenced with interviews of VC Directors. Open coding began as soon as 
the first interview data was collected, and it involved constructing initial codes 
and categories through constant comparison and memo-writing. Having 
developed 52 open codes and a memo bank of 90 memos, the main concern 
has emerged. The core category also emerged throughout the coding and 
analysis process. Open coding and analysis are detailed in the next chapter. 
The second stage was triggered once core category was known. Coding 
became selective, where only core category and categories related to it were 
coded for and irrelevant categories were abandoned (Glaser, 1978). Further 
data collection was sampled theoretically i.e. the researcher collected data 
relevant to core and related categories (Glaser, 1998). Pilot data and new 
interviews were deemed as the best sources of such data. At this stage 
interview questions became more focused and derived from emerging 
concepts (Urquhart, 2013). Data collecting, coding and sampling continued 
until all categories have been saturated, i.e. when new incidents of data do 
not yield new properties (Glaser, 1978). Theory advancement was thus 
progressed through selective coding and theoretical sampling as emerging 
categories were used to direct further data collection until all relevant 
categories were “saturated, elaborated and integrated” (Glaser, 1992, p.102, 
Heath and Cowley, 2004). 
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The third and final stage could be distinguished by the beginning of 
theoretical coding which was used to identify theoretical code in order to 
conceptualise how concepts related to each other. This was aided by memo 
sorting and write up. This took place while stage two and theoretical 
sampling was still ongoing, which is not unusual in a GT study, and thus 
collection of data was attuned in real time to fit with the theoretical 
development of concepts and the relationships between them (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967). Once the theory was sufficiently grounded, the researcher 
engaged with the literature in the substantive field of interest by relating it to 
the outcomes (Glaser, 1992).  
Table 5 summarises the data collection stages and sources, and links it to 
the stages of analysis and coding activities: 
Table 5. Overview of Data Collection linking to Data Analysis and 
Coding 
Data Collection  
(Chapter 3) 
Overview Participants Link to Data 
Analysis and 
Coding Stage 
(Chapter 4) 
Initial Interviews Main concern and 
core category 
emerged 
5 VC Investor 
Directors 
Open coding 
stage 
Pilot Interviews 
and New 
Interviews via 
Theoretical 
Sampling  
Sampled 
theoretically using 
pilot data and 
further interviews 
Pilot participants 
(11 interviews) 
Further new 3 VC 
Investor Directors 
Selective coding 
stage 
 
Further Interviews 
via Theoretical 
Sampling  
 
Sampled 
theoretically using 
further interviews 
Further 5 
interviews with VC 
Investor Directors 
and NEDs 
Theoretical coding 
stage 
Source: Table developed by the Author, 2020 
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The data analysis and coding stages are presented in detail in the next 
chapter. This rest of this section provides information about the approach to 
participant selection and interviews. 
3.6.2  Participant Selection  
During the main study, 13 new interviews were carried out and with the 
pilot’s 11 interviews, the total number of interviews for this study comes to 
24. From the outset, the main data collection began with interviews with VC 
Investor Directors, as per the rationale discussed above during the review of 
pilot study. The same selection criteria have been applied for the initial 
interviews as for the pilot: i.e. all VC Investor Directors had a current venture 
board experience. As data collection progressed, the selection of participants 
in the main study was guided by the needs of the emerging grounded theory 
and followed the GT procedure of theoretical sampling. Theoretical sampling 
involves gathering data purposefully, where the type of data and the best 
source of it is determined on analytical grounds of the emerging theory 
(Urquhart, 2013). The next chapter includes details of the analytical grounds 
and requirements for theoretical sampling.  
Table 6 provides a summary of profiles of participants across the three types 
of directors throughout the data collection. It assigns participants with a 
unique identifier which is then used in quotations in the subsequent chapters. 
In order to protect the anonymity of interviewees, the directors have been 
abbreviated by type, i.e. VC Investor Directors have been assigned an 
identifier of VC, as VC1-VC12, Founder Directors have been assigned an 
identifier of F, as F1-6, and Non-Executive Directors have been assigned an 
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identifier of NED, as NED1-6. Since interviewed angel investors also had a 
NED position in the business, they were included into the NED director type. 
Table 6. Main Study Participants Profile Overview 
No Participant – 
Director Type 
Profile Summary Assigned 
Identifier for 
Quotation 
Purposes in 
Analysis 
1.  VC Investor 
Directors 
• Over 10 years of experience in VC firms 
investing in early stage tech ventures 
• Over 10 Investor Director and/or Observer 
board appointments 
• Board experience includes very high 
growth companies and failed ventures 
VC1-12 
2.  Founder 
Directors 
• First-time founders, CEOs, board 
experience 
• Ventures in early stages of development 
in their company lifecycle 
• Received up to £1.5m investment 
• Had formal board of directors for at least 
12 months prior to the interview 
F1-6 
3.  Non-Executive 
Director 
• Very experienced NEDs 
• C-suite experience  
• Several venture board experiences 
NED1-6 
Source: Table developed by the Author, 2020 
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3.7   Interviews 
Due to the concurrent nature of data collection and analysis in grounded 
theory, careful planning was required to allocate sufficient time between 
interviews to allow for analysis (Glaser, 1978).  Therefore, interviews were 
sufficiently spaced out so that each can be analysed immediately after it 
occurred. Thus, the researcher went into the main data collection and 
analysis with a realistic calculation of time required to transcribe and analyse 
data from an interview before moving on to the next data collection point.  
In order to access geographically dispersed participants to their convenient 
time and date, most of interviews were conducted via telephone or skype. It 
is not unusual to use telephone interviews to “mitigate logistical issues during 
a grounded theory study” (Birks and Mills, 2011a).  
The approach to interview design has followed the GT procedures. Thus, the 
objective of collecting data via interviews was two-fold: initial interviews were 
carried out to discover the participants’ emergent main concern and how they 
resolved it (core category), and then subsequent interviews were used to 
saturate categories only relating to the emergent core using theoretical 
sampling for the data and its source (Glaser, 1998). The duration of 
interviews was between 37 and 74 minutes, averaging 49 minutes. Consent 
has been obtained as shown in Appendix 1. 
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3.7.1  Initial Interviews 
In line with the grounded theory procedures, initial interviews were designed 
to explore director experiences as openly as possible, allowing participants 
to steer the direction of the interview so that the researcher could develop an 
understanding of key issues of concern they face (Bryant and Charmaz, 
2010). The interview questions were open-ended and designed to learn as 
much as possible about directors’ experiences, their possible concerns, 
reactions, observations and thoughts. 
In preparing for the initial interviews to identify participants main concern and 
its resolution, the pilot interview questions were refined in order to maximise 
the acquisition of relevant non-forced data (Glaser, 1992, p.25). Having 
listened to interview audio recordings and re-read the transcripts from pilot 
interviews, it became apparent that participants easily took up to 20 minutes 
of the interview speaking about their background, their skills and, as such, 
not spoke directly about their board experiences. It also stood out that when 
participants eventually did speak about their boards, they focused on board 
composition, systems and processes, board meetings structure and papers. 
This meant more frequent prompts were necessary to elicit examples of 
interactions and behaviours. Therefore, going into the main data collection, 
interview questions were refined and thus opened with a question about 
participants’ experiences on venture boards as opposed to a question about 
their background. The remaining questions were re-structured to maximise 
the elicitation of non-forced examples of issues of importance, interactions 
and variance in behaviour. 
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Interview Guide is available in Appendix 4 Interview Guides. Broadly, the 
initial interviews consisted of three parts: 
Part 1. Experiences  
In the first instance the interviews opened with ‘tell me about your 
experiences on boards’, thus ‘instilling the spill’ (Glaser, 1992). 
Picking up on experiences mentioned, several prompts followed ‘Tell 
me more…You mentioned X– could you tell me more about this 
experience?’ 
Part 2. Issues of importance and how they got resolved 
The second part picked up on specific examples of issues within 
participants’ experiences, repeating what was mentioned and delving 
into what happened, how issues were addressed and resolved, 
prompting for illustrative examples of reactions to the actions from 
other board members (Urquhart, 2013).  
Typical questions and prompts included: ‘This seemed important to 
you as director on boards of ventures… Why, could you tell me more 
about this? How did you go about addressing this? Could you tell me 
more about how this got resolved? Please tell me about the reaction 
of other directors?’ 
Part 3. Change in behaviour over time 
The third part explored experiences of differences ‘When you look at 
your experiences, could you tell me about a situation where one of 
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your boards did something differently? Could you please describe the 
most important lessons you learnt through your experiences on 
boards on boards of VC-backed startups? How did you discover that? 
Have your views changed over time?’ 
Participants were prompted to provide examples from their experiences 
across current and past relevant boards. All participants were encouraged to 
speak about their own specific experiences, providing real situational 
examples where possible, rather than giving out an opinion or making 
general statements.  
3.7.2  Interviews via Theoretical Sampling 
As soon as the main concern and its resolution (core category) have 
emerged during the analysis, the cycles of data collection and analysis 
progressed into selectively coding for categories relating to the emergent 
core and sampling theoretically for necessary data determined on analytic 
grounds (Glaser, 1998). In line with the canons of grounded theory, the 
interview questions became increasingly focused according to the needs of 
the emerging concepts and theory (Bryant and Charmaz, 2007). The details 
of the progression of the requirements for questions and sampling are 
provided in the next chapter. Interview Guide with example questions for 
Theoretical Sampling, is also available in Appendix 4 Interview Guides. 
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3.8   Chapter Summary 
This chapter explained the positioning of this study as a classic grounded 
theory research carried out from an interpretivist philosophical perspective. 
This positioning is aligned with the aim of this study to understand what 
happens on early venture boards and to develop a theoretical framework on 
early venture boards.  
The chapter also offered the results of a pilot study and, based on the its 
conclusions, summarised an approach to data collection for the main study. 
The next chapter provides details of the process of data analysis and its 
results, demonstrating the compliance with the procedures of the classic 
grounded theory method. 
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Chapter 4 Data Analysis 
4.0   Introduction 
In this study, data analysis was based on the procedures of classic grounded 
theory (GT). Specifically, these procedures include open coding, selective 
coding, theoretical sampling, theoretical coding, memo writing and sorting 
(Glaser, 1978). Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to present how 
these procedures were implemented, thus providing, as far as possible, a 
transparent account of the emergence and development of categories, and 
of the relationships between them, from the data. By doing so, the chapter 
demonstrates the process used to develop the substantive grounded theory, 
the theory of Optimising for Growth. 
The first section of this chapter summarises the three stages of data 
analysis, providing a high-level picture of the purpose and the outcome for 
each stage. Sections which follow then give details. Thus, the first stage of 
the analysis, open coding, is described in the second section. The section 
shows how initial codes and categories were generated and developed using 
the distinct GT analytical techniques of constant comparison and memo 
taking (Glaser, 1978). It provides a summary of open codes built up during 
this first stage. Importantly, the section also explains how the main concern 
of participants and the process they use to resolve it have emerged as the 
core category.  
In classic GT, identifying the main concern and its resolution are the signals 
for moving to selective coding (Glaser, 1998). Thus, the third section of the 
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chapter demonstrates how coding progressed from open codes to selective 
codes through the process of selective coding, i.e. coding only for categories 
relating to the core and specifying, connecting and abstracting the emerging 
categories. The section also evidences saturation of categories using the 
principle of theoretical sampling which involves collecting further data based 
on the state of completeness of emerging concepts from analysis. By doing 
so, it essentially illustrates the distinct dynamic feature of the grounded 
theory of the interaction between emerging analysis and the evolution of the 
research question. As a result, the substantive area under investigation is 
conceptualised empirically by emerged set of selective codes clearly shown 
as grounded in collected data (Glaser, 1978).  
The fourth and final section details the process of theoretical coding. 
Theoretical coding is the process of advancing selective codes into 
theoretical codes by relating them to each other and conceptualising those 
resulting statements of relationships (Glaser, 1998). Essentially, in classic 
grounded theory, this is the process of theorising and it is supported by 
procedures of memo sorting and forming a set of theoretical codes. The 
section culminates with the outline of the developed theoretical relationships, 
the foundation of the substantive grounded theory of Optimising for Growth.  
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4.1   Stages of Data Analysis 
As it was previously mentioned, using a grounded theory method, data 
analysis is done at the same time as data collection (Glaser, 1978). The 
approach to collecting data was outlined in Chapter 3, Section 3.6   Data 
Collection. Interview guide is also available in Appendix 4 Interview Guides. 
The process of data analysis consists of 3 stages: open coding, selective 
coding and theoretical coding (Glaser, 1978). Figure 1 summarises the 
purpose, what was done, and the output of each stage of analysis in this 
study.  
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Figure 1. Stages of Data Analysis 
 
Source: Figure developed by the Author, 2020 
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Although Figure 1 gives an impression of a very clean flow of the data 
analysis process from open coding to selective, from selective to theoretical 
coding, in reality, the analysis is much more iterative in nature as opposed to 
being linear and delimited (Glaser, 1978). This means codes are frequently 
reorganised and even renamed (Urquhart, 2013).  
Since the process has been continuously iterative and because through it the 
researcher has generated a huge volume of open codes and properties, the 
full audit trail of the transformation of data into theory is impossible to 
showcase (Glaser, 1998). However, this chapter have provided several 
examples of the transformation where possible. 
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4.2   Open Coding Stage 
GT recommends starting the investigation with a focus on identifying a 
common problem expressed by participants and recognising how they go 
about dealing with it (Glaser, 1978).  
Thus, as shown on Figure 2 below, the purpose of the initial stage of analysis 
is to identify the main concern of participants and a core category which 
depicts how this concern is being processed or resolved (Glaser, 1992). 
Whilst researcher is looking for the main concern and core category, the 
analysis also generates a set of open codes and together these represent 
the output from the open coding stage. The rest of the section accounts for 
how the process of open coding was carried out. 
Figure 2. Open Coding Stage 
 
Source: Figure developed by the Author, 2020 
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4.2.1  Initial Generation of Open Codes and Properties 
Thus, data analysis of the main study began once the first piece of data was 
collected via an interview with a VC Investor Director, VC3 (for list of 
participants and their identifiers see Table 6. Main Study Participants Profile 
Overview. The voice-recorded audio file was transcribed and then analysed 
using open coding technique. The open coding is a technique which brakes 
data into descriptive episodes or incidents of something happening, and 
constantly compares them to each other for similarities and differences 
(Glaser, 1978). Constant comparison is a process of asking basic questions 
as follows (Glaser, 1998, p.140): 
“What category does this incident indicate?” 
“What property of what category does this incident indicate?” 
In order to aid the discovery of the main concern in the initial stage, the 
research is also advised to add the third question ((Glaser, 1998, p.140): 
“What is the participant main concern?”  
Thus, by asking the first two questions, similar incidents were grouped 
together and given a label, a process also known as naming a code. GT 
recommends to initially give names to codes ‘in-vivo’ or in the language of 
the data itself (Glaser, 1978, Urquhart, 2013). This is because naming the 
codes using participants own words instantly gives them authenticity and 
becomes a “source of important analytic insight about the world of the 
participants” later in the process (Urquhart, 2013, p.103). In this study, there 
is no claim that these code names are “correct”, since the research has been 
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carried out from interpretivist philosophical perspective (Urguhart, 2013, 
p.81). Categories were formed by comparing codes to other codes and 
grouping them (Glaser, 1978).  
Table 7 illustrates how the researcher began analysing the first interview 
data using open coding and constant comparison techniques. The table 
shows a short excerpt from the first interview and demonstrates how it was 
broken into data incidents which were then given a code name: 
Table 7. Open Coding. Illustration of Initial Generation of Codes 
Interview Excerpt (VC3) 
Main Study’s First Interview 
Breaking down the 
Interview into Data 
Incidents 
Generated Initial Code 
(Open Code) 
I think all the boards are 
broken, I think they are 
generally, the board of 
directors function isn’t really 
fit for purpose in the 21 
century. 
Well I just think a lot of 
directors of companies, the 
independent ones, turn up 
unprepared, they haven’t 
read the prepared, the board 
pack beforehand. I think a lot 
of CEOs don’t do a great job 
preparing a board pack in 
the first place and they send 
it out too late for the 
directors who do want to get 
involved and understand 
what’s happening, to read 
and think about it. (Investor 
Director) 
 
I think all the boards are 
broken I think they are 
generally, the board of 
directors function isn’t really 
fit for purpose in the 21 
century 
 
Broken Board Function 
 
a lot of directors of 
companies, the independent 
ones, turn up unprepared, 
they haven’t read the 
prepared, the board pack 
beforehand 
Turning up Unprepared 
 
a lot of CEOs don’t do a great 
job preparing a board pack in 
the first place 
Preparing Badly 
they send it out too late for 
the directors who do want to 
get involved and understand 
what’s happening, to read 
and think about it. 
Notice Period Late 
 
Source: Table developed by the Author, 2020 
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Thus, Table 7 has illustrated the generation of four initial code names: 
Broken Board Function, Turning up Unprepared, Preparing Badly, and Notice 
Period Late. Code names Broken Board Function and Notice Period Late 
have a direct link to the participant’s own words. 
When breaking interview data into data incidents, in order to aid constant 
comparison and as recommended by GT, a neutral question was asked to 
each data incident “What category or property of a category does this 
incident indicate?” (Glaser, 1998, p.140). This enabled for codes to be 
developed and generated via a continuous comparison process.  
For example, as this initial interview with VC3 was further analysed, there 
were several additional data incidents which described similar happenings as 
initial codes illustrated in Table 8, thus indicating they belonged to the same 
code. These additional data incidents were grouped together, and the code 
names were evolved to better reflect what was happening. This process also 
began revealing properties of some codes.  
Property of a code is also a code which helps with describing it (Urquhart, 
2013). Initially, the naming of the property is most likely to come directly from 
the data, i.e. in-vivo and in participants own words, however, as analysis 
progresses, the aim is to “go beyond that initial description and analyse it” 
(Urguhart, 2013, p.36). 
Code properties could take many forms: they could be describing a type, a 
degree, a stage, a dimension, or any other feature of a particular code or 
category (Glaser, 1978).  
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For example, as analysis progressed, the initial code Notice Period Late has 
transformed into Notice Period with two properties Upfront and Late. As 
illustrated in Table 8, Notice Period has itself become a property of a 
category Board Pack Provision: 
Table 8. Illustration of Developing Open Categories and Properties 
Open 
Category 
Property Sub-
Property 
Data Incidents from interview with VC3 
Board Pack 
Provision 
 
Preparing  
 
Badly 
 
• a lot of CEOs don’t do a great job preparing 
a board pack in the first place 
• Typically you find that the CEO has turned it 
[board pack] out the night before 
• they are late in preparing 
 
Notice 
Period 
 
Upfront 
 
• send the board pack 2-3 days beforehand 
• giving the board packs upfront 
 
Late 
 
• they send it out too late for the directors 
who do want to get involved and understand 
what’s happening, to read and think about it. 
• poor notice period in order to read it, a lot 
of detail does not get read it at all 
• they are late in preparing and therefore and 
the board directors can’t prepare 
 
Turning up  Unprepared - • a lot of directors of companies, the 
independent ones, turn up unprepared, 
they haven’t read the prepared, the board 
pack beforehand 
• if the CEO sent out the pack the night 
before or the morning of the meeting, you 
know, if I have meetings all morning I won’t 
be able to prepare either 
• there is a vicious circle that they are late in 
preparing and therefore and the board 
directors can’t prepare 
 
Source: Table developed by the Author, 2020 
Several important observations can be made from the coding thus far. First, 
as Table 8 shows, using properties the researcher was beginning to capture 
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variations in data (Glaser, 1978). Thus, using the example above, at this 
stage of analysis, Board Pack Provision can vary as follows:  
- badly prepared board pack sent upfront; or 
- badly prepared board pack sent late. 
Second, example data incidents also indicate a relationship between 
Preparing Badly and Sending Late, the properties of Board Pack Provision, 
and directors Turning Up Unprepared to a board meeting.  
To capture this relationship, GT recommends using memos, a simple, free-
style record of analytical ideas about codes and relationships between them 
(Glaser, 1978, 1992). Memos have an emergent nature, they change at each 
stage of analysis, as more data is analysed (Glaser, 1992). During the final 
stages of analysis, ideas captured in memos get sorted to organise the 
relationships between final codes and categories. Therefore, memos play a 
very important role in generation of the grounded theory (Glaser, 1978).  
GT suggests to memo whenever an idea comes to mind, whether it is during 
or post interview, during transcribing, analysing or simply thinking about the 
work (Glaser, 1978). Writing memos provides space to develop a deep 
understanding of inter-relationship between codes, something that’s not easy 
to capture through the process of just systematically codifying similar data 
incidents.  
To illustrate this, Figure 3 shows a copy of the initial memo taken to note the 
relationship between Board Pack Provision and Turning Up Unprepared. The 
memo example shows that it was subsequently updated with other ideas as 
they emerged while analysing this interview. As this memo was about a 
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relationship between categories, it was named to reflect this relationship, 
Directors Preparing. 
Figure 3. Illustration of Initial Memo and its Development 
 
Source: Figure developed by the Author, 2020 
As Figure 3 illustrated, writing a memo helped capture relationships between 
different properties and categories. 
  
Initial Memo  
Directors Preparing 
Data indicates a relationship between the CEO Preparing Badly the Board Pack (BP) 
and/or sending it Late to the board ahead of the meeting and the ability and the level of 
preparedness of other directors (NEDs, VCs) for the board meeting (Turning up 
Unprepared). 
Badly Preparing the BP seems to indicate that BP has a quality to it (to keep in mind as 
a future category). If BP is Well Prepared, its Quality would be High, and if BP is Badly 
Prepared its Quality would be Low. 
It is indicated further in the data that Badly Preparing and Notice Period Late are 
indicators that the CEO does not value the board (see category CEO Valuing Board). 
The data describes and reveals a relationship between several categories as a Vicious 
Circle: CEO not Valuing Board, Badly Preparing and Sending Late pack, directors 
Turning Up Unprepared and therefore unable to Add Value at the meeting, completing 
the loop and going back to ‘square one’ CEO not Valuing Board. 
There seems to be an additional relationship between Directors Preparing and Board 
Function. Vicious Circle is an indicator of a Broken Board Function. 
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4.2.2  Identifying the Main Concern 
According to Glaser (1998), the participants’ main concern is a category 
which emerges to represent the unfolding interactions. During analysis, it can 
be ascertained by reflecting on a question “What is the participants’ main 
concern?” while examining the interactions signified by emerging open 
categories (Glaser, 1998, p.140).  
To help with this reflection, the researcher kept a memo exploring clues for 
identifying the main concern of the participants while analysing the initial 
interviews. Figure 4 includes the copy of this memo, showing the reflection 
and analysis process that enabled to uncover the participants’ main concern. 
Figure 4. Memo Discovering the Main Concern of Participants 
Memo 
 
Discovering Main Concern – What is the participants’ main concern? 
Thinking about the main concern of participants, one issue seems to stand 
out. It is a concern expressed by participants that venture boards are not fit 
for purpose: 
“I think all the boards are broken” (Investor Director) 
“the board of directors’ function isn’t really fit for purpose” (Investor 
Director) 
“My focus from day one is obviously get in there and work out whether 
it is going to be fit for purpose” (Investor Director) 
Several questions arise here: ‘Being fit for purpose’, what does it actually 
mean, when a board is fit for purpose? What is the board’s purpose here and 
what are the options for this purpose? What would indicate a fit? 
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On the one hand, according to data, the ‘purpose’ or role of the venture 
board at such early stage of development, is not governance. In participants 
own words: 
“if you think corporate governance is your role on the board, you are 
missing the point” (Investor Director).  
Data indicates a lot of activity happening across participant experiences 
trying to resolve this fit, i.e. identifying gaps in skills, structuring boards to fit 
those, getting access to the right reporting information at the right time, 
establishing communication channels and relationships, developing trust. 
This is indicated by codes/categories Identifying Gaps, Composing Boards, 
Board Functions, Preparing to Board Meeting, Deep Understanding of the 
Business, Avoiding Surprises, Vicious Circle, CEO-Board Communication, 
etc. This activity seems to be persisting across all participants experiences. 
Related categories are saturating fast, i.e. no new properties come up with 
new data, even at such low numbers of interviews. Everyone I interviewed so 
far is involved in this activity in one way or another.  
The question arises: is this the participants’ main concern? Are participants 
concerned with the role of the board being ‘fit for purpose’? 
On the other hand, however, data also indicates that board being “fit for 
purpose” is just an initial concern of Investor Directors. This concern is 
something that is happening immediately post-investment. Data also 
indicates a reason for this issue – worry about the board being ‘fit for 
purpose’ takes place simply because ventures do not typically have a board 
before the first investment. Therefore, as a concern, it seems to be limited to 
a specific period. Getting a board to fit for purpose could be just a standard 
(to all early stage ventures) exercise to get board systems and processes in 
place.  
As it has such temporary nature; it therefore cannot be the ‘main’ concern. 
So, what happens if/when the venture board is ‘fit for purpose’, i.e. 
appropriately structured and organised? Is there a bigger picture here and a 
bigger or different concern that persists beyond this initial structuring 
exercise? 
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Perhaps it would help to observe what else is happening apart from board 
structuring and organising and if it all can be brought together as one 
common concern that sums up all the issues/problems participants are 
experiencing. 
Apart from board structuring, I have several categories indicate activities 
relating to the development of Founder Director - Educating and Mentoring 
the CEO, Becoming CEO.  
There are also emerging categories indicating interactions which are centred 
around the future of the company: Helping, Future Focusing, Behaving 
Bigger.  
At this stage I am also beginning to build conceptual profiles of different 
director types: Founder Director, VC Director and NED, mainly with 
Demographic characteristics, Experience and Mindset. 
A useful perspective comes to light when reflecting on Portfolio Mindset and 
Taking a Long-Term View categories, which summarise a mindset 
perspective and the bigger picture for the interviewed participants, VC 
Directors. Participants speak about being investor-directors on several 
boards of their investment portfolios, how they have a need to take a long-
term view on their individual company investments, exiting their investments 
by selling companies, and delivering returns of the investment fund as a 
whole. To some degree, the motivation of participants, i.e. VC Directors, and 
their material interest appear to go beyond the confines of a board of a single 
company.  
Since this is a study of director experiences on boards, pursuing this as the 
main concern would be outside the scope of the study and mean taking this 
research into a different direction away from exploring director interactions 
on early venture boards. 
Bringing it back to the venture board level, what are the concerns of 
participants as directors on venture boards as opposed to directors of an 
investment fund?  
 
117 
 
There are indications in data that the board structure, interactions among 
directors and the company itself go through a change. This happens by the 
point of the next investment. This change is indicated by categories Growth 
Company Characteristics, Identifying Gaps at Next Stage, Board Changes.  
Participants usefully highlight their focus of interest throughout this period as 
“needing to secure a growth” in the company, to the position where the 
venture could successfully raise the next investment round, preferably a 
Series A, a multi-million-pound investment.  
In order to get the next investment, the company “growth curve had to hit a 
certain range”. This seems like a useful insight to understand the issue that 
participants, i.e. board directors, are dealing with post first investment.  
Data keeps indicating that achieving not just growth but “huge growth” as a 
chief concern of participants. The essence of this concern appears to reflect 
the purpose behind several unfolding interactions among directors on 
venture boards. Data suggests that everything that directors do, including 
structuring and organising boards, developing CEO, helping to focus on the 
future, is aimed at getting the company to grow quicker and at an exponential 
rate in order to be in shape for that next ‘serious’ investment round.  
Usefully, Growth as a category is also emerging and is being defined by 
several properties, including, Rate of Growth and Growth Curve Gradient. 
Achieving Growth is therefore a reasonable candidate category for the main 
concern of participants as directors on early boards.  
As Glaser puts it, you recognise the main concern because it is grounded in 
the data, it is “meaningful” to the participants and “salient to the setting under 
investigation”, i.e. early stage ventures (Glaser, 1996, p.105). Growth has 
been identified as meaningful to the interviewed VC Directors and at the 
same time relevant to the setting of early venture boards. 
Source: Figure developed by the Author, 2020 
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The memo demonstrated the analysis of several codes and the relationships 
between before arriving at Growth as being the main concern of participants.  
It was illustrated that several candidate categories for the main concern have 
been considered and rejected. For example, Board Structuring, although 
frequently occurring and quickly saturating, could only account for some of 
the participants’ problems, but not others. Another example, an open code 
Delivering Returns on a Whole Fund, was situated outside the scope of the 
setting for this investigation, the setting of early venture boards. The memo 
showed that candidate categories indeed related to each other and they also 
emerged to be part of the bigger and distinct picture – a concern to achieve 
exponential Growth. 
The grounded theory method’s criteria for identifying the main concern is that 
it is something that is “meaningful” to the participants, i.e. it is indicated by 
data and often referred to by them, as well as being “salient to the setting 
under investigation” (Glaser and Kaplan, 1996, p.105).  In this case the 
memo demonstrated how the identified category conformed to these criteria. 
Thus, following extensive consideration, reflection and analysis, the data 
revealed that the essence of participants concerns revolved around ventures 
achieving Growth. It was often referred to by participants and in their own 
words the main concern can be illustrated as follows: 
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Growth – Main Concern: 
“in Venture Capital, we are trying to optimise to grow huge 
companies” (VC3) 
“What we are after is not necessarily profit, but big growth” (VC3)  
“The growth curve had to hit a certain range” (VC4) 
“Ultimately needing to secure growth in the portfolio company is 
the most important thing for a VC” (VC5) 
“the only thing that matters to the investor is one out of 10 
companies would go through the roof and the others will be 
killed, if they don’t move forward” (VC6) 
“[it] comes through in everything the director is doing to help the 
company or persuade them to go down a particular product line, 
as that is a bigger market, so then the company would grow 
more quickly (VC7) 
The data from the analysis of Growth revealed that participants defined 
growth using non-traditional accounting measures of company performance 
(Garg, 2013). To them, growth had to be ‘huge’, ‘big’, ‘steep’, ‘going through 
the roof’, as opposed to not ‘hitting a certain range’, not ‘moving forward’ or 
‘almost going backwards’. Whilst traditional accounting measure of company 
performance include turnover, profit, number of employees, Growth emerged 
to be defined by non-traditional measures, or properties, such as Rate of 
Growth and Growth Curve Gradient. Chapter 2 earlier discussed that due to 
unpredictable nature of early venture performance against plan, they tend to 
use more subjective measures of performance (Fried, Bruton and Hisrich, 
1998). The main concern category, Growth, has emerged as illustrated by 
examples of data incidents in the Table 9. 
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Table 9. Emerging Main Concern 
Category for 
Main Concern Properties Data Incidents (participant quotes) 
Growth Growth Indicators: 
 Rate of Growth  “we are after is not necessarily profit but big 
growth and therefore long-term value” (VC3) 
“MRR and ARR should be sufficient that at 
least the Serious A is in theory possible” 
(VC4) 
“from a sales perspective you know the key 
things typically are probably rate of growth, 
quality of customer” (VC4) 
 Growth Curve 
Gradient 
“it was still profitable, you know, but ultimately 
its growth curve was less steep than it had 
been” (VC4) 
“the growth curve had to hit a certain range 
and if it didn’t and even if we were growing, 
we were still kind of almost going backwards” 
(VC4) 
Source: Table Developed by the Author, 2020 
As data analysis progressed through the stages, the category of Growth has 
been developed and saturated further. See Table 16. Main Concern 
Category - Growth for the final conceptualisation of the main concern. Also, 
see Appendix 5 From Data to Concepts for all final categories.  
As part of the analysis process which identified the main concern, the 
researcher has also generated a large number of open codes. These are 
discussed later in this section and summarised in Table 11. List of Open 
Categories. 
.  
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4.2.3  Discovering Core Category 
The next analytical task was to identify how participants resolved their main 
concern, i.e. the core category of the grounded theory. Identifying core 
category in this study, however, was not an easy and straightforward task, as 
Glaser (1978, p.95) points out: 
“when analyst starts coding, categories tend to emerge quickly, giving 
the appearance of finding core categories. But the analyst should be 
suspect of these as core. It takes time and much coding and analysis 
to verify a core category…it happens ‘eventually’!”. 
As the researcher proceeded with open coding, constant comparison and 
memo writing, the analysis generated a vast number of open codes. These 
are discussed later in this section and summarised in Table 11. List of Open 
Categories . This set of open codes provided a good basis for exploring how 
participants went about resolving their main concern of Growth. 
According to Glaser (Glaser and Kaplan, 1996, p.111) the resolution, or core 
category, “is a central integrative scheme”. Glaser (1978) and Glaser and 
Kaplan (1996) offer guidance for confirming the core category. Thus, it is 
recommended to begin by comparing emergent open categories and their 
properties to each other (Glaser, 1978). The goal is to look for a category 
which relates meaningfully to all other categories and appears to be central 
to all others.  By doing so the core category would thus account for and 
explain most of variations in the data. This is another reason why it takes 
some time to identify and saturate the core category, because many 
categories may appear central and be frequently reoccurring in the data, but 
not all would have the ability to account for most of what is going on (Glaser, 
1978).  
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The process of uncovering of the core category was very challenging due to 
an overwhelming number of open codes generated at this stage. It was an 
iterative process of much re-organising, comparing emerging open 
categories and their properties to each other, trying out categories for core, 
arranging and thinking (Glaser, 1978). The main challenge was to find a 
resolution category which accounted for all that was happening, and which 
also addressed the participant’s main concern. Moreover, such category 
should have also explained the variations in data that are being captured 
using dimensions (Glaser, 1978). 
 Broadly speaking this process involved the following activities: 
• noticing open categories emerged in three themes; 
• realising the core category was a process because 
o observed categories indicating perceivable states of beginning 
and end of a process or activity, thus  
o discerned several emerging processes of transformation for 
founder, company and board; 
o distinguished two stages of a process; 
• finally discovering and confirming core category of Optimising 
These activities are discussed in more detail in the following sub-sections. 
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4.2.3.1  Themes Emerging Among Open Categories 
In order to uncover the core category, as recommended, the researcher 
carried out a comparison of emergent open categories and their properties to 
each other (Glaser, 1978). By doing so, open codes and categories were 
grouped into three themes (see Table 10). Thus, the data suggested that in 
order to resolve the main concern, i.e. Growth, directors were involved in 
activities in those three areas, emerging to be consisting of: 
a) open codes describing structural components and processes 
depicting how boards are structured and organised;  
b) open codes and categories representing learning, cognition, thinking 
and feeling; and 
c) open codes and categories of patterns of director actions and 
behaviour. 
For example, categories that indicated components and processes of how 
ventures boards are structured and organised included, among others, 
different director types (Founder, VC Director and NED), and their 
characteristics, as well as open codes such as Identifying Gaps, Types of 
Gaps, Composing Boards, Board Pack, Board Meeting, Preparing for Board 
meeting, CEO-Board Communication, Getting Rid of CEO. 
Emerging categories suggesting learning, cognition, emotion and feelings 
can be illustrated by categories such as Educating and Mentoring 
CEO/Founder, Becoming CEO, Evolved CEO, Aligning Mindsets, Trust. 
Processes of learning, cognition and feelings are often referred to in GT as 
social-psychological processes (Glaser, 1978). 
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Developing patterns of behaviours and interactions between VC directors 
and Founder directors that became apparent throughout analysis include 
categories such as Gaining Deep Understanding of the Business, Avoiding 
Surprises, CEO Reaction, Board Meeting Behaviours (Challenging, Raising 
Hard Questions, Getting out of the way), Helping, Future Focusing, Seeing 
Failure.  
Table 10 illustrates how the open codes emerged into three themes. 
Table 10. Emerging Themes of Open Codes 
Emerging Theme 1 Structural Components and Processes 
i.e. how boards are structured and organised 
 
Open Categories Open Codes included in the Category 
Founder Director  
 
Characteristics of Founder Director (First time 
Everything, Mindset) 
VC Director Characteristics of VC Director (Types of Experience, 
VC Portfolio Mindset, Focusing on the Winners, Taking 
a long-term View) 
NED Type of Experience, Soft Skills, Incentivisation 
Board Size Small, Large 
Identifying Gaps Post First Investment, At Next Stage 
Gaps Types Systems and Processes Gaps, KPI Gaps, Governance 
Gaps, Skills and Experience Gaps 
Composing Boards Choice, Investor Seat, Filling Gaps, Blending 
Experiences and Skills, Balancing Execs and Non-
Execs 
Board Meeting Good/ Bad, Evolving, Structure 
Board Pack Getting it Right, Structure, Quality of Information, Notice 
Period 
Preparing to Board 
Meeting 
Preparing well, Preparing badly 
CEO-Board 
Communication 
Effective, Ongoing, Transparency, Familiarity, Contact, 
Tone 
Getting Rid of 
Founder/CEO 
- 
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Emerging Theme 2 Social-Psychological processes and 
characteristics 
 
Open Categories Open Codes included in the Category 
Educating and Mentoring 
CEO/Founder 
- 
Becoming CEO - 
Everyday Challenge for 
CEO 
- 
Evolved CEO Attributes of Evolved CEO (Dealing Succinctly, More 
Experienced, Mindset, Having Clear Asks, Taking 
Ownership) 
CEO Reaction - 
Board Mindset Aligned/Misaligned 
Emerging Theme 3 Patterns of Actions, Behaviour and Director 
Interactions 
 
Open Categories Open Codes included in the Category 
Tapping into Board 
Experience 
Using Board/ Not using the Board 
Added Value Type, Measurability, Context, Quality 
Aligning Power - 
Helping from Experience - 
Communication 
Approach 
Importance, Constructive, Destructive, Coaching 
Communication Style Aggressive, Subservient, Passive-Aggressive 
Gaining Deep 
Understanding of the 
Business 
- 
Avoiding Surprises - 
Behaviours During 
Board Meeting 
Challenging, Adding, Raising Hard Questions, Getting 
out of the Way 
Helping - 
Future Focusing - 
Seeing Failure - 
CEO Reaction Accepting and Acting, Inaction 
VC-Founder 
Relationship 
Building Active Relationship (Effectiveness, Change in 
Relationship after Investment) 
Source: Table Developed by the Author, 2020 
The researcher found several potential ways to structure and connect the 
categories together (Urquhart, 2013). The question here was, of course, 
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what kind of category would sum up such diverse set of processes, distinct, 
and sometimes contradictory behaviour patterns, whilst reflecting the 
substance of director experiences and what was occurring on early venture 
boards?  
According to Glaser (1978), a core category could be a set of types, 
conditions, dimensions or strategies which would relate to all other 
categories, for example via a hierarchy. However, a core category does not 
have to be a category which is connected to all others hierarchically. It could, 
in fact, be any structure or configuration, including a process (Glaser, 1978). 
Glaser (1978, p.97) has explicitly written about process-type core categories 
defining the process as “something which occurs over time and involves 
change over time”. A process-type core category is characterised by having 
two or more distinct stages, each with own properties, conditions and 
consequences, and by having a time dimension, i.e. there is a movement 
over time with a perceivable beginning and end (Glaser, 1978, p.97).  
Three things in the data signalled to the researcher that the core category is 
a process-type core category. First, there were categories with two 
perceivable states of beginning and end each, which in turn indicated a 
change over time (Glaser, 1978). Second, there were several structural and 
social-psychological processes that accounted for transformation from one 
state to another (Glaser, 1978). Third, there were embryonic shapes of at 
least two distinct stages.  
These are discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
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4.2.3.2  Perceivable States of Beginning and End 
The first indicator of a core category being a process was noticing several 
categories with perceivable states of beginning and end. Figure 5 below 
illustrates these three categories. Thus Venture, Board and Founder 
emerged perceivable states of beginning and end each, thus indicating a 
change over time: 
Figure 5. Emerging Categories with Perceivable Beginning and End 
 
Source: Figure Developed by the Author, 2020 
Venture: Early Venture – Growth Company 
Thus, Early Venture category included emerging characteristics of Informal 
Style, Low Technical Risk, Uncertainty, Requiring Multiple Round of Funding, 
Potential to Scale Fast and Performance Below Target. 
And Growth Company was specified by properties Taking a Large Funding 
Round and Company Size. 
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Board: Early Board – Fit for Purpose Board 
These were discerned by variations in structural and cognitive processes as 
well as director behaviours.  
Founder: First Time Founder – Evolved CEO 
The Founder Director category was characterised by First Time Everything 
and Mindset. 
And the Evolved CEO category could be distinguished by Level of 
Experience, Mindset, and Approach to Dealing with Issues. 
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4.2.3.3  Processes of Transformation  
The second indicator of a process-type core category was the fact that there 
were several structural and social-psychological processes that accounted 
for transformation from one state to another. For example, Becoming CEO 
was a social-psychological process internal to founders which indicated a 
transformation from inexperienced first-time founder into a more skilful head 
of the company. Another example is categories such as Identifying Gaps and 
Composing Boards, Getting Board Pack Right, Evolving Board Meeting all 
indicate a structural process transforming Board Functioning. 
The processes were also accompanied by emerging patterns of predictable 
non-random interactions between VC Directors and Founder Directors, 
including, for example, Helping, Changing and Future Focusing. One 
particular pattern was conceptualised as Vicious Circle, as it referred to self-
perpetuating nature of unhealthy CEO-Board relationship, where CEO does 
not value the board, is late at sending the board pack, the pack sent is of low 
quality, directors are not well prepared, directors cannot add much value at 
the board meeting or value is of low quality, leading back to CEO not 
regarding board as a valuable asset.  
Additionally, data captured polar-opposite variations of some patterns of 
behaviours and interactions, for example: 
Telling What To Do --- Not Telling What To Do 
Touch-basing Regularly --- Board Meeting Only Contact 
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4.2.3.4  Two Emerging Distinct Stages of the Process 
The third indicator which signalled a process-type core category consisted of 
embryonic shapes of at least two distinct stages and a time dimension. The 
first stage has emerged and was noted while analysing data to uncover the 
main concern of participants. Writing about it in a memo (see above Table 9. 
Emerging Main Concern), it was recognised as a group of composing, 
structuring and formalising activities transforming the structure and 
functioning of the venture board, i.e. the mix of skills and company processes 
to be ‘fit for purpose’ of helping to grow. Notably, these activities happened 
immediately post-investment and were a time-limited exercise to formalise 
systems and processes of Early Venture. These activities have been 
grouped as Stage 1 and named as Evaluating and Structuring Stage.  
The second stage emerged to incorporate all other activities of attuning and 
changing systems, processes, teams, mindsets as well as monitoring 
performance. This stage was characterised by a wide range of structural 
changes taking place internally and externally to the company. Internally, for 
example, as well as working on technological and product development, 
teams were changing, with new people joining and existing people taking on 
wider roles, inevitably leading to new relationship dynamics. Externally, at 
the same time, the company was experimenting with different ‘go-to market’ 
strategies, product-market fit, trying to grow their customer base and 
revenues. These changes placed founders under unique set of pressures to 
deliver on expectations within extremely unstable and ever-changing internal 
and external environments while at the same time, for most of them, this was 
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their first instance dealing with such issues. This Stage 2 was named using 
participants’ own words, Behaving Bigger Stage, anticipating to capture 
structural and social-psychological transformations of the company, board 
and the founder. A need for further external investment signalled the end of 
this stage.  
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4.2.3.5  Discovering and Confirming Core Category of Optimising 
As a consequence of recognising the concepts portraying characteristics of 
early and growth venture, board and founder as well as transformational 
structural and social-psychological processes taking place over two stages, 
the core category has emerged as a process. It was named Optimising, 
taking inspiration from participant’s own words: 
Optimising – Core Category Resolving Main Concern Growth: 
 “in Venture Capital, we are trying to optimise to grow huge 
companies” (VC3) 
“the board should be about helping, facilitating and optimising” 
(VC3) 
 “part of the evolution […] for me is to show that progress not just 
in terms of finances, but, you know, this is very much when we 
need to build an exec team, build a non-exec team, build the 
whole board, formalise it and structure it properly” (VC4) 
“You need to start pretty early and make sure you’ve got all of the 
stuff in good order” (VC5) 
“It’s always a chess game to get the best outcome” (VC6) 
Optimising emerged as a process of transformation, where structural 
attributes of venture and board, and cognitive attributes of founder and the 
directors, are developed, adjusted and enhanced via a set of activities and 
behaviours, in order to foster growth of the company. 
Research into activities of VCs suggests they are heavily involved in 
professionalise ventures they invest, in order to enable the company to float 
on a stock exchange via an IPO (Hellmann and Puri, 2002a). 
Professionalising of startup firms is described as a process of raising a 
standard of all organisational aspects of a new company, including the 
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management team (Harper, 2001). Upon reflection, it is not surprising, 
therefore, that optimising was found in this study to be a core process 
resolving the main concern of VC Directors during the early stages of startup 
development. Thus, whilst the bigger picture for investor concern is exit, 
during early stages, this study suggests it is about achieving a high rate of 
growth. Consequently, early investors are optimising company to achieve 
growth in order to take it to the next stage of venture development lifecycle 
and obtain further investment. Data shows, Optimising for Growth explained 
what was happening on early venture boards, including variations being 
captured by emerging dimensions of categories. 
To summarise, the core category of Optimising has emerged as a process-
type category. Connecting the main concern and the core category, the 
process has been conceptualised as a process of Optimising for Growth 
(Glaser, 1998). As such, to resolve their main concern, i.e. striving to achieve 
exponential growth, the data revealed that directors engaged in a process of 
Optimising. This process contains two stages – Stage 1 Evaluating and 
Structuring Stage and Stage 2 Behaving Bigger Stage and it involves a 
structural and social-psychological transformation of the company, its 
founder and the board. The process takes place during the period post initial 
investment, i.e. between the first investment and the next investment round, 
a period typically lasting 12-18 months. 
Figure 6 illustrates the shape and structure of the core category, as emerged 
at that stage of data analysis, clearly indicating a process-type core category. 
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Figure 6. Uncovering the Core Category 
 
 
Source: Figure Developed by the Author, 2020 
The Figure 6 shows how the process-type core category of Optimising 
permitted to organise into a “central integrative scheme” several processes 
and interactions that otherwise might seem disconnected (Glaser, 1996, 
p.111). It visually captures the initial view of the identified core category, 
containing the emerging 2 stages, indicators of the transition states of 
company, board and founder and transformation processes.  
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4.2.4  Generation of Open Codes 
Whilst analysing data to identify the main concern and core category, 
researcher has carried out open coding. 
Using a constant comparison technique, data incidents from new interviews 
were grouped into either new or existing open codes. Several properties 
emerged to define open codes. The researcher wrote memos noting ideas, 
relationships and connections between emerging categories, properties and 
codes (Glaser, 1978). 
As part of the data analysis process, open codes were continuously re-
organised and renamed, based on new data or properties that emerged, 
which is a natural occurrence during the coding process of the grounded 
theory method (Glaser, 1998). 
Several versions of memo and coding files were kept in order to have a track 
record of the evolution of data analysis and collection stages, development of 
codes, categories and theory. 
At a point of identifying and confirming the core category, 52 open categories 
have emerged and a rich memo bank of 90 memos was also developed. 
Several codes emerged into categories with extensive properties, which 
defined boundaries. Table 11 contains a set of early emerging open 
categories and open codes or properties, arranged in alphabetical order. 
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Table 11. List of Open Categories 
Open Categories Open Codes 
Added Value Type, Measurability, Context, Quality 
Aligning Power - 
Avoiding Surprises - 
Becoming CEO - 
Behaving Bigger Adding value 
Behaviours During Board 
Meeting 
Challenging, Adding, Raising Hard 
Questions, Getting out of the Way 
Bigger Picture - 
Board Chair Chair Effectiveness (Strong, Weak) 
Board Changes Type of Catalyst 
Board Effectiveness Characteristics of Effective Board, 
Characteristics of Ineffective Board 
Board Functions Governance / Strategic 
Board Meeting Quality Good, Bad, Evolving, Structure 
Board Meeting Preparing Preparing well, Preparing badly 
Board Meeting Value Getting Value, Not Getting Value 
Board Mindset Aligned / Misaligned 
Board Pack Getting it Right , Structure, Quality of 
Information, Notice Period 
Board Size Small/Large 
Board Style - 
Bringing Skills from Externals - 
CEO-Board Communication Effective, Ongoing, Transparency, Familiarity, 
Contact, Tone 
CEO Reaction Accepting and Acting, Inaction 
Changing Subtly 
Communication Approach Importance, Constructive, Destructive, 
Coaching 
Communication Style Aggressive, Subservient, Passive-Aggressive 
Composing Boards Choice, Investor Seat, Filling Gaps, Blending 
Experiences and Skills, Balancing Execs and 
Non-Execs 
Deep Understanding of the 
Business 
- 
Divergence in Interests - 
Early Venture Characteristics of Early Ventures (Informal 
Style, Low Technical Risk, Uncertainty, 
Requiring Multiple Rounds of Funding, 
Potential to Scale Fast, Performance Below 
Target) 
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Open Categories Open Codes 
Educating and Mentoring 
CEO/Founder 
- 
Evolved CEO Characteristics of Evolved CEO (Dealing 
Succinctly, More Experienced, Mindset, 
Having Clear Asks, Taking Ownership) 
Every day Challenge for CEO - 
Founder Director  Characteristics of Founder Director (First time 
Everything, Mindset) 
Future Focusing - 
Gaps Types Systems and Processes Gaps, KPI Gaps, 
Governance Gaps, Skills and Experience 
Gaps 
Getting Rid of Founder/CEO - 
Growth Growth Characteristics (Rate of Growth, 
Growth Curve Gradient) 
Growth Company Characteristics of Growth Company (Taking 
Large Funding Round, Company Size) 
Having Templates - 
Helping from Experience  - 
Helping - 
Identifying Gaps Post First Investment, At Next Stage 
Issues Faced by Early Ventures Similar, Commercial, Evolving 
NED Type of Experience, Soft Skills, 
Incentivisation 
Optimising Stage 1 Evaluating and Structuring, Stage 2 
Behaving Bigger 
Seeing Failure - 
Trust - 
Tapping into Board Experience Using Board/ Not using the Board 
Thinking about the Exit - 
Typology of Boards Brain Trust, Silent Mentality, Administrative 
Burden, Wine and Cheese 
Vicious Circle - 
VC Director Characteristics of VC Director (Types of 
Experience, VC Portfolio Mindset, Focusing 
on the Winners, Taking a long-term View) 
VC-Founder Relationship Building Active Relationship (Effectiveness, 
Change in Relationship after Investment) 
Source: Table Developed by the Author, 2020 
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Table 11 is a summary of initial set of 52 open categories as emerged 
following the open coding stage. Going forward, through the selective and 
theoretical coding stages, open categories have been further developed into 
selective codes, and the relationships between them emerge as theoretical 
codes (Glaser, 1978). The illustrative quotes from interviews demonstrating 
the development of codes and the connection between data and the codes 
and categories can be found Appendix 5 From Data to Concepts. 
This list of early categories in Table 11 shows that, inevitably, at such early 
stage, some of these codes were quite descriptive in nature. For example, 
codes such as Having Templates, simply expressed what was happening in 
corresponding data incidents: 
Having Templates: 
“we have templates and things like that” VC4 
“but in terms of other bits of the business, so it’s one of the things 
we’ve been working on ourselves in fact, is to put together a 
template of this is what we think a board pack should look like 
because you know, there is not much point in saying, we don’t 
much like the look of that and then just leave it for them to figure 
out for themselves. So starting to put together some guidance 
around that” VC5 
“as a VC we tend to be fairly prescriptive about what we want to 
see in the board pack, you know, from management accounts, key 
updates on the month, product development roadmap, you known, 
anything going on from competitive landscape perspective. All 
those kind of things you know. So there is a slide deck we are 
provided with, which is a fairly standard format month on month 
which we get taken through” VC1 
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However, several analytical codes also emerged at this stage. For example, 
codes such as Issues Faced by Early Ventures, named matters that showed 
up systematically in a more analytical way, as opposed to using participants 
own words: 
Issues Faced by Early Ventures: 
“Although the companies may be working in different sector and 
on a completely different product they tend to have similar issues 
in the first year of funding” VC7 
“we said that something was going to happen and then for things 
outside our control it didn’t happen as quick as we thought” F5 
“they can have their hands broadly in even bigger set of changes” 
NED1 
At the same time, categories began capturing variations in data. For 
example, open category Board Meeting Quality included properties such as 
Good, Bad and Evolving. To illustrate this in participants own words: 
Good Board Meeting Quality: 
“all over sudden the quality of the board and the quality of the 
discussion is really good because we are in a position whereby we 
start to talk around the issues rather than waste time on vanity” 
VC4 
“a good way that the board functions is for the CEO to present a 
problem also present a solution and then open it up for discussion.  
And then the board members at the board meeting will provide 
input” VC7 
Bad Board Meeting Quality: 
“sometimes it is a very long narrative of everything they did last 
month, which is well it is informative, it is not that instructive” VC3 
“it is informative, it is not that instructive because you spend all 
your time talking about what’s already happened as opposed to 
what’s going to happen” VC5 
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Evolving Board Meeting Quality: 
“most meetings I have, at least started life as management 
meetings in my view and the challenge is I think is to try and 
evolve them into board meetings” VC5 
“I think if we are talking about early stage companies, it’s very 
much an evolutionary process” VC6 
Codes began capturing variation not only in structures, such as illustrated 
above, but also variations in behaviours. For example, open category 
Tapping into Board Experience conceptualised a behaviour of a Founder 
Director when they are seeking input from the board. Data showed variation 
in this behaviour, thus Founders were either Using Board or Not Using the 
Board. To illustrate this in participants own words: 
Tapping into Board Experience: 
Using Board: 
“one of the key skills for any founder is how to use his or 
her board to the best possible effect, because 
sometimes founders don’t really tell their directors what 
they want from them” VC8 
“when the CEO needs to tap into the experience of the 
board and making sure they optimise the company for 
success” VC3 
Not Using Board: 
“I very much felt his roles hasn’t really been exploited in 
the way it should have been. I felt that they should have 
been using him to tap into his networks” VC4 
“I don’t think we got tremendous input from them at the 
board meeting, in that case, so we kind of had to figure it 
out for ourselves, to be honest. So you know I think may 
be what we should have done was challenge them a bit 
more to look for the value add, you know, respectfully, 
obviously” VC5 
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As these examples show, through coding, the researcher began capturing 
variations, thus developing a foundation for the grounded theory to account 
for differences in director experiences. 
Also, at this point of open coding, there seemed to have been an endless 
number of ways in which the 52 open categories within this set could be 
grouped and organised into further categories (Urquhart 2013). For instance, 
the most obvious combination was to conceptualise types of board directors 
by properties, since Founders, VC Directors and NEDs had a set of similar 
properties, including Level of Experience and Skills. However, at the same 
time, each director also had properties it did not share with other director 
types, such as for example, Mindset, and Incentivisation.  
Another example of candidate codes for an obvious grouping is categories of 
Board Meeting and Board Pack. These could have been easily combined 
into Board Norms. Yet, such amalgamation and indeed, such naming could 
later prove to be too obstructive to untangle relationships indicated by 
categories Vicious Circle, Board Value and Board Effectiveness. Especially 
since there was not yet clear distinction of which codes would be relevant to 
which of two stages of the process of Optimising. 
Glaser (1998) notes that the decision to group codes at an early open stage 
of analysis could be premature and prove unhelpful at the later stages, 
especially when identifying and explaining relationships between categories 
in relation to individual director behaviour. That is why 52 open categories 
have not been grouped further during open coding stage. Fundamentally, the 
way in which these initial and subsequent codes get grouped and organised 
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clearly depended on the purpose of these categories in relation to the core 
category (Urquhart, 2013).  
The emergence of the main concern and core category has therefore 
completed the open coding stage of data collection and analysis, signalling 
the readiness for the analysis to move to selectively coding for categories 
only relating to core and collecting and theoretically sampling data based on 
analytic grounds in order to saturate categories. 
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4.3   Selective Coding Stage 
Having identified Growth as the main concern of participants and Optimising 
as the process for its resolution, the analysis moved into the next stage – 
selective coding and theoretical sampling.  
In classic GT, selective coding involves coding of only those categories that 
relate to the core. The aim of this type of coding is to specify, connect and 
saturate categories that link up to the core and to make decisions about such 
categories that do not have a relationship with it (Glaser, 1992). Arriving at 
the set of selective codes, also known as substantive codes, since they 
conceptually define the substantive area under investigation, this stage 
drives sharpening and in-depth development of concepts and, consequently, 
plays a very important role in theory emergence (Urquhart, 2013). 
Summarised in Figure 7 as follows: 
Figure 7. Selective Coding Stage 
 
Source: Figure developed by the Author, 2020 
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Thus, the purpose of the selective coding stage of analysis was to generate 
selective codes, specify and saturate them thus arriving at a set of 
abstracted selective codes. Broadly speaking this stage included the 
following activities: 
• coding selectively only for those categories relating to the core and 
arriving at initial set of selective codes; 
• theoretical sampling; 
• arriving at the final set of 6 selective codes; 
• discarding unused codes; 
• revisiting research question. 
These activities are discussed in more detail in the following sub-sections. 
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4.3.1  Initial Selective Codes 
During the previous open coding stage, there were several options for how to 
further group categories together. Nevertheless, the researcher resisted 
advancing with major integration efforts in case resulting categories might be 
more obstructive than helpful during this stage (Glaser, 1998). Instead, the 
ideas about different ways of grouping open codes were captured in the 
memo bank. At selective coding stage, it was time to revisit those ideas and 
to decide how open codes could be usefully grouped into selective codes in 
a way that was relevant to core category in “sufficiently significant ways” 
(Glaser, 1992, p.75). In order to make such decisions, it was also necessary 
to ‘scale up’ open codes into larger categories and to develop those in terms 
of properties until saturation, i.e. the recurrence of the interactional pattern 
(Glaser, 1992, Urquhart, 2013).  
To code selectively, the efforts were focused on coding for anything relating 
to Optimising for Growth of company, board and Founder. During this 
process, several sources of data were used. First, the transcripts of the 5 
interviews conducted during the open coding stage were reviewed to search 
for data incidents around the core category. Then, attention turned to the 
data collected during the Pilot study, comprising of 11 interviews with a 
variety of directors including VC Directors, an Angel Investor Director, 
Founders, Replacement CEO and independent NEDs. These were coded 
selectively for the set of open codes, using constant comparison method and 
noting possible relationships through memos.  
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This led to a relatively quick fill out of categories relating to codes of 
Evaluating Gaps and Composing Boards to the point where through constant 
comparison it was evident that new data incidents just gave another 
description of existing code but not yielded any new dimension or properties, 
indicating saturation (Glaser, 1998). Similarly, categories characterising the 
three types of directors and the different states of company, board and 
Founder also got quickly shaped. 
Table 12 provides a summary of the initial set of 15 selective codes at that 
stage. 
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Table 12. Initial Set of Selective Codes  
Selective Codes Open Codes  
Board Purpose Governance Function 
Strategic Function 
Board Meeting Quality Characteristics of Effective/Ineffective Board Meeting 
Quality, comprising of different dimensions of  
Board Pack (Quality of Information – high, poor, 
variation, Notice Period – timely, late) 
Board Meeting (Reporting – high quality, low quality, 
inaccurate, Strategic Discussion – high quality, low 
quality) 
Preparing 
Vicious Circle 
Board Mindset Board Mindset (Aligned, Misaligned) 
Challenges of Early 
Ventures 
Type of Challenge – Performance, Commercialising, 
People Issues, Funding 
Challenges of 
Founders 
Self-doubt 
Tunnel Vision 
Challenges 
Characteristics 
Similar, Unknown, Evolving in Complexity 
Composing Boards Investor Right to Board Seat 
Filling Gaps 
Balancing 
Evaluating Gaps Post Early Investment 
Pre-Next Investment 
Founder Director Experience of First Time Everything 
Coachability of Mindset (Coachable, Not Coachable) 
Receptiveness of Advice (Open to Advice, Resisting 
Advice) 
Susceptibility to Value Board (Positive, Negative) 
Gaps Structural Systems and Processes Gaps, KPIs Gaps, Skills and 
Experience Gaps 
Gaps Cognitive Understanding Governance Gaps 
Growing Company 
Characteristics 
Taking Large Investment Round 
Company Size (Turnover, Number of Employees) 
Growth Growth Curve Gradient (Rate, Speed)  
Volatility  
NED Type of Experience (Large Corporate Experience, Industry 
Expert, Early Stage Experience) 
Skills (Soft skills) 
VC Director Type of Experience (Large number of boards, Early Stage 
Experience, Full Cycle Experience) 
VC Portfolio Mindset (Inherent Conflict, Focusing on the 
Winners, Cutting out Failures, Taking Long-term View) 
Source: Table Developed by the Author, 2020 
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4.3.2  Theoretical Sampling 
The remaining categories did not fill out as easily in this process of 
selectively coding from data collected during the Pilot study. Therefore, 
theoretical sampling was used to obtain data from the new interviews. 
Theoretical sampling is an approach to gathering data purposefully, by 
considering what to sample for and where to sample from based on 
analytical grounds (Urquhart, 2013). According to Glaser (1998, p.157), 
theoretical sampling  
“focuses questions more and more on the direct emergence of the 
theory (thus showing again, how interview schedules constrain 
theoretical sampling). Questions constantly change with the 
requirements of the emergent theory and theoretical sampling”. 
This helps progress the development of theory about core category by a 
process of systematically increasing the density of selective codes related to 
the core. Consequently, theoretical sampling is deemed a crucial “core 
analytic tenet” of the grounded theory method as it advances the theory 
about core category (Suddaby, 2016, p.640). 
Unsaturated selective codes provide and excellent basis for sampling 
theoretically (Urquhart, 2013). Therefore, the requirements for theoretical 
sampling were considered based on the unsaturated categories. 
Broadly there were three clusters of categories that required further 
saturation: 
1) Founder Becoming CEO, Characteristics Evolved CEO, Getting 
Rid of Founder/CEO 
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2) Communication Approach and Style, Contact, Trust 
3) Adding Value, Director Behaviours, CEO Reaction, Helping 
Considerations were made thinking through where the next data sample 
should come from. Thus, regarding the first cluster, the next data sample 
should provide details about CEO characteristics at the point of the next 
round of funding. Sampling for this information could also help saturate the 
process by which CEO is evolving, i.e. Becoming CEO and what happens if 
founder hasn’t ‘evolved’ and replaced. Additionally, this data sample should 
enable the researcher to get better defined properties of the boundary of the 
core category. 
Such data should be sampled from sources/interviewees with a broad range 
of experience on boards at later stages, post next round of funding, i.e. 
where the founder remained to lead the company and in situations where 
they were replaced. Experienced VC Director would be a target interviewee 
to gather such data from. Also, it would be good to interview VCs specialising 
in later stage investments as opposed to early stage VCs, the focus so far. 
Also, since Angel Investors are often credited with providing help and 
mentoring founders throughout early stages, an experienced Angel Investor 
Director could also provide such data. 
The second cluster, Communication cluster categories are very complex with 
several properties already identified. There seems to be a complex 
relationship that needs clarifying between Communication, Contact, Trust 
and Director Relationship, shaped by properties such as Effectiveness and 
Changing. This data could come from any type of director. 
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Finally, categories and properties of the third cluster, Added Value need 
further sharpening, they are somewhat shaped by properties such as Type of 
Added Value, Measurability, Method, Advice Consequences and CEO 
Reaction. However, there is a need to better understand the context, director 
behaviours, causes and effects of Added Value so it could be better located 
in the stages of the process of optimising.  This data could come from any 
type of director. 
Table 13 outlines those unsaturated categories and discusses the 
requirements for theoretical sampling. 
Table 13. Requirements for Theoretical Sampling 
Clusters of 
Unsaturated 
Categories 
Requirements for Theoretical Sampling 
Becoming CEO 
Evolved CEO 
Getting Rid of 
Founder/CEO 
• Details of CEO characteristics at the point of the next 
round of funding 
• Saturate the process by which CEO is evolving, i.e. 
Becoming CEO and what happens if founder hasn’t 
‘evolved’ and replaced.  
• Data can be sampled from sources/interviewees with a 
broad range of experience on boards at later stages, 
post next round 
 
Communication 
Approach and Style 
Contact 
Trust 
Director Relationships 
• Saturate and clarify complex relationships between 
Communication, Contact, Trust and Director 
Relationship, shaped by properties such as 
Effectiveness and Changing.  
• This data could come from any type of director. 
 
Adding Value  
Director Behaviours 
CEO Reaction 
 
• To saturate the context, causes and effects of Added 
Value so it could be better located in the stages of the 
process of optimising. Saturate dimensions of a range 
of director behaviour patterns 
• Provide further data on director behaviours 
• This data could come from any type of director. 
Source: Table Developed by the Author, 2020 
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As Table 13 illustrates, four clusters of unsaturated categories were 
identified. This provided a basis for considering properties and dimensions 
that needed to be sampled for theoretically. Guide to Interviews via 
Theoretical Sampling is available in Appendix 4 Interview Guides. 
Figure 8 illustrates unsaturated areas in relations to the core category: 
Figure 8. Unsaturated Areas in Relation to Core Category 
 
Source: Figure Developed by the Author, 2020 
In addition to identifying requirements for the data to sample for, the most 
relevant sources of such data were also identified, effectively creating criteria 
for the recruitment of next interview participants. As it was highlighted in the 
previous chapter, throughout the stage of selective coding and theoretical 
sampling further new participants were interviewed. 
In the process of the theoretical sampling, the interviews become “means of 
eliciting information” on the required area (Suddaby, 2006, p.635). As 
outlined in the previous chapter, the initial interview structure was evolved to 
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add focus on asking questions around the identified areas and therefore 
responding to the needs of the emerging selective codes.  
Having persevered with further interviewing and data analysis, the majority of 
the remaining selective codes have been saturated, resulting in additional 3 
selective codes, as shown in Table 14. 
Table 14. Additional Selective Codes 
Selective Codes 
 
Open Codes  
Adding Value Quality 
Types of Value Add (Opening Doors, 
Providing Strategic Input, Dealing with 
Issues, Challenging, Sounding Board, 
Focussing on the Bigger Picture, Mentoring 
Founder) 
Delivery of Value Add, Level of Engagement 
and Instructiveness 
Obtaining the Value Add, Delivery of Value 
Add 
Becoming CEO Attributes Taking Ownership 
Being Explicit with Asks 
Communicating During Board Meeting, Ongoing basis 
Deep Understanding of the Business 
Trust 
Source: Table Developed by the Author, 2020 
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4.3.3  Final Set of Selective Codes 
Previous sections showed how a set of selective codes was saturated via 
selective coding and theoretical sampling. The resulting set of 18 selective 
codes as shown in tables Table 12. Initial Set of Selective Codes and Table 
14. Additional Selective Codes, defined the substantive area under 
investigation. Still, it arguably did so with excessive level of detail, in no fewer 
than 18 selective categories. However, “to be workable, and elegant, a 
theory needs to have only a few constructs” (Urquhart, 2013, p.89). It is 
necessary to be able to explain what is happening in the substantive area in 
fewer categories as possible (Glaser, 2011). This requires an exercise in 
conceptualising and abstracting of the set of codes.  
Several analytic techniques can be used to aid the abstraction (Urquhart, 
2013). In this study, in order to achieve abstraction, the researcher 
considered whether any of the selective codes could be grouped together, 
deliberated on whether any of the codes were in fact a property of another 
code and weighed up options for a better name for any of the categories 
(Glaser 1998). This was also where the researcher decided on the codes 
relating to each Stage of the process of Optimising. Throughout the process, 
the ideas in the memo bank about how categories might be conceptualised 
were reviewed and expanded on.  
Table 15 shows the result of this process, demonstrating how the 18 
selective codes were further structures and abstracted into just 6.  
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Table 15. Evolution and Abstraction of Selective Codes 
Initial Set of Selective Codes 
 
Final Set of Selective Categories 
Growth Curve Gradient Growth 
Growing Company Indicators 
Becoming CEO Attributes 
Evaluating Gaps Stage 1 Evaluating and Structuring 
Stage Composing Boards 
Founder Director 
VC Director 
NED 
Adding Value Stage 2 Behaving Bigger Stage 
Communicating 
Board Purpose Degree of Fit for Purpose Board 
Board Mindset Alignment 
Board Meeting Quality 
Challenges of Early Ventures Venture Challenges 
Challenges of Founders 
Challenges Characteristics 
Structural Gaps 
Cognitive 
Source: Table Developed by the Author, 2020 
The remainder of the section provides details for each of the final set of 
selective codes, linking illustrative quotes to open codes to selective codes. It 
also interprets them thus laying the foundation for the next section of this 
chapter on theoretical sampling which defines the relationships between 
these categories into a grounded theory. The summary of the final set of 
selective codes and illustrative quotes can also be found in Appendix 5 From 
Data to Concepts. 
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4.3.3.1  Growth – Main Concern 
Growth has emerged as the main concern of participants. This was 
illustrated earlier in the chapter in Section 4.3 Open Coding. In participants 
own words: 
“Ultimately needing to secure growth in the portfolio company is the most 
important thing for a VC” VC5 
“[it] comes through in everything the director is doing to help the 
company or persuade them to go down a particular product line, as that 
is a bigger market, so then the company would grow more quickly VC7 
“we are after is not necessarily profit but big growth and therefore long-
term value” VC3 
Participants specified Growth using three properties: 
• Growth Curve Gradient; 
• Company Growth Indicators; and 
• Becoming CEO Attributes. 
The first property illustrated that Growth had to be ‘huge’, ‘big’, ‘steep’, ‘going 
through the roof’, as opposed to not ‘hitting a certain range’, not ‘moving 
forward’ or ‘almost going backwards’. Thus, it was defined by Growth Curve 
Gradient, consisting of Rate of Growth, Speed and Volatility. Properties Rate 
of Growth and Speed both captured variation in data High/Low. To illustrate: 
Rate of Growth High/Low: 
“when we started to see it grow it was very satisfying and actually 
from memory it finally achieved its growth curve” (VC1) 
“it was still profitable, you know, but ultimately its growth curve 
was less steep than it had been” (VC4) 
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Speed High/Low 
“do this, you know, do whatever you can to get as big as you can 
as fast as you can” (F5) 
 “it could always go faster. Investors are never happy” (F5) 
Volatility indicated that Growth was not stable: 
“he has built that business from 0 to £20m, to 0 and now we are 
down to £3m, so we’ve been up and down a yo-yo with that 
business” (NED4) 
Overall, Growth Curve Gradient shows that whilst directors were concerned 
to achieve a very specific type of growth, i.e. at high rate and speed, at the 
same time, the reality of venture’s early stage meant that Growth was also 
unstable and volatile.  Thus, it defined Growth using non-traditional and 
subjective measures of company performance (Garg, 2013). Due to high 
levels of uncertainty, it was deemed by directors as a more relevant measure 
of performance during the early stages of startup than traditional measure 
such as turnover or profit (Fried, Bruton and Hisrich, 1998). 
The second property of Growth was identified as Company Growth 
Indicators. Whilst participants acknowledged they could identify growth 
through traditional indicators of growth, such as turnover, for example: 
“we could see it through the numbers, frankly” (VC1) 
“it grew from virtually no revenue to revenues of roughly £10m” (VC1) 
Company Growth Indicators were, in fact, specified by the ability of the 
company to be Taking a Large Investment Round and increase in Company 
Size. To illustrate:  
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Taking a Large Investment Round: 
“we are preparing for series A” (F4) 
“we took a round of investment there which was essentially seed 
which ballooned into a Series A” (F6) 
Company Size: 
“when you go into the office and it is suddenly like a grown-up 
company. There are all these people here, and you don’t know 
what they do” (VC3) 
“we are a team of 10 now” (F1) 
“The growth is was myself January last year, then [NAME] joined, 
he’s arrived, he [JOB ROLE], and then really quickly, we hired our 
first full time developer” (F3) 
The third property of Growth has emerged relating to the venture founder: 
Becoming CEO Attributes, i.e. behavioural attributes that indicated a 
transformation of first-time founder into a CEO. The profile of Founder at the 
start of the investment has been coded as Founder Director Profile “First 
Time Everything” and it can be found as a property of Stage 1 Evaluating 
and Structuring Stage, described later in this section. Together, these codes 
represent conceptualised states of the beginning and end of the founder 
journey through the process of Optimising for Growth.  
Thus, at the beginning of the process, Founder Director Profile is 
characterised by lack of experience, and variations in Mindset (positive or 
negative Coachability, Receptiveness to Advice, and Susceptibility to Value 
Board). Whereas, at the end, Becoming CEO Attributes show that founders 
are Taking Ownership and become very skilled at using their boards coded 
as Being Explicit with Asks. To illustrate: 
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Taking Ownership: 
“it is important that the CEO recognises that he needs to lead, or 
she” (VC7) 
“everybody has different inputs and we, in a formal but, in a 
sense, informal way, we now want to discuss what’s right and 
ultimately for the CEO to execute on it” (NED1) 
Being Explicit with Asks: 
“they will ask for very specific help because they can manage 
most things themselves because they’ve done it before” (VC7) 
“he is very good at asking for advice” (NED3) 
“one of the key skills for any founder is how to use his or her 
board to the best possible effect, because sometimes founders 
don’t really tell their directors what they want from them. So I think 
that’s something I noticed” (VC8) 
“absolutely clear statements what they would like from their board” 
(VC8) 
Table 16 summarises the main concern category of Growth and its 
properties. 
Table 16. Main Concern Category - Growth 
CATEGORY GROWTH 
Selective Code, Property Open Codes, Properties (Sub-Properties) 
Growth Curve Gradient Rate of Growth (High/Low) 
Speed (High Low) 
Volatility 
Growing Company 
Indicators 
Taking Large Investment Round 
Increasing Company Size 
Becoming CEO Attributes Taking Ownership 
Being Explicit with Asks 
Source: Table Developed by the Author, 2020 
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4.3.3.2  Process of Optimising – Stage 1 – Evaluating and Structuring 
Data revealed the process of Optimising For Growth has two stages and it 
starts with Stage 1. Evaluating and Structuring Stage. To illustrate: 
“My focus from day one is obviously get in there and work out 
whether it is going to be fit for purpose” (VC4) 
“they evaluated a gap in the experience in the board they went out 
to find somebody” (VC5) 
During this stage directors are engaged in two activities: Evaluating Gaps 
based on the profiles of Founder and VC Director, and Composing Boards to 
fill those gaps. 
Evaluating Gaps as activity, took place Post Investment, i.e. at the beginning 
at the process of Optimising for Growth. Data shows that several distinct 
types of gaps are evaluated, which were categorised into Gaps, and these 
have been conceptualised as a separate category, which can be found after 
Stage 1, Table 18. Gaps below.  
Particular attention was paid to the Founder Director because venture 
founders are typically first-time entrepreneurs, young individuals who never 
run a company before. In this study this characteristic of Founder was 
conceptualised as Experience First Time Everything and Mindset. This can 
be illustrated by the following participant quotes: 
Experience of First Time Everything: 
“I am a first-time founder” (F1) 
“they are often first-time entrepreneurs” (VC4) 
“for many companies, particularly you know, early stage 
companies, it may well be the first business they have started, so 
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you know, they don’t have the experience already to do that” 
(VC5) 
“in most growth companies backed by VCs you are starting with a 
usually unexperienced team, very capable but inexperienced. In 
all, I often say the Chief Exec has L plates, like a learner driver” 
(VC6) 
Mindset refers to individual’s cognitive processes which enable them to 
better deal with complex tasks and environments (Gollwitzer and Bayer, 
1999). It represents Founder’s way of thinking and influences their 
interpretations of what is happening around them (Ireland, Hitt and Sirmon 
2003, p.967). Most importantly, it shapes the way they respond to the 
challenges (Lant, Milliken and Batra, 1992, Ocasio, 1997, Reger and Palmer, 
1996). Therefore, Mindset is linked to Founder’s behaviours and actions, 
since cognitive processes are evoked when individuals make decisions, 
assessments or judgements (Mitchell et al., 2002). In this study, Mindset 
emerged to be defined by the following three properties: 
• Coachability (Positive/Negative), indicating an attitude open to advice, 
input and discussion; 
• Receptiveness to Advice (Positive/Negative), revealing if CEO would 
be embracing rather than dismissing the input; 
• Susceptibility to Value Board (Positive/Negative), a sign of CEO’s 
mindset understanding board as a valuable asset as opposed to a 
control mechanism. 
Illustrative quotes for each of those properties can be found in Appendix 5 
From Data to Concepts. It is important to note how these three properties 
capture a potentially significant variation in Founder Mindset. On one 
extreme, there is a Founder who has a Coachable Mindset, someone who is 
receptive to advice and values his/her board. On the other extreme, a 
Founder could also be not Coachable, dismissive or not receptive to any 
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advice and does not consider his/her board as valuable asset. As it could be 
seen at the next stage of analysis Founder Mindset plays an important role in 
the ability of the board to add value and getting it to Growth. 
VC’s ow Director Profile is also considered during the Evaluating Gaps 
activity. VCs have been characterised by having a Right to Board Seat, 
Experience of Large Number of Boards and Full Cycle, as well as having an 
Inherent Conflict of Interest and Focusing on the Winners. Illustrative quotes 
for each of those properties can be found in Appendix 5 From Data to 
Concepts. 
Evaluating Gaps is followed by Composing Boards activities. These have 
been conceptualised as Bringing NEDs, Filling Gaps and Balancing. To 
illustrate: 
Bringing NEDs 
“we normally would try and use our board seat to bring in an 
external third-party individual” (VC1) 
“looking outside just investors for non-execs is a very valuable 
thing to do, because obviously any director including a VC director 
has a responsibility for the company but they are all obviously are 
acting on behalf of their own firm whereas a truly independent 
non-exec is a very valuable in that they don’t have that loyalties 
skewed. They are responsible to the board and to the company 
and the shareholders and aren’t influenced by valuations in the 
same way as it is for the investor. So, I think making sure there 
are independent non-execs on the board is very important” (VC5) 
Filling Gaps: 
“success to me is when all of the skills required or represented on 
the board either in executive or non-executive capacity” (VC1) 
 “he is a classic where he understands his own limitations and 
he’s built a team around him who are all better in their individual 
disciplines than he is” (NED3) 
162 
 
“And then a good board will then have an industry expert who isn’t 
necessarily familiar with the problems that early stage companies 
face generically. But, is able to help with much more with the 
product. Help the team in a more specific way around the product 
and the market that they might be going into” (VC7) 
Balancing: 
“We had a right blend of skills” (VC4) 
“I think that’s highly effective … getting a blend of those different 
kind of experience” (VC5) 
“I think it’s very crucial to ensure that if you bring people in, they 
are not only have a good range of complementary skills and 
networks, but, and this is a difficult balance to get, one who will 
challenge, both the founder and potentially the board itself so they 
will have strong views on what might be affecting the company.  
But also, you do want to get people who are not going to distract 
the CEO because what you don’t want is individuals who have 
personal agendas who may spend too much time around the CEO 
and give them a bad advice”  (VC8) 
Furthermore, data indicated that Evaluating Gaps activity also took place At 
Next Investment, i.e. at the end of the process of Optimising for Growth. Both 
boards and Founders were evaluated replaced with the new investment 
coming in. To illustrate: 
Restructuring Boards 
“when we raised £1.5m they wanted a proper paid Chair who had 
experience in our sector” (F5) 
“when you raise more money from different types, growth funds, 
from larger VC funds, you will then get Investor Directors onto the 
board who have experience of later stage funds. So that tends to 
work quite well, they tend to have different experience to the early 
stage investors. And its key that you get that step, that step is 
quite normal as your percentage holding in the company falls you 
would expect your board seat to eventually go and it gets replaced 
by investors who are more experienced at stage the company is at 
now” (VC7)  
Getting Rid of Founder/CEO: 
“certain people, for example, can probably run a business from 0 
to £1m turnover and then they get beyond their skills set” (VC4) 
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“it was time professionalise the executive team away from the 
founders” (VC1) 
This gave an indication that the process of Optimising for Growth is re-
starting at the point of raising the next investment, however since venture 
was no longer early stage, this was outside the scope of the study. 
To summarise, Table 17 shows details of Stage 1 Evaluating and Structuring 
Stage (illustrative quotes for each code can be found in Appendix 5 From 
Data to Concepts). 
Table 17. Stage 1. Evaluating and Structuring Stage 
CATEGORY EVALUATING AND STRUCTURING STAGE 
Selective Code, 
Property 
Open Codes, 
Properties Sub-Properties 
Evaluating Gaps Post Investment None 
At Next Investment Restructuring Boards 
Getting Rid of Founder/CEO 
Composing Boards Bringing NEDs NED Profile 
Filling Gaps Having Templates 
NEDs Role in Founder’s Mindset 
Balancing None 
Founder Director Profile 
“First Time Everything” 
Experience of First 
Time Everything 
None 
Mindset Coachability (positive/negative) 
Receptiveness to Advice 
(positive/negative) 
Susceptibility to Value Board 
(positive/negative) 
VC Director Profile Right to Board Seat None 
Experience Large number of boards 
Full Cycle Experience 
Portfolio Mindset Inherent Conflict Fund vs Venture 
Focusing on the Winners 
Source: Table Developed by the Author, 2020  
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4.3.3.3  Gaps 
As it was mentioned during the presentation of Stage 1 Evaluating and 
Structuring, the evaluation activities are carried out to identify a number of 
shortages in the company, board and team. These shortages have been 
conceptualised as Gaps. Two types of gaps have emerged from the data: 
Structural gaps and Cognitive gaps.  
First type of gaps, Structural gaps, have emerged to consist of Systems and 
Processes, KPIs, and Skills and Experiences gaps. Since most venture 
boards are formed as a result of the first investment (Garg, 2013), it was 
important to check if venture’s systems and processes were fit with the 
ambitions to grow exponentially and if there was a right degree of formality. 
To illustrate: 
Systems and Processes (Structural Gaps): 
“in terms of its systems, processes and controls, it was still very 
much a small company” (VC4) 
“from the point of view of governance, formality, we were not very 
formal” (F4) 
Skills and Experiences (Structural Gaps): 
“Each executive team has different strengths and weaknesses 
and I think it is important to fill out the board in a way that is 
complimentary to the executives around the table, making sure 
you are filling any skill gaps or if someone is young and 
inexperienced, make sure there is some..., one there who can be 
a chair, mentor type of person, if it someone that doesn’t have 
industry experience, make sure there is someone on there with 
good networks and into the industry that’s relevant. It’s working 
out what the board needs to look like in totality to complement the 
executives. The executives, generally, they are what they are, so 
it is a matter of building the board to fit around” (VC1) 
 “Then we are going to really get down by doing the jobs about 
where the gaps are, so we know we need a non-exec with 
marketing experience, so we started looking for that type of 
person, and then we are just starting to look at wider mix of 
people” (F5) 
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KPIs (Structural Gaps): 
“what are the right metrics that are going to give you advance 
notification of, you know, are we looking like we are going to be on 
track or not” (VC5) 
“He examined the KPIs and he decided whether they were the 
right KPIs” (VC4) 
“The ones that are self-aware enough to go and do some research 
themselves about what are the right metrics to be tracking” (VC5) 
Second type of gaps, Cognitive gaps, related to whether the Founders had a 
real Understanding of Governance, e.g. the functions of the board and the 
purpose of governance, including a legal entity with fiduciary duties and 
responsibilities, as well as recognising the board as bringing benefit and 
value. To illustrate:  
Understanding Governance (Cognitive Gaps): 
“The number one priority is to make sure the CEO understands 
what’s the function of the board is and a lot of them don’t” (VC3) 
“In the very early stages a lot of the CEOs don’t really value the 
board meetings and the input of the board” (VC3) 
“They don’t necessarily understand what’s the benefit is” (VC4) 
“I was very, very nervous [at board meetings] on the first few 
because I didn’t understand the process” (F2) 
Table 18 summarises the category Gaps and its properties. 
Table 18. Gaps 
CATEGORY GAPS 
Selective Code, Property Open Codes, Properties 
Structural  Systems and Processes Gaps 
KPIs Gaps 
Skills and Experience Gaps 
Cognitive Understanding Governance 
Source: Table Developed by the Author, 2020 
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4.3.3.4  Fit for Purpose Board 
This category represents the degree of board fit for its purpose. It emerged 
from data that this fit is determined using three properties:  
• Board Purpose,  
• Board Mindset Alignment and  
• Board Meeting Quality. 
First, two board purposes have been discerned from the data: the traditional 
purpose of Monitoring and the purpose of providing Strategic Help. To 
illustrate: 
Monitoring 
“the governance part of it, is really directors and shareholders 
checking up that the company has been doing a good job and the 
CEO has been doing a good job, which is the governance part of 
it” (VC3) 
“But those investor positions are really about monitoring the 
performance of the company itself” (VC8) 
Strategic Help 
“making sure it’s being more strategic, making sure the companies 
are thinking occasionally strategically rather than just tactically all 
the time. (VC3) 
So the business was always focused on the strategy always 
focused on the direction (VC4) 
Second, in order to perform this role effectively, the board’s collective 
Mindset must also have an Alignment:  
Board Mindset (Aligned/Misaligned) 
“a common understanding on board that they are there to help, 
rather than to check up what’s happening. And if you manage to 
achieve that you’ve probably got a very effective board” (VC3) 
“I think what’s most detrimental is where the members of the 
board are not properly aligned” (VC5) 
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Third, the board’s Fit was also defined by the Board Meeting Quality, 
consisting of variations in Getting Board Pack Right, Level of Preparation 
and Strategic Discussion Quality. To illustrate: 
Getting Board Pack Right (Quality High/Low) 
“Obviously providing information well in advance and clear terms” 
(VC8) 
“poor notice period in order to read it, a lot of detail does not get 
read it at all” (VC3) 
Level of Preparation (Prepared/Unprepared) 
“The best ones are the ones that do their home work” (VC6) 
“I try to avoid the boards where it is what I call a ‘wine and cheese’ 
non-execs who just turn up once a month, they read the papers if 
you are lucky, the day of the meeting and if you are unlucky, 
actually during the board meeting itself” (VC6) 
Strategic Discussion Quality (High/Low) 
“all over sudden the quality of the board and the quality of the 
discussion is really good” (VC4) 
“There was no quality discussion, again linking directly back to 
how poor the information was and how untimely it came out, they 
would just talk from an operational perspective, so it was very 
much a management meeting only” (VC4) 
Table 19 summarises the category Fit for Purpose and its properties 
(illustrative quotes for each code and dimension can be found in Appendix 5 
From Data to Concepts).  
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Table 19. Fit for Purpose Board 
CATEGORY FIT FOR  PURPOSE BOARD 
Selective Code, 
Property Open Codes, Properties Sub-Properties 
Board Purpose Monitoring None 
Strategic Help None 
Board Mindset Alignment - Aligned- Misaligned 
Board Meeting Quality Getting Board Pack Right Quality of Information High-Low 
Notice Period Timely-Late 
Level of Preparation Prepared-Unprepared 
Strategic Discussion Quality High-Low  
Source: Table Developed by the Author, 2020 
As it was illustrated, Fit for Purpose Board category has captured potentially 
significant variations in the board as presented in the collected data. Based 
on those variations, further interpretations could be made about a profile of 
an early venture board defined by these emerged properties. Thus, data has 
shown that board’s Purpose during early stages should be to provide 
Strategic Help, as opposed to Monitor.  
Consequently, these variations can be interpreted as characteristics of 
effective and ineffective early boards, as shown in Table 20. 
Table 20. Fit for Purpose Board: Effective vs Ineffective Early Boards 
Property Effective Ineffective 
Board Purpose Strategic Help Monitoring 
Board Mindset Alignment Aligned Misaligned 
Board Meeting Quality Quality of Information High Quality of Information Low 
Notice Period Timely Notice Period Late 
Level of Preparation 
Prepared 
Level of Preparation 
Unprepared 
Strategic Discussion 
Quality 
High  
Strategic Discussion Quality 
Low 
Source: Table Developed by the Author, 2020 
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When analysing the properties of the effective and ineffective Board, there is 
a significant room for variation, resulting from a combination of different 
dimensions of Board Purpose, Board Mindset, Board Pack Quality and 
Notice Period, Board Meeting Reporting and Strategic Discussion and 
Director Preparing. Effectively, these variations, or a degree of Fit for 
Purpose Board, and in this case, for the purpose of Strategic Help as 
opposed to Monitoring, are linked to the effectiveness of the board in adding 
value during the Stage 2 of the process of Optimising for Growth. 
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4.3.3.5  Process of Optimising – Stage 2 – Behaving Bigger Stage 
In the process of Optimising for Growth, Stage 1 Evaluating and Structuring 
Stage is followed by Stage 2 Behaving Bigger. The concept of behaving 
bigger can be illustrated in participants own words: 
“The main thing, as I say, behaving as a bigger company before you 
are one” (VC4) 
“you need to start pretty early and making sure you’ve got all of the 
stuff in good order because when it comes time when you might be 
looking for investment or potentially an exit, it just makes the whole 
thing a lot more smoothly” (VC5) 
“it means a lot of things because growth is our bread and butter. We 
effectively make money out of growing stuff for people, so at any time 
we are growing, like we are growing for the clients we are growing for 
ourselves, we are growing everything” (F4) 
The challenge of ‘growing everything’ is that early ventures are faced with 
rather distinct issues during this crucial growth stage (Garg, 2013). Chapter 2 
provided details of some of those issues and data from this study revealed 
several fresh insights. These have been conceptualised as a separate 
category Venture Challenges, and is discussed after Stage 2. 
In the context of facing the distinct Venture Challenges as discussed above, 
the Behaving Bigger Stage can be characterised by Adding Value activities 
underpinned by Communicating. 
First, Adding Value category incorporated Type of Value Add and its Quality. 
Value add was found to have a High or Low quality. Additionally, seven types 
of value add activities have been distinguished, as follows: Opening Doors, 
Providing Strategic Input, Dealing with Issues, Challenging, Sounding Board, 
Focussing on the Bigger Picture, Mentoring Founder.  
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Furthermore, variations in the Delivery of Vale Add and its Obtaining were 
also captured. Thus, there were important distinctions on whether value add 
was delivered instructively, by Telling What to Do, or in a more friendly way, 
i.e. Not Telling What to do. To illustrate:  
Telling What to Do 
you’ve got to let them get on with it. Because if you interfere you 
are just interfering.  You might as well run it yourself, and that’s 
not what I do anymore (NED3) 
Not Telling What to do 
that was under the guidance of the board, telling us that we 
should very much focus now on one person, and we kind of 
stopped servicing some of the other customers (F1) 
Similarly, there was a distinction on whether the value add was Sought or 
Not Sought. The picture was emerging that more effective way of adding 
high quality value included when it was asked for and, at the same time, 
proactively offered. 
As it was mentioned above, Adding Value activities were underpinned by 
Communicating. Here, coding reflected whether communication between the 
board and the founders were taking place only During the Board Meeting or 
on Ongoing Basis and whether there was Trust. 
Data also revealed a relationship between the quality and depth of Adding 
Value and the characteristics of the Communication. Very little value was 
added when communication was limited to the formal governance 
mechanisms of board reporting and board meetings. In contrast, there was a 
deeper understanding of the business developed and as a result a more 
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targeted value added, when both board directors and the CEO were making 
time for more regular communications. 
Table 21 summarises the category Stage 2 Behaving Bigger and its 
properties (illustrative quotes for each code and dimension can be found in 
Appendix 5 From Data to Concepts). 
Table 21. Stage 2. Behaving Bigger Stage 
CATEGORY STAGE 2 BEHAVING BIGGER STAGE  
Selective 
Code Open Codes Sub-Properties 
Adding Value Quality of Value Add High/Low 
Type of Value Add Opening Doors 
Providing Strategic Input 
Dealing with Issues 
Challenging 
Sounding Board 
Focussing on the Bigger Picture 
Mentoring Founder 
Delivery of Value Add Not telling what to do / Telling what to 
do 
Obtaining the Value Add Sought/ Not Sought 
Communicating During the Board Meeting None 
Ongoing Basis Touch Basing 
Avoiding Surprises 
Deep Understanding of the Business 
Trust None 
Source: Table Developed by the Author, 2020 
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4.3.3.6  Venture Challenges 
During Stage 2 Behaving Bigger, ventures ‘are growing everything’, as one 
participant illustrates: 
“We effectively make money out of growing stuff for people, so at 
any time we are growing, like we are growing for the clients we 
are growing for ourselves, we are growing everything” (F4) 
Data showed that this context of ‘growing everything’ presents ventures with 
a distinct set of challenges. The distinctness of the context that early 
ventures exist have been laid out as a background to this study in Chapter 2.  
In this study, further characteristics of challenges have emerged. Data has 
shown the challenges as being Similar and somewhat Inevitable during early 
stage, indicating that VCs found these challenges to be commonly occurring 
across early stage ventures with first time founders. To illustrate: 
Similar  
“A lot of the things that [we] have seen as venture capitalist, we 
see time again as we are exposed to many different companies 
that the same things come up” (VC6) 
“Most of the members of the board would have seen lots of early 
stage companies at that particular point in time. Although the 
companies may be working in different sector and on a completely 
different product, they tend to have similar issues in the first year 
of funding” (VC7) 
“that’s very commonly the case that you put projections together 
and for one reason or other it doesn’t happen” (VC5) 
Inevitable 
“There are always problems that come up in seed, in early stage 
investing” (VC7) 
“there are a lot of moving parts, there are a lot of things that can 
change” (F5) 
“There will be all sorts of bumps in the road. And in fact, most will 
adapt” (VC8) 
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Specifically, two types of challenges have emerged from the data: challenges 
that were faced by the company and challenges facing by the Founder.  
The first set, Company Challenges consisted of issues of Performance, 
Commercialisation, People Issues and Funding challenges. At this stage in 
their development, ventures typically experiment with different ‘go-to market’ 
strategies, in order to commercialise ideas, grow their customer base and 
revenues. As participants demonstrate: 
Commercialising: 
“the test here is more of a commercial challenge” (VC5) 
“Over and above that growth companies will simply need to get 
new customers” (VC6) 
“The biggest concern is that classic how do you achieve this 
product-market” (VC1) 
However, venture Performance at this stage has quite a unique characteristic 
about it, because, as a category, it emerged to sum up the experiences 
which show that in early ventures, the performance seems to be always or 
usually below any KPIs. In participants own words: 
Performance: 
“business plans and budgets are only a scenario. From 
experience, you actually know that’s one scenario they are never 
going to hit, it’ll be something else, but at least it gives a scenario 
to measure performance against” (VC1) 
“that’s very commonly the case that you put projections together 
and for one reason or other it doesn’t happen” (VC5) 
“revenues don’t always line up and projections are always wrong” 
(F5) 
“us being an early stage tech business, when you are always 
running behind the finances” (F6) 
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At the same time, ventures require multiple rounds of funding and data show 
that the issue of Funding is ever-present during the Behaving Bigger stage: 
Funding: 
“we took a number of follow on rounds from same investors before 
doing a Series B when we introduced a second institutional 
investor into the mix” (F6) 
“By the nature of these types of companies they are venture-
backed, they typically, the don’t just need a one round of funding, 
they need multiple rounds of funding” (VC5) 
“we had quite a few follow on rounds because we were growing 
very, very quickly” (NED3) 
Internally, Founders are under unique set of pressures to deliver on 
expectations within extremely unstable and ever-changing internal and 
external environments while at the same time, for most of them, this was 
their first instance dealing with any of that. Since it is not uncommon for 
ventures to fail to meet the performance targets, together with challenges of 
fundraising and commercialisation, it is also not unusual for venture to face 
some sort of People Issues, disagreements or, at extreme end, failure of the 
relationships: 
People Issues  
“Most of our companies that haven’t worked out at all have been 
through some kind of failure of the relationships, either investor or 
founder or founders to board, pretty much all” (VC1) 
“when I saw there was a dissent brewing in the different direction” 
(NED1) 
“between myself and my cofounder, who is also a Director, we 
probably have quite a different opinion actually, which comes out 
in the board meeting, quite a lot probably” (F1) 
“we were having a little bit of a, [COFOUNDER] and I, we were 
having a little bit of a meltdown at that point, very much so ‘ooo’ it 
didn’t feel like anything was going right” (F2) 
176 
 
The second set, Founder Challenges, consisted of challenges faced by first 
time Founders such as Self-Doubt and Tunnel Vision. To illustrate: 
Self-doubt: 
“I am a first time founder, so a lot of the time I am wondering 
whether I am even putting my attention in the right things right 
now” (F1) 
 “it’s every single day we are having to look at this anyway and 
[COFOUNDER]’s constantly questioning everything that he does 
on marketing, every single day” (F2) 
“A lack of belief in ourselves, was the reason for getting in with 
them, because it was supposed to give us a financial comfort, the 
financial cushion” (F3) 
Tunnel Vision: 
“you always have got challenges to deal with on a daily basis. they 
[the team] are involved in the problems of today and tomorrow, not 
necessarily 12 months out” (VC5) 
“most of the time the executive team is just busy keeping the lights 
on and just working day in day out” (VC6) 
“they are loosing sight of what they are trying to achieve” (VC4) 
Table 22 summarises the category Venture Challenges and its properties 
(illustrative quotes for each code and dimension can be found in Appendix 5 
From Data to Concepts). 
Table 22. Venture Challenges 
CATEGORY VENTURE CHALLENGES 
Selective Code, Property Open Codes, Properties 
Challenges Characteristics Similar 
Inevitable 
Company Challenges Performance 
Commercialisation 
People Issues 
Funding 
Founder Challenges  Self-doubt 
Tunnel Vision 
Source: Table Developed by the Author, 2020  
177 
 
4.3.4  Unused Codes 
As it happens naturally throughout this stage of data analysis, it was not 
possible to meaningfully relate several of the open categories to the core 
category (Glaser, 1978). Therefore, they have been excluded from selective 
coding. Similarly, some selective codes did not saturate, and therefore they 
have also been removed from the process (Glaser, 2011). Table 23 provides 
a snapshot of unused codes. 
Table 23. Unused Codes 
Unused Codes 
VC Type – Full-Service VC, Public-Sector Backed VC 
Picking Investors – Having a Choice, Not Having a Choice 
Board Strategy Session 
Board Size – Small, Large 
Board Structure – Investor Dominated 
Low Technical Risk as property of Characteristics of Early Venture  
Lead Investor  
Collective Investor View 
Source: Table Developed by the Author, 2020 
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4.3.5  Revisiting Research Question 
Throughout this stage of data collection and analysis it is important to 
highlight “an interaction between the emerging analysis and the research 
question” (Urquhart, 2013, p.121). To re-cap, as a typical classic grounded 
theory research, this study started with a broad two-part research question:  
What are the issues that directors on venture boards face?  
How are these issues being resolved? 
The process of open coding has effectively answered those questions by 
identifying the main concern and the core category. Additionally, the process 
of selective coding and theoretical sampling has sharpened and deepened 
the dimensions of categories relating to the core. Effectively, this allowed to 
identify “dimensions of the research problem” (Urquhart, 2013, p.118). The 
process of coding and constantly comparing categories to each other raised 
one rather interesting issue around the core category of optimising for 
exponential growth. As such, the research question has therefore been 
evolved into: 
How does the process of Optimising for Growth explain the 
variations in experiences on early venture boards? 
Thus, the resulting research question defined the research problem. Most 
importantly, since the relationship between selective codes was also 
observed, it signalled a move towards the next stage of analysis – theoretical 
coding (Urquhart, 2013). 
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4.4   Theoretical Coding Stage 
The previous sections covered the first two stages of a GT data analysis – 
open and selective coding. The outcome of these stages is a set of selective 
codes, also known in GT as substantive codes since they “conceptualise the 
empirical substance of the area of research” (Urquhart, 2013, p.107). In 
essence, the substantive codes provide a rich conceptual description of the 
research area under investigation (Glaser, 1998). Since GT method is 
usually used to study areas that have not been previously explored much 
and, therefore, difficult to define from the outset, arriving at a conceptual 
description of it is a significant step in the research process. This is because 
it would often provide novel insights into the area under study (Suddaby, 
2006). In this study, for example, the set of substantive codes specifies the 
little explored area of what is happening on early venture boards as a 
process of Optimising for Growth. 
In addition to providing a conceptual description of the research area, the 
substantive codes also constitute initial elements of theory (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967). However, in order to complete the building of the theory, it is 
necessary to have both the set of substantive codes and a relationship 
between them (Urquhart, 2013). In GT, to arrive at theory, the process of 
discovering relationship is done via relating substantive codes to each using 
the third type of coding – theoretical coding. The aim of theoretical coding is 
therefore to identify relationships by a process of comparing substantive 
codes to each other and conceptualising that relationship (Urquhart, 2013). 
This third stage plays a critical role in the process of theory development 
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because “without these statements of relationships, we are not theorising” 
(Urquhart, 2013, p.106). As Figure 9 below summarises. 
Figure 9. Theoretical Coding Stage 
 
Source: Figure developed by the Author, 2020 
Although the process of collecting and analysing data has been presented 
here in a logical sequential process, it is widely acknowledged in the GT 
literature that, in reality, the three stages have significant overlap (Urquhart, 
2013). Therefore, using GT method is more of an ambiguous, iterative and 
reflective process of constantly going in and out and between the raw data, 
codes and their conceptualisation as opposed to a logical, step-by-step linear 
process with well-defined boundaries (Glaser, 1978, Suddaby, 2006, 
Urquhart, 2013). Correspondingly, theoretical coding in this study began 
during theoretical sampling. 
Theoretical coding is aided by a process of memo sorting. Memo sorting is 
organising the large bank of memos in an analytical order (Glaser, 1992). 
Such structuring of memos is necessary since they have been written over a 
period of the research project and in no particular order. Glaser (1978, p.117) 
suggests to sort “the categories and properties in memos by similarities, 
connections, and conceptual orderings” and argues it would compel patterns 
of relationships between categories to become more visible. Further, Glaser 
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(1978, p.118) maintains memo sorting cannot be skipped as “it modified, re-
integrates, proportionalises and verifies the codes”. Consequently, the 
memos were sorted “by similarities, connections, and conceptual orderings” 
into structural processes, social-psychological processes, behaviours, 
contexts, consequences, types, characteristics and strategies (Glaser, 1978, 
p.118). The memos were the re-sorted around the emerging selective codes.  
Next, it was necessary to identify the relationships between the codes. 
Although Glaser (1978) provides examples of several theoretical coding 
families to try for fit, he also encourages researchers to develop their own 
theoretical code based on the relationships emergent from memos and data. 
To this end Glaser (1978, p.118) suggests “asking theoretical questions” to 
each of substantive codes, for example “is it a condition or a context? Is it a 
matter of degree or two dimensions?”. Following this type of questioning, the 
following relationships between the 6 selective codes were identified:  
• Gaps were an input to Stage 1 Evaluating and Structuring Stage; 
• Evaluating and Structuring was a stage of the process of Optimising; 
• Degree of Fit for Purpose Board was an outcome of Stage 1 
Evaluating and Structuring; 
• Behaving Bigger was a stage of the process of Optimising; 
• Venture Challenges were a context for Behaving Bigger; 
• Stage 2 Behaving Bigger was dependent on Degree of Fit for 
Purpose Board; 
• Process of Optimising was used to strive for Growth; 
• Characteristics were an outcome of Stage 2 Behaving Bigger; 
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• Gaps were assessed against Growth; 
• Growth served as input to Gaps. 
This inter-relationship of categories provides an overview of the structure of 
the theory. Figure 10 provides a visual representation of the emerged 
theoretical framework. 
Figure 10. Emergent Substantive Theory of Optimising for Growth 
 
Source: Figure Developed by the Author, 2020 
The theoretical framework that emerged here illuminates what happens on 
boards of early ventures and explains variations in behaviours by a set of 
relationships. At this stage, the theory has been shown as sufficiently 
grounded and this serves as a signal to engage with the literature in the 
substantive field of interest by relating it to the theoretical framework (Glaser, 
1992).  
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4.5   Summary of the Emergent Theory of Optimising for 
Growth 
Thus, the substantive theory of Optimising for Growth on the work of early 
venture boards can be summarised as follows: 
• Directors on early venture boards are involved in a complex two-stage 
process of optimising the board’s role, company processes and 
founder, in order to achieve growth. 
• The process takes place between investment rounds, it starts 
immediately post first investment round, and it culminates with taking 
on the next investment round. If ventures are not successful in 
obtaining the next round of funding, they typically close down. If 
ventures are successful in gaining further funding, their boards would 
typically change to include new investors.  
• The outcome of the process of optimising is growth, defined by 
company growth indicators and Becoming CEO attributes. These are 
evaluated by VC investors, existing and new, to determine if company 
and its CEO are fit for a further investment round. 
• The first stage of the process includes evaluation of different types of 
gaps and subsequent structuring of boards to fill those gaps, resulting 
in a board fit for purpose of monitoring or providing strategic help. 
• The second stage of the process involves complex value add 
interactions between board directors that compel the venture to 
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behave as a bigger company. The effectiveness of these interactions 
depends on the degree of fit for purpose board and the context of 
challenges faced by ventures and their founders. 
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4.6   Chapter Summary 
Grounded theory is understood and learnt simply by “doing it” (Heath and 
Cowley, 2004). This chapter provided an account of how data was collected 
and analysed for this study demonstrating the learning-by-doing process of 
engaging with the method. 
Although, in reality, the data collection and analysis were overlapping and 
iterative, this chapter presented and organised the outcomes of the process. 
The open coding uncovered the participants’ main concern and a core 
category which explained how they resolve it. It was showcased how the 
principle of constant comparison was applied from the start of the analysis to 
create codes and develop their properties. Examples of memos wrote 
throughout the process were also included. Moving into the second stage of 
selective coding, it was demonstrated how only the categories that 
meaningfully related to the core were coded and saturated and how the 
analysis progressed with densifying the emerging codes via a process of 
theoretical sampling. The analytic requirements for the theoretical sampling 
were outlined based on the emerged but unsaturated codes. Furthermore, it 
was showed how throughout the analysis the level of abstraction was 
increased, abstracting 18 initial selective codes into a set of final 6 
categories. At the same time, the evolution of the study’s research question 
was also considered. Finally, theoretical coding, the final stage of the 
analysis, was also presented as a process of relating selective codes, aided 
by memo sorting.  
186 
 
The chapter culminated with an emergent substantive theory of Optimising 
for Growth. In the next chapter, the researcher the theory will be refined by 
engaging with the literature. 
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Chapter 5 The Emergent Theory Within Extant Literature 
5.0   Introduction  
Previous chapter has showcased the development of substantive theory of 
Optimising for Growth. Although the emerged theory enhances the 
understanding of early venture boards, it is still understandably nascent. To 
this end, the grounded theory method asserts that “it is both necessary and 
desirable to relate the emerged theory to literature” (Urquhart, 2013, p.129). 
It is deemed to be ‘necessary’ because such process further abstracts of the 
emerged theory relating its components to other theories in the extant 
literature. It is also considered ‘desirable’, as the process demonstrates the 
role of the emerged theory in the wider theoretical landscape. 
The purpose of this chapter is, therefore, to integrate the emerged theory of 
Optimising for Growth within extant literature. In line with the GT procedures, 
this is done at the end of the GT process and achieves two objectives 
(Glaser, 1978). Frist, reviewing the extant literature serves to refine and 
validate the emerged theory, enabling further abstraction and arriving at a 
more formal substantive theory. Second, it also helps identify areas of 
contribution to the existing knowledge with novel insights (Urquhart, 2013).  
Thus, the first section of this chapter briefly discusses the GT-based process 
of transforming the substantive theory to a more formal grounded theory. 
Then the second section considers the relevant extant literature. The section 
shows how relevance of the reviewed literature was determined by the 
substantive theory. The appropriate corporate governance literature, 
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corporate finance literature, entrepreneurship and leadership literatures are 
therefore reviewed throughout the rest of the section, organised around the 
core category of Optimising for Growth and its two stages, Stage 1 
Evaluating and Structuring and Stage 2 Behaving Bigger. This review 
identifies areas of convergence and divergence between the study’s findings 
and the existing body of knowledge, thus shaping the contribution of the 
study (Urquhart, 2013). It also refines the substantive theory, preparing it for 
further abstraction to a more formal substantive theory, which is completed in 
the final section of this chapter. 
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5.1   From Substantive to a More Formal Grounded Theory 
The aim of this study was two-fold: first, to understand what happens on 
early venture boards and, second, to develop a theoretical framework of the 
complex relationship between directors’ attributes and behaviours, board’s 
role and processes, and venture performance during the critical early stages 
of development. Grounded theory method defines theory as a set of 
concepts and relationships between them, all integrated into a framework 
that explains a phenomenon (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Thus, the study’s 
aims were met by developing the substantive theory of Optimising for 
Growth, a two-stage process of optimising the characteristics of company 
systems and processes, founder and venture board. 
Substantive theories are developed from the specific context of experiences 
being studied and thus, they pertain only the specific “practical domain” 
(Locke, 2000, p.35). Formal theories, however, explain and predict 
relationships between entities and are applicable to wide areas of 
organisational life regardless of context (Straus, 1987). They are usually 
comprised of high-level conceptual entities (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
Conversely, there are “not many examples of formal theories” developed 
using the grounded theory method (Urquhart, 2013, p.192). This is because 
it would require carrying out theoretical sampling through several relevant 
contexts to widen the scope, generalise and test the substantive theory, 
which is usually outside the constrains of a doctoral study. It is expected, 
however, that substantive theories developed by doctoral research, are 
moved “through levels of conceptualisation” (Urquhart, 2013, p.131).  
190 
 
The process of transformation from a substantive theory to a more formal 
substantive theory is a process of abstracting and relating concepts to each 
other and then to the extant literature (Glaser, 1978). Thus, the researcher is 
starting with “a bounded context” and by engaging with the extant body of 
knowledge, she is arriving to a more formal grounded theory. Since 
substantive theories are developed from data but not tested, this process of 
relating it to the existing body of knowledge improves their “analytic 
generalisability” (Urquhart, 2013, p.136). Thus, a more formal substantive 
theory contains more theoretically abstract concepts and relationships 
between them (Urquhart, Lehmann and Myers, 2010).  
The subsequent section reviews and compares the substantive theory of 
Optimising for Growth to the relevant literature. This review identifies areas 
of convergence and divergence between the study’s findings and the existing 
body of knowledge (Urquhart, 2013). It also refines the substantive theory, 
preparing it for further abstraction to a more formal substantive theory, which 
is completed in the final section of this chapter.  
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5.1.1  Integration of Emergent Theory with Extant Literature 
Bringing the emerged substantive theory and existing literature together 
enhances its theoretical level (Eisenhardt, 1988). This section offers the 
integration of the developed theory of Optimising for Growth with the relevant 
literature. The decisions about the relevance of literature are guided by the 
emerged theory and its theoretical concepts (Urquhart, 2013). This section 
provides a summary how the relevant extant literature was organised in this 
study. It then critically discusses the literature relating to the key theoretical 
concepts of Optimising, Stage 1 Evaluating and Structuring and Stage 2 
Behaving Bigger.  
5.1.2  Organising Relevant Extant Literature 
As the emergent substantive theory of Optimising for Growth guides the 
choice of literature, the review covers only the literature that is relevant to the 
developed concepts and relationships between them (Glaser, 1978).  
In brief, Optimising for Growth has emerged as a process of transformation 
from early venture, first time founder, non-existent or nascent board into a 
company of discernible growth, with effective board that is fit for purpose and 
a founder demonstrating characteristics of a more experienced CEO.  
This transformation was revealed by data to be a two-stage process. First 
stage consisted of Evaluating gaps and Structuring boards to Fit for Purpose. 
Second stage was about Behaving Bigger as a company and founder, which 
happened in conjunction with board adding value activities. Figure 11 is a 
diagrammatic illustration of the theory as a reminder. 
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Figure 11. Emergent Substantive Theory of Optimising for Growth 
 
Source: Figure Developed by the Author, 2020 
As this brief overview of the emergent theory suggests, the relevant literature 
is multi-disciplinary. Not surprising, it goes beyond the obvious field of 
corporate governance and venture boards. “There are many different ways of 
thinking about boards of directors” (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004, p.4). Thus, 
upon closer examination of relevant concepts in literature, it was deemed 
appropriate to include corporate finance, entrepreneurship and relational 
leadership as well as corporate governance research fields into the review. 
In order to reflect the structure of the emergent theory, as suggested by the 
GT method, the literature review has been organised in three areas: 
Optimising literature, Evaluating and Structuring literature and Behaving 
Bigger literature (Urquhart, 2013). Table 24 provides an overview of the 
relevant literature within the structure. 
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Table 24. Overview of Relevant Literature. 
Area of Substantive 
Theory  
Relevant Literature 
Optimising for Growth Professionalising in Corporate Finance and 
Governance Literature  
Hellmann and Puri, 2002a, Davila and Foster, 
2005, Filatotchev and Wright, 2005, Wasserman 
2014 
Capability development in Management and 
Governance Literature  
Zahra and Filatotchev 2004 
Relational leadership in Leadership Literature  
Uhl-Bien, 2011 
Evaluating and Structuring 
Stage  
Board attributes, such as director characteristics, 
board composition, and the role of boards in 
Corporate Governance Literature  
Pettigrew, 1992, Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand, 
1996, Forbes and Milliken, 1999, Huse, 2000, 
Garg, 2013, Garg and Eisenhardt, 2017, Garg 
and Furr, 2017 
Mindset and Cognition in Entrepreneurship 
Literature  
Mitchell et.al, 2002, Wirtz, 2011, Eggers and 
Kaplan, 2013 
Behaving Bigger Stage Value Add in Corporate Governance Literature  
Sapienza, 1992, Sapienza, Manigart and Vermier, 
1996, Busenitz, Fiet and Moesel, 2004, 
Wasserman and Boeker, 2005 
Source: Table Developed by the Author, 2020 
In summary, the process Optimising itself has been located in corporate 
finance literature on professionalising of startup firms the entrepreneurship 
and management literature on new capabilities development and the 
literature on relational leadership. 
Stage 1 Evaluating and Structuring has been located within the corporate 
governance literature on attributes, composition and the role of boards. This 
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literature is vast but mainly developed in the context of large corporations, 
their boards and their experienced CEOs. A novel insight developed in this 
study has been offered as a contribution to this extant literature from the 
emerging entrepreneurship literature on mindset and cognition. 
Finally, Stage 2 Behaving Bigger has also been positioned within the 
corporate governance literature on value add. The integration with the 
literature reveals the study developed novel insight into the understanding of 
board-founder value add interactions by linking specific venture challenges 
and value add activities. 
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5.1.2.1  Optimising For Growth In Extant Literature 
The emerged process of Optimising for Growth was located within the extant 
literature on professionalisation of startup firms by VC investors, the 
entrepreneurship and management literature on new capabilities 
development and the literature on relational leadership.  
Optimising Systems and Human Resources 
In corporate finance literature, professionalising of startup firms is described 
as a process of raising a standard of all organisational aspects of a new 
company (Harper, 2001). This is very similar to the concept of Optimising for 
Growth process, discovered in this study and defined as a process of 
transformation, where structural attributes of venture and board, and 
cognitive attributes of founder and the directors, are developed, adjusted and 
enhanced to foster growth of the company.  
Extant research focused on activities of VCs, specifically suggests that VC 
directors play a primary role in the professionalisation of ventures they invest 
in (Hellmann and Puri, 2002a). Not surprising, therefore, that optimising was 
found in this study to be a core process resolving the main concern of VC 
Directors. 
The extant literature uses two factors to explain the reasons behind VCs 
attention to professionalising.  
First, VC funds tend to have a limited period of typically ten years within 
which they must invest and get returns (Gilson, 2003). Therefore, VCs are 
under pressure to control the exit from their investments (Bonnet, Wirtz and 
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Seville, 2013). They do so by compelling their investees companies to 
professionalise as early as possible, thus providing the “important signal to 
the market that the company has arrived” and getting prepared for sale or 
IPO (Jones, 2017, p.170). According to this literature, exiting and achieving 
return is the key concern of VCs. However, the study suggests that during 
early stages of investment, achieving growth as opposed to exit is the main 
concern of VCs, because without growth, company fails to progress 
altogether. 
Second, listing on a stock exchange “has served as the ultimate exit 
strategy” for startup ventures and VCs for over several decades now (Jones, 
2017, p.170). Such listing requires companies to have a complex set of 
systems and processes to be in place and operating for a certain number of 
years ahead of the listing, depending on the specific rules of a relevant stock 
exchange institution. This means professionalising as early as possible is 
very important to the process of preparation for the IPO. This is believed to 
have “a significant disciplining effect on managers of startups” as it forces 
them to “assemble infrastructures that would pass muster with underwriters 
and the public” (Jones, 2017, p.170). In turn, this discipline encourages 
startups to mature their operations as early as possible and simultaneously 
with their efforts to grow, effectively pushing early stage firms to appear and 
behave as much bigger companies than they actually are. This Behaving 
Bigger aspect is a point of convergence between the extant literature and the 
emerging theory of Optimising.  
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The extant literature suggests VCs focus their professionalisation efforts on 
two broad areas of their investee startups: they encourage the adoption of 
professional company systems, processes and policies, and they also 
influence the human resource base of the company by, for example, 
recruiting professional senior management team and/or replacing original 
founder with an experienced CEO (Hellmann and Puri, 2002a). 
Typically, organisational systems, processes and policies are at the centre of 
the transformation efforts as adopting professional methods to operate the 
business is a very “important event in the life of young and growing 
companies” (Davila and Foster, 2005, p.1039). Examples of such efforts 
include switching to professional management accounting and financial 
reporting systems, introducing standardised sales and customer services 
processes and developing internal company policies. Davila and Foster 
(2005) study examined adoption of management control systems in startup 
companies in the US. They found systems adoption was highly relevant to 
the growth of startup firms. In particular, the rate of adoption was associated 
with the increase in company size, international expansion and rise in 
revenue. Unsurprisingly, they also found a link between adoption of 
management control systems and CEO turnover, highlighting that CEOs with 
shorter tenures tended to have implemented fewer professional management 
systems. This finding links professionalising of systems with 
professionalising of the CEO, i.e. the recruitment of a professional CEO to 
replace the original founder.  
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Recruiting professional CEO is part of VC activities aimed at 
professionalising the human resources base of their investee companies. 
This activity has several dimensions. It is not uncommon, for example, to see 
VCs to introduce non-executive directors to startup boards (Filatotchev and 
Wright, 2005). It is also quite a commonplace for VCs to be involved in 
recruiting experienced professionals into other top management roles (Conti 
and Graham, 2016). Such professionalising efforts signal to the outside world 
that the company has the competencies, capabilities and skills that are 
commonly perceived as required to run large companies. This is often 
considered by VCs and startups as VC value-add service alongside 
providing the funding. 
Replacing founder with a professional CEO is deemed to be a “significant 
step in the professionalisation” of startup’s human resources (Hellmann and 
Puri, 2002a, p.181). In VC-backed businesses, although it is somewhat 
contentious, hiring a professional CEO to replace founders is not only very 
common, but, in fact, it is considered to be the most likely outcome of the VC 
involvement (Hellmann and Puri, 2002a). Moreover, the effect of VC on CEO 
replacement is “statistically significant and economically large” meaning it 
has impact on the company valuation (Hellmann and Puri, 2002b, p.21). 
Explanations for hiring a professional CEO tend to be related to the 
performance of original founder, such as, for example, delivery of poor 
company performance (MacMillan, Kulow and Khoylian, 1989, Bruton, Fried 
and Hisrich, 2000, Schefczyk and Gerpott, 2001) or inability to manage a 
large company, which, if you are a young first time founder, requires a very 
different types of skills and experience to launching a startup (Stevenson and 
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Jarillo, 1990). However, this is far from a full picture. Studies have also 
shown that even if founders meet performance expectations in achieving 
growth, VCs were just as likely to bring in a professional CEO (Hellmann and 
Puri, 2002a). This is partly because ventures, where founders that have not 
been replaced, find the transition into a larger firm a lot more difficult to 
manage (Hambrick and Crozier, 1985). Although, more significantly, as 
research into over six thousand American startups by Wasserman (2014) 
has so strikingly shown, companies where founders remained in the CEO 
position, were, in fact, between c.23-58% less valuable compared to 
companies where original founders gave up their control.  
Since founder replacement is such a contentious issue, it has, by itself, 
become of high interest to researchers. Thus, it emerged into a separate and 
growing literature on its own (Boeker and Karichalil, 2002). This emerging 
literature has expanded the understanding of factors that influence founder 
replacement (Dubocage and Galindon, 2014) and shed light on the 
relationship between the startup performance and the founder replacement 
(Chen and Thompson, 2015). In this study, however, the process of 
Optimising for Growth looks at the very early transformations of company, 
board and the founder. As such, the findings of this study indicate founders 
are evaluated and judged at the end of the optimising process, as part of the 
decision to invest further. Since founder replacement has not emerged as a 
strong relevant concept of the theory, therefore, this specialist literature was 
considered outside the scope of this review.  
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In summary, within VC backed startup context, professionalising is a process 
of raising a standard of organisational and human resources of investee 
companies. It is instigated by VCs in response to the time pressures to 
deliver fund returns and the need to meet strict IPO criteria, the top exit route 
to achieve exponential return. In relation to this study, the literature on 
professionalising places the process of optimising in the context of VC’s 
ultimate aim of achieving an exponential return on their investment portfolio. 
Having limited timescales to realise the return justifies starting the optimising 
process early on even when the venture is still quite nascent. This ‘big 
picture’ perspective from the extant literature allows to locate the emergent 
theory of optimising for growth in the corporate finance literature on 
professionalising.  
In the extant literature, professionalising refers to the development of VC-
backed startup companies into pre-IPO firms. IPO, however, can take 
several years and several funding rounds, during which ventures go through 
several stages in their lifecycle and their investors, boards and management 
teams change significantly (Wasserman, 2014, Pollman, 2019). As such, the 
review of the literature on professionalising has shown that it does not 
distinguish between the stages of the investment rounds, nor does it relate to 
the stages in the development life cycle of the venture. It simply treats pre-
IPO firms as ‘early stage’ (Hellmann and Puri, 2002a). This can be partly 
explained by a lack of data on the early and transitional stages of startups 
and availability of data on pre-IPO firms. Furthermore, the current studies 
tend to focus on the VC effects of professionalising and lack insights into the 
process itself. This study’s emerged theory of Optimising for Growth, 
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however, provides such insights, including stages of the process, board’s 
role and activities as well as characteristics of the early venture and founder. 
The results of this study also suggest professionalising efforts are linked to 
investment rounds, points at which investors have higher negotiation power 
to compel changes they want as conditions of their next investment. Whilst 
this study looked specifically at the period between the ventures first and 
second significant funding rounds, the findings indicated that optimising 
starts with a VC investment and then it is triggered again with a follow-on 
investment, when company, board and a founder characteristics are 
evaluated against gaps and the VC’s growth expectation criteria by a new set 
of board actors. Thus, this study contributes to the literature by providing 
insights into the process of professionalising, its cyclical nature and links to 
investment rounds and venture lifecycle. 
The findings are also aligned with this literature in a sense that it shows VCs 
initiate professionalising of company systems, processes and policies as 
early as first investment. According to this study, VCs evaluate structural 
gaps, such as systems and processes, KPIs, skills and experiences, and 
cognitive gaps, such as founder’s understanding of governance, their role 
and the role of the board, immediately post investment. Based on the 
identified gaps, VCs provide assistance, for example, they recruit NED into a 
role of a mentor for founder or offer templates for board reporting. Through 
their value add activities, investors also get involved operationally and 
strategically.  
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It has emerged, however, that early on there is a need to balance 
professionalising efforts with the availability of resources. For example, the 
founders should not be spending a disproportionate amount of time on board 
reporting, if the startup team is still very small and basically consists just of 2-
3 co-founders. Founders’ resources, time and efforts, might be better spent 
on product-market fit activities or sales to drive growth. The findings from the 
emerged theory of optimising suggests efforts to professionalise should be 
balanced and efficient relatively to the availability of resources. For example, 
a more balanced and efficient way to report to the board would be via 
frequent ongoing communications between the founders and the board as 
opposed to a lengthy monthly board pack, as it emerged in the results. 
Regarding influencing the human resource base of the company as part of 
professionalising efforts, the findings suggest VCs are involved and support 
startups with recruitment of NEDs. However, replacing founder is not on their 
agenda at least until the venture starts looking for another round of funding. 
Findings show that early on VCs very much associate the startup with the 
founders and see it is as pointless to replace them. Founder mindset 
characteristics, such as coachability, receptiveness to advice and 
susceptibility to value board, as emerged in this study, have a huge influence 
on the ability of the board to add value. During Behaving Bigger Stage of 
Optimising, the founder-VC develop their relationship and level of trust 
through various interactions. Founders also develop a set of dynamic 
capabilities through this relationship and their venture role. Together with 
company performance, founders’ capabilities and the level of trust, motivate 
the VCs judgement on whether at the next round they should be 
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professionalising the senior management team by brining in a replacement 
CEO. 
The objective of this study was to explain variations in director board 
experiences in early ventures. Specifically, this observable variation in 
experiences suggests some early board propel startups to growth and others 
fail to add any value, even where different startup boards have the same VC 
(Garg, 2013). The findings have suggested that the variation can be 
attributed to the difference in efforts of cognitive and structural alignment of 
the founder, the board directors and the company. Whilst this novel 
explanation has emerged from the data, the extant literature of 
professionalising offers an alternative option. As it was revealed above, 
empirical studies show that to get ready for IPO, VCs are highly likely to 
replace founders by bringing in a professional CEO (Hellmann and Puri, 
2002b). Controversially, this suggests that since founders are likely to be 
replaced, it is counter-productive for time-poor VCs to invest resources in 
helping first time founders develop their dynamic capabilities. However, the 
recent trends, discussed in Chapter 2, indicate that founders of most 
valuable companies have been retaining ownership and CEO positions. This 
trend is a point of divergence with the extant literature on founder 
replacement, indicating that the literature needs updating. It also leads to the 
conclusion that investing resources in developing founders is a necessary 
priority for VC firms going forward. The theory of Optimising for Growth, thus, 
provides a framework for effectiveness of board-founder relationships. 
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Compared to non-VC backed companies, ventures are more likely to 
professionalise much earlier on in their development cycle and, equally, they 
are more likely to do it faster (Hellmann and Puri, 2002a). However, looking 
beyond the context of just VC-backed ventures, the notion of 
professionalising is also relevant to new or growing companies that are not in 
receipt of venture capital. As such the concept of professionalising is similar 
in nature to the concept of achieving strategic coherence in much wider 
literature, the industrialisation theory, i.e. the theory of economic change of 
the modern world. The industrialisation theory suggests that new and 
growing companies go through transformation where they “over time add 
activities that relate to some aspect of existing activities” (Teece et al., 1994, 
p. 3). The success of this process hinges on achieving strategic coherence 
among company’s core competencies and assets. In turn, strategic 
coherence is argued to be a function of learning and path dependencies 
shaped by the growth journey and a function of the environment (Teece et 
al., 1994). This suggests the success of professionalising efforts is also 
function of learning, path dependencies and context. This notion in wider 
literature appears to be at odds with the current literature on 
professionalising highlighting efforts of VCs to replace the founder as 
opposed to investing time and money into developing founders. Thus, the 
much wider literature signals the importance of learning processes in context 
of company growth. Such processes emerged in this study as founder 
learning, developing new capabilities and emerging relational leadership, 
have been disregarded by the VC professionalisation literature due to 
founder replacement issue.  
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Another obvious gap in the VC professionalisation literature is the role of the 
board in this transformation process. The extant research seems to take the 
presence of VCs as a proxy for board and measured effects include the 
effects of VC presence rather than any board-related variable. This study 
adds to the knowledge on the process of professionalisation by highlighting 
the importance of having a board that is composed and fit for the purpose of 
supporting the founder during the crucial early stages. This is aligned with 
the VC value add literature signalling that designing systems to enable 
optimising is very much the role of the governing board in early stage 
ventures (Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004).  
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Founder Becoming CEO 
This research focused on early venture boards which typically consist of 
founder directors, VC directors and NEDs. The Founders were first time 
founders, having little experience compared to the other types of directors, 
who came with significantly more of experience not just in the industry but in 
running companies. One of concepts that emerged, is a set of behaviours 
that indicate transformation of first-time founder to fully-fledged CEO. In 
extant knowledge, this could be located in the entrepreneurship and 
management literature on new capabilities development.  
The entrepreneurship and management literature acknowledges that first 
time founders need to develop new capabilities fast, highlighting that those 
“new capabilities usually require radically different knowledge” from what 
they might already have (Zahra and Filatotchev 2004, p.886). Furthermore, 
in the context of ventures, even exploiting existing capabilities requires 
different approach because of the pressure to achieve exponential growth 
over much shorter period of time (Zahra and George, 2002). Due to high 
degree of uncertainty of achieving a product-market fit, rapid change in the 
size of the company and ever-increasing complexity of issues that first time 
founders have to deal with during the early stages, the literature recognises 
that founders “face unique problems in creating new capabilities” and 
therefore “struggle with developing new skills to match opportunities and 
threats they face” (Zahra and Filatotchev 2004, p.887). This struggle is 
usually associated with several factors. First, the process of developing new 
capabilities or new approach to exploit them includes considerable 
experimentation (Daily and Dalton, 1992). Founders’ attitude, unwillingness 
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or simply lack of ability to constantly experiment, reflect and adapt would 
undermine their knowledge capacity and learning capacity (Mintzberg and 
Westley, 1992). These would therefore also inhibit the process of new 
capability development (Mahoney 1995, Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004). This 
is in line with findings from this study, especially the concept of Founder 
Mindset. Second, the literature points out that it is not just the attitude and 
ability that are important, but also that the pace of experimenting and 
learning are of critical importance (Mintzberg and Westley, 1992). Ventures 
exist in a fast-moving context and they strive to grow from non-existing 
turnover and a very small team to multi-million pound revenues and a large 
employee base in just a few years. Comparing to the typical career path to 
CEO in a corporate environment taking, on average, twenty years (Schoar, 
2007), first time founders must make this transformation within extremely 
reduced timescales. Finally, in an effort to compose venture boards with 
experienced directors thus filling founders’ knowledge and experience gaps, 
it is often overlooked that not all types of knowledge are transferrable. Tacit 
knowledge, for example, is the type of knowledge that can only be acquired 
through personal experience over time and therefore cannot be transferred 
from an experienced director to an inexperienced founder (Conner and 
Prahalad, 1996). The issue, of course, then is to be able to monitor or judge 
the learning over time.  
Currently, there is a gap in the literature in understanding early indicators or 
individual attributes of venture founder transformation to CEO. There is also 
a lack  of understanding of the process itself. This study offers insights into 
founder attributes of behaviour that illustrate their learning and development. 
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In the context of early venture boards, the study has revealed that founders 
that have been successful in acquiring new capabilities and approaches, 
become more assertive in how they use the input and value-add the board 
members have to offer. For example, they become more proactive, very 
detailed and directive when asking their board for help. Thus, they show 
ability to evaluate gaps in their own knowledge or business, precisely 
identifying support they might need, and asking the right board member for 
that support. Overall, they become very effective in “using their board to the 
best possible effect” (VC8). Another indicative behaviour includes taking 
ownership and accountability for every aspect of the business, the typical 
responsibility of a fully-fledged CEO. Ultimately, they become a “custodian of 
everything that is happening” (VC6). Those two behavioural attributes, at 
board level, make it very clear to other board members when founder starts 
owning the vision, strategy and the accountability for the delivery of that 
strategy, thus becoming the CEO. 
Thus, the study has revealed that founder behaviours which are indicative of 
the transformation to the CEO, are an outcome of the process of optimising 
for growth. All board directors are involved in this process of optimising and, 
as this study illustrated, the process goes beyond composing boards and 
following board processes, but also involves mindset alignment and value 
add interactions. This, therefore, suggests that the founder’s transformation 
into a leader is relational in nature (Uhl-Bien, 2011). In other words, founder’s 
transformation is the product or outcome of the inter-relations of directors on 
early venture boards throughout a period of time. In relatively recent 
literature, this has been conceptualised as relational leadership, meaning 
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leadership is seen as a process “by which social order is constructed and 
changed” where “self and other are not separable but coevolving” and the 
knowledge is “socially constructed and socially distributed” (Uhl-Bien, 2011, 
p.664). Relating these latest literature concepts to the study’s findings, this 
means that the process of Optimising for Growth is a relational process, and 
that company growth is not the only outcome of this process but Founder 
becoming CEO is its additional, more novel, outcome. 
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Section Summary 
This section has positioned the emerged theory of Optimising for Growth 
within the extant literature on professionalisation of startup firms by VC 
investors, the entrepreneurship and management literature on new 
capabilities development and the literature on relational leadership. Whilst 
the extant literature provided a wider context and showed drivers for 
optimising, the review revealed a gap in the understanding of the process of 
professionalisation at different stages of venture development lifecycle and 
offered the process of Optimising for Growth as contribution to fill this gap for 
early stage ventures. 
This section illustrated how the study contributes to this literature on 
professionalisation by highlighting the role of the board and by providing the 
framework for effectiveness of board-founder relationships. The study’s 
findings also indicate that the process of Optimising is relational in nature, it 
serves as a backdrop and a driver for the transformation of inexperienced 
Founder into a fully-fledged CEO. Table 25 summarises the contribution. 
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Table 25. Contribution to Professionalising Literature 
Area of 
Contribution 
 
Supported Added Challenged New 
Corporate 
finance 
literature 
on 
professionalising 
of startup firms 
backed by VCs 
 
• Early ventures 
are under 
pressure to 
professionalis
e as early as 
possible 
(Jones, 2017), 
conceptualised 
in this study as 
Behaving 
Bigger stage 
 
• In early ventures 
HR base is 
professionalised 
by introducing 
experienced 
NEDs to boards 
(Filatotchev and 
Wright, 2005) 
• Unlike 
professionalisin
g where VC’s 
main concern 
is exit (Bonnet, 
Wirtz and 
Seville, 2013), 
during early 
stages of 
investment and 
when 
optimising, VCs 
main concern is 
growth since 
without it, the 
startup and the 
investment 
simply fails to 
reach the next 
stage  
 
• This study 
challenges 
that founder 
replacement is 
as a matter of 
‘when’ as 
opposed to ‘if’ 
(Hellmann and 
Puri, 2002a). 
 
Because during 
the early stages, 
founders are 
indistinguishable 
from the venture. 
 
Study offers 
founder 
characteristics 
which are used 
by VCs to judge 
bringing founder 
replacement  
(this is also a 
contribution to 
practice). 
 
• Since founders 
are eventually 
replaced, it 
might be 
counter-
productive for 
VCs to invest in 
founder 
development. 
 
This study 
challenges this 
and offers 
Optimising for 
Growth as 
framework for 
the effective 
VC-Founder-
Board 
relationship. 
 
• Professionalising 
is a ‘black box’, 
(Hellmann and 
Puri, 2002a) 
 
Optimising is 
offered as the 
first stage of 
professionalising 
process, linking it 
to stages in 
investment 
rounds and in 
company 
development 
lifecycle. 
 
• Extant literature 
equated boards 
with VCs, this 
study offers 
boards to have 
an important role 
in the optimising 
and 
professionalising 
process.  
 
• The process of 
Optimising for 
Growth is a 
relational 
process (Uhl-
Bien, 2011). 
Company 
growth is not the 
only outcome of 
this process but 
Founder 
becoming CEO 
is its additional, 
more novel, 
outcome. 
 
Source: Table Developed by the Author based on Scott (2007) 
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5.1.2.2  Evaluating and Structuring Stage in Extant Literature 
Findings suggested that post-investment, the first stage of Optimising for 
Growth involved two types of activities: evaluating and structuring.  
Evaluating included appraising gaps in structure, such as systems and 
processes, key performance indicators and skills and experiences, and gaps 
in founder cognition, or understanding governance and the working of the 
board. Structuring meant the subsequent filling of those gaps. The outcome 
of the activities of this stage was essentially a set of board structures and 
processes and a mindset dynamic on the board. The degree to which those 
structures, processes and mindset were ‘fit for purpose’ of achieving growth, 
in effect, represented the assumed dominant role of the board and, as such, 
it emerged as a micro-foundation for board effectiveness at delivering added 
value at the next stage of the process, Behaving Bigger. 
Based on this set of concepts and the relationships between them, this stage 
and its activities can be broadly located in corporate governance literature, 
specifically the literature pertaining to board attributes, such as director 
characteristics, board composition, and the role of boards (Pettigrew, 1992, 
Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand, 1996, Huse, 2000), and an emerging 
entrepreneurship literature on mindset and cognition (Mitchell et.al, 2002, 
Eggers and Kaplan, 2013). These are reviewed below. 
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Board Attributes 
Whilst the extant corporate governance literature on board attributes focuses 
most exclusively on the traditional context – large corporates (Roberts, 
McNulty and Stiles, 2005), with the recent increase in importance of 
ventures, it has been extended to the context of investor-backed private 
companies (Garg, 2013, Garg and Eisenhardt, 2017). 
Board attributes, such as director demographic characteristics (Lynall, 
Golden and Hillman 2003, Beckman, Burton and O’Reilly, 2007), board size 
(Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells, 1998) and board independence (Bhagat 
and Black, 1999, Lawrence and Stapledon, 1999), are the most studied 
aspects in the corporate governance literature (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). 
The bulk of this literature seeks to determine and predict the relationship 
between these board attributes and the performance of the firm (McNulty, 
Zattoni and Douglas, 2013). It is widely recognised, however, that so far 
these efforts have failed to produce any conclusive results (Daily and 
Johnson, 1997, Van Ees, Gabrielsson and Huse, 2009). Whilst this study 
was focused on gaining understanding and explaining differences in 
experiences on early venture boards as opposed to predicting the 
relationship between board attributes and performance, its findings do, 
however, include profiles of venture board directors. Therefore, some of this 
board attributes literature was deemed relevant. 
The extant knowledge on the demographic characteristics of early venture 
board directors has effectively been offered in Chapter 2, whilst providing the 
context to early venture boards as a backdrop to better understand the 
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substantive area of interest. In brief, the literature shows that early venture 
boards typically include three types of directors: Founders, VC Investor 
Director and NED, each with idiosyncratic demographic characteristics. 
Thus, Founders are typically young individuals with first time experience 
founding and running a company, often having an in-depth technical 
knowledge but lacking market, sales and marketing expertise (Sapienza and 
Gupta, 1994, Sapienza, Manigart and Vermier, 1996). VC Investor Director 
are characterised by having current experience on large number of boards, 
including startups and growth companies, and having industry knowledge 
because they tend to specialise in investing in specific sectors (Sorenson 
and Stuart, 2001). VC Investor Directors also have strong and personal 
financial incentives linked to the success of the venture (Sahlman, 1990, 
Garg and Furr, 2017). Individuals appointed as NEDs usually have a 
significant amount of experience in the relevant markets and industries 
(Lerner, 1995). However, the way NEDs are appointed and incentivised, 
influences their independent status (Davis and Cobb, 2009, Garg and Furr, 
2017). Chapter 2 discussed these demographic characteristics in detail and 
in comparison to directors on boards of public firms, the traditional context for 
the literature. The findings from this study are in line with this literature. 
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Mindset  
The findings of this study have also conceptualised the demographic profiles 
of Founders, VC Investor Directors and NEDs, as shown in Chapter 4. These 
profiles are positively in line with the literature, highlighting the striking 
asymmetry of knowledge and skills between Founders and other types of 
early venture directors. The findings, however, included Mindset, a novel 
demographic characteristic of Founder directors. In this research, Founder 
Mindset has emerged as a cognitive feature indicating the coachability of 
founder, their receptiveness to advice and susceptibility to value board and 
its contribution. 
In extant literature, mindset, as a concept, has emerged relatively recently in 
the entrepreneurship literature from the managerial cognition literature, 
rooted in psychology literature (Mitchell et.al, 2002, Eggers and Kaplan, 
2013). Generally defined, mindset is activation of cognitive processes that 
help with better dealing with complex tasks and environments (Gollwitzer and 
Bayer, 1999). In entrepreneurship literature, entrepreneurial mindset is 
known as “the ability to rapidly sense, act, and mobilise”, and it represents a 
way of thinking by entrepreneur about the complexities of their venture, often 
being able to focus on strategic opportunities and actions, even in conditions 
of extreme uncertainty (Ireland, Hitt and Sirmon 2003, p.967). As such, 
mindset is believed to influences CEO’s interpretations of the environment 
around them, thus shaping the way they respond to the challenges (Lant, 
Milliken and Batra, 1992, Ocasio, 1997, Reger and Palmer, 1996).  
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Mindset is, therefore, linked to behaviours and actions, since cognitive 
processes are evoked when individuals make decisions, assessments or 
judgements (Mitchell et al., 2002). The findings of this study suggest that the 
differences in Founders’ Mindset add to the understanding of the variations 
in board experiences. Thus, founders that demonstrate coachability, and 
receptiveness to advice, as well as susceptibility to value board, would be 
more open to actively interact with other board directors and their 
contribution. Whereas founders that do not value their boards and show 
resistance to coaching and advice, are most likely to be unwilling to engage 
with their boards over and above what is required. Such behaviour creates 
cognitive ‘blinders’ where founders find themselves unwilling to consider the 
contribution offered by the boards especially if it lies outside their expertise 
(Eggers and Kaplan, 2013).  Since mindset is linked to behaviours and 
actions, it is also an important concept when it comes to considering 
company performance (Eggers and Kaplan, 2013). 
The literature on entrepreneurship has recently started linking insights about 
mindset and cognitive processes with the knowledge about organisational 
system capabilities, such as routines, procedures and practices (Eggers and 
Kaplan, 2013). Thus, organisational system capabilities are considered to 
serve as microfoundations of mindset and behaviours (Coriat and Dosi, 
1998). In the context of early venture board, the study has found the board 
plays an important role in shaping these microfoundations by structuring, e.g. 
introducing routines and processes. This highlights the importance of 
evaluating the Mindset, as an additional demographic characteristic, so that 
structuring activities bring in routines and processes that fit the relevant 
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mindset gaps and needs as well as other types of gaps, which usually 
include skills and systems. The routines, systems and processes are also 
important measures when evaluating cognition and mindset, as efforts and 
attention that CEO offers to dealing with a particular challenge, in the context 
of the study this would relate to CEO-board relationship, serve as a proxy for 
measuring their mindset (Ocasio, 1997, Eggers and Kaplan, 2013). The 
relationship between organisational capabilities and mindsets is 
characterised by high path dependency (Wirtz, 2011). This means, for 
example, that the same routines, processes and procedures would be 
interpreted differently by founders with different mindsets, something that is 
pertinent to VC Investor Directors and their portfolio approach to investee 
companies.  
The literature notes, that gap in cognition stimulates learning and that 
mindsets develop over time (Forbes and Milliken, 1999, Wirtz, 2011, Eggers 
and Kaplan, 2013). This suggests that external directors on early venture 
boards need to be particularly aware of their role in shaping the mindset and 
cognitive capabilities of first-time founders.  
Wider corporate governance literature has also began recognised the 
importance of mindsets. Wirtz (2011) suggested that in the context of 
entrepreneurial firms such as early ventures, boards play “a central role in 
sustaining high levels of growth through the extensive use of cognitive lever”, 
meaning cognitive processes developed and evoked to influence decision 
making (p. 431). Moreover, he asserts that “the cognitive lever should be 
crucial in achieving and maintaining growth” thus supporting the findings of 
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this study that Mindset is an important demographic characteristic which 
plays a role in the overall process of optimising for growth (Wirtz, 2011, 
p.436). As such, it adds to the explanation of variation in experiences on 
early venture boards.  
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Board Composition 
The literature proposes traditional boards are structured with highly 
experienced and independent directors because they bring legitimacy to 
firms (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Boards are also advised to have 
proportionally more non-executive directors who are independent from the 
management and the outcomes of the firm, thus ensuring effectiveness of 
judgement (Westphal, 1998). Venture boards are usually dominated by VC 
Investors and although technically VC Investor Directors are non-executive 
directors, i.e. they do not work in the firm full time, they are not independent 
because they usually either represent the shareholders or are direct 
shareholders themselves (Zhang, Baden-Fuller and Pool, 2011). When 
attracting non-investor non-executive directors, it is also a common practice 
to encourage them to invest thus signalling legitimacy and validity of the 
business model (Everett and Casparie, 2018). The findings of this study are 
in line with the literature, showing that VC investors engage in balancing 
early boards by bringing in non-executive directors. 
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Fit for Purpose Board 
The findings showed that the board’s purpose during early stages is to 
provide strategic help as opposed to monitor and control. The degree to 
which the board is ‘fit for purpose’ is the outcome of the Evaluating and 
Structuring stage, the first stage in the process of optimising for growth. The 
concept of Fit for Purpose Board has emerged to be shaped by Board 
Purpose and underpinned by board Mindset Alignment and the Quality of 
Board Processes. 
The literature relating to mindset has been reviewed above in context of an 
individual mindset of a founder. Mindset, however, pertains not only to 
individuals, but also to groups (Wirtz, 2011). In the seminal work on the 
relationship between cognition and corporate governance, Forbes and 
Milliken (1999) suggested that the board outcome is “entirely cognitive in 
nature” since boards do not get involved in the implementation of their 
decisions, only executives of the company do (p.492). Thus, as it also 
emerged in this study, in order for a board to be effective, or fit for purpose, 
its collective mindset needs to be aligned. In the context of early ventures, 
the study showed, boards need to be aligned in such a way, that individually 
and collectively as a group they focus on providing strategic help to the 
venture as opposed to monitoring and controlling.  
Similar to individual mindset, collective mindset is also path dependent in 
relation to organisational routines and processes (Wirtz, 2011). Thus, the 
findings are aligned with the literature in the view that cognitive and structural 
characteristics are connected and play an important role when it comes to 
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boards and their function. Boards, however, are particularly susceptible to 
encounter difficulties from ineffective processes, since they come together 
only periodically with large intervals (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Therefore, 
quality of board processes is very important, as this study discovered, and it 
has an impact on board effectiveness (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). 
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Board Roles 
The concept of Board Purpose, as emerged in this study, is similar to the 
concept of board role or board function in extant literature. This literature is 
situated in the traditional corporate governance body of knowledge, and it is 
quite vast. There are multiple theoretical perspectives of board roles in the 
literature ranging from the well-established agency, resource-dependence 
and stewardship theories, to more emerging theory – the behavioural theory 
of boards (Gabrielson and Huse, 2005). 
Thus, Agency theory defines monitoring as the role which makes the board 
responsible for aligning and monitoring the interests of shareholders and 
managers using structures and incentives (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, 
Fama and Jensen, 1983). The main focus of agency theory is, therefore, on 
board characteristics and their relationship to firm performance (Roberts, 
McNulty and Stiles, 2005). This relationship is often described as “a set of 
interrelated elements where a change in one element will affect other 
elements in the system” (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004, p.5). There is, however, 
only limited support for the intended effect of the monitoring role of the board 
on company’s performance, and agency is widely criticised for failing to 
produce a consistent conclusion about the relationship with predictive 
powers (Leblanc and Gillies, 2003, Dalton et. al., 2007). 
In contrast, Resource Dependence Theory identifies a resource provision 
role, a board role as a source of important resources, arguing that better and 
faster access to resources maximises performance, minimises risk and 
dependence on external environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, Zhang, 
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Baden-Fuller and Pool, 2011). Examples of such resources include finance 
(Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988), introductions to external parties (Haunschild & 
Beckman, 1998), and support to the Chief Executive (Carpenter & Westphal, 
2001), among others. The theory, however, assumes that the resource 
provision is, in fact, valuable to the company, as opposed to potentially being 
harmful (Katila, Rosenberger and Eisenhardt, 2008). Additionally, it seems to 
only explain which director characteristics and experiences get priority when 
boards are formed, without specifying which resource links to which effect in 
the efforts of maximising the performance (Davis and Cobb, 2009). 
Stewardship theory emphasizes the collaborative role of the board and the 
collaborative nature of the relationships among board directors (Davis, 
Shoorman and Donaldson, 1997). The theory, assumes involved parties 
have aligned interests and argues that the CEO acts as a steward, engaging 
boards into a collaborative relationship in order to make effective strategic 
choices (Davis, Shoorman and Donaldson, 1997). The main criticism of the 
stewardship theory is that it does not address how the collaboration among 
board members actually happen (Wasserman, 2006). Additionally, the theory 
lacks the ability to explain variations in the outcomes of the collaborative 
relationship (Garg, 2011). 
The emerging Behavioural Theory of Boards views boards as open systems 
with multiple coalitions of stakeholders possessing varying weight and power 
and participating in a complex process of strategic decision-making (Huse, 
2007, Van Ees, Gabrielsson and Huse, 2009). Thus, boards roles are 
defined as the strategic decision-making role. The framework recognises that 
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board members rely on their knowledge, past experience and lessons, which 
they routinise and apply during decision-making, thus creating environment 
of learning by doing and experimenting in the boardroom (Huse, 2007). 
However, the behavioural perspective on board-performance relationship is 
still emerging and, apart from a few studies, for example by Voordeckers et. 
al. (2014) examining the relationship between board structures and actual 
board behaviours in SMEs in Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway, it 
remains largely untested. Moreover, the theoretical behavioural basis of this 
framework has been criticised for being nearly impossible to test empirically 
(Van Ees, Van der Laan and Postma, 2008). 
In context of investor-backed ventures the literature and the findings of this 
study identify two most prominent board roles of Monitoring (Garg, 2013) and 
Strategic Help (Graebner and Eisenhardt, 2004).  
Thus, monitoring in ventures is defined as “activities of the board and its 
individual directors that track the significant behaviours of executives, the 
outcomes of their actions, and the performance of the venture in order to 
ensure that corrective action is taken as needed” (Garg, 2013, p.90). In his 
seminal work, Garg (2013) argues that monitoring by venture boards is 
“distinctive” (p.90) from monitoring activities of corporate boards of public 
firms. He asserts that such feature of monitoring in ventures arises from high 
failure rate and unique venture characteristics, such as inherent instability, 
unstable environment and rapid change, and describes it as more frequent, 
happening in a variety of ways, i.e. not just through formal board meetings 
but also via phone calls, personal discussions and visits, and as being aimed 
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at not only governing, but also strategic and operating activities (Garg, 2013). 
Significantly, Garg’s (2013) work proposed that such distinctiveness of 
venture board monitoring has and inverted U-relationship with venture 
performance, meaning the more intense board monitoring leads to negative 
impact on performance. This was a novel proposition and insight since 
majority of prior literature on the role of the VC-dominated boards strongly 
supports monitoring as the dominant role of the board that ensures the 
interests of all shareholders (Sapienza and Gupta, 1994, Lerner, 1995, 
Hellmann and Puri, 2002a). Indeed, as Chapter 2 discussed, from formation 
venture boards are well equipped to behave as a monitoring function since 
their conduct is subject to legally binding Investment Agreements which often 
spell out frequency of board meetings and required monthly information.  
However, in reality, as Garg (2013, p.92) also found, a venture board often 
acts as “cooperative syndicate”, providing strategic help with a wide variety 
of challenges. Thus it seems that the most relevant framing of board’s role as 
a source of strategic help, coming from the work by Graebner and Eisenhardt 
(2004, p.1), defines boards role “as an interdependent peer relationship in 
which directors and managers contribute unique resources in the pursuit of 
collective success and in the context of multidimensional motives”. Given the 
high failure rates of startups and their critical lack of resources, this suggests 
the board’s role is to actively contribute to the success.  
This study outcome certainly aligned with this view that in the process of 
optimising for growth, early venture board take on a strategic help role and 
ensure that the collective mindset of directors on the boards is aligned with 
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that purpose. The misalignment of mindset and the board’s purpose, or 
prioritising monitoring role above strategic help, explains variation in the 
experiences of early venture boards since monitoring activities typically focus 
on tracking traditional company indicators and, as such, they are lacking 
when it comes to influencing the founders’ cognitive development and 
establishing the worth of value add activities of board directors.  
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Section Summary 
This section has positioned concepts within Evaluating and Structuring Stage 
within the extant literature on board attributes, board roles, cognition and 
mindset. The study’s outcome advocate for early venture boards to be 
structured to perform a strategic help role as opposed to a monitoring role. 
The study contributed to the extant literature by highlighting that the 
misalignment of board attributes and board roles explains the difference in 
experiences on early venture boards. Additionally, the study has introduced a 
concept of mindset from entrepreneurship and cognition literature as a novel 
and relevant board attribute. Table 26 summarises the contribution. 
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Table 26. Contribution to Corporate Governance and 
Entrepreneurship Literature. 
Area of 
Contribution 
 
Supported Added Challenged New 
Corporate 
governance 
literature on 
board 
attributes and 
board role 
• Supported: 
founders’ 
attitude, 
unwillingness to 
reflect and adapt 
undermines their 
learning capacity 
(Mintzberg and 
Westley, 1992). 
 
Thus, Founder 
Mindset 
(coachability, 
receptiveness to 
advice and 
susceptibility to 
value board) 
emerged as 
important 
attribute. 
 
• Board outcome 
is “cognitive in 
nature” (Forbes 
and Milliken 1999, 
p.492, Wirtz, 
2011) 
 
• Board mindset is 
path dependent 
in relation to 
board processes 
(Wirtz, 2011). 
 
• Cognitive and 
structural 
characteristics 
are connected 
and play an 
important role  
(Wirtz, 2011) 
• Mindset 
influences 
founder’s 
interpretations 
of the 
environment, 
shaping the 
way they 
respond to 
challenges 
(Lant, Milliken 
and Batra, 
1992, Ocasio, 
1997, Reger 
and Palmer, 
1996) 
• Challenging: 
monitoring is 
the most 
important role, 
on boards of 
early ventures 
strategic help 
is more 
appropriate 
role. 
 
Thus, if 
boards are 
structured to 
monitor, they 
are not fit for 
the purpose 
of strategic 
help.  
 
• Founder Mindset  
is offered as a 
novel attribute. 
 
• Novel founder 
characteristics 
offer better 
understanding of 
transformation to 
CEO. 
 
This 
transformation 
is relational in 
nature (Uhl-
Bien, 2011). It is 
the outcome of 
the interrelations 
of directors on 
early venture 
boards. 
 
• Founder Mindset 
and Board 
Mindset 
Alignment play 
important role in 
the overall 
process of 
Optimising for 
Growth. 
 
• Misalignment of 
mindsets and 
the board’s 
purpose, is a 
novel 
explanation of 
variation in the 
experiences of 
early venture 
boards 
 
Source: Table Developed by the Author based on Scott (2007) 
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5.1.2.3  Behaving Bigger Stage in Extant Literature 
The study’s outcomes suggest that the second stage of the process of 
Optimising for Growth involves adding value to the company. Based on the 
emerged set of concepts and the relationships between them, this stage and 
its activities can be broadly located in the corporate governance literature on 
value add.  
Value Add 
The extant literature has established that VC-backed ventures outperform 
other companies (Brophy and Verga, 1988, Baker and Gompers, 2003). 
Performance is one of the determinants of a share price, a traditional 
measure of company’s value. (Garg, 2013). Conventionally, company’s value 
is a “function of its expected future cashflows, discounted for risk and time”, 
which in relation to ventures, can be generated “from the realisation of 
growth opportunities” (Matolcsy, Stokes and Wright, 2004, p.34). In early 
investor-backed ventures, the value of growth opportunities is highly 
subjective, it is individual to specific company and is usually indicated by the 
share price that investors are willing to pay when funding it (Trichkova and 
Kanaryan, 2015). Achieving a much higher price during investment rounds 
and then at IPO, is often attributed to “additional value created through 
intervention by venture capitalists”, which goes beyond just providing funding 
capital (Sapienza, 1992, p.11). Certainly, not all VCs engage in interventional 
activities over and above monitoring of their capital (Robbie, Wright and 
Chiplin, 1997). This very much depends on the purpose and internal policies 
of any individual VC firm. However, where VCs do engage in value added 
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activities, they do so usually in their position as board directors and 
observers, and this extant literature can be divided into two streams 
(Sapienza, 1992).   
The first stream of this literature treats VC value add as a black box and 
attempts to measure VC-linked value add by comparing IPO returns of 
ventures (Cherin and Hergert, 1988, Brophy and Verga, 1988, Stein and 
Bygrave, 1990). Essentially, some of these studies confirm the link between 
VCs, company’s comparative increased performance and value at IPO, but 
they naturally lack detail about any specific activities that give rise to the 
value. (Sapienza, 1992). Not all studies in this stream confirm the link either. 
Some argue that meaningful added value is only delivered by top 20 high 
tech venture capitalists in the world (Stein and Bygrave, 1990, Rosenstein et 
al, 1993, Hsu, 2004). Others suggest that VCs do not add value even when 
they try (Manigart et al, 2002, Steier and Greenwood, 1995, Gomez-Mejia, 
Balkin and Welbourne, 1990). This stream has also been criticised for its 
inability to separate any added value effects of VCs from the effects by other, 
non-VC directors (Sapienza, 1992). Despite this and lacking specific details 
about value add activities, this type of macro-research is highly pertinent to 
facilitating a greater understanding of role VCs play in ventures transitioning 
into IPO (Garg and Furr, 2017). 
The second stream of this literature recognises that by their nature, value 
add activities are quite hard to quantify and therefore there is a “limited 
potential for drawing causal inferences” (Busenitz, Fiet and Moesel, 2004, 
p.787). Instead, seeking detail and insights, empirical studies in this stream 
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have conceptualised the value add as a series of activities that are assumed 
by VC directors and attempted to ascertain the relative importance of these 
inter-actions by gathering information about their perceived value directly 
from VCs and Founders (Sapienza, 1992). This study aligns itself with the 
second stream of literature on value add. Through Behaving Bigger stage, 
the emerged grounded theory offers rich, data-based insights into the value 
add intervention and its quality, activities, delivery and underlying conditions 
from VC Investor Director perspective. 
The main contribution of this stream of literature is an examination of value 
add activities, conceptualisation and categorisation of them into several 
types. Broadly speaking, the literature has identified four types of value add 
interactions including strategic, operational, networking and interpersonal 
activities (MacMillan, Kulow and Khoylian, 1989, Sapienza and Timmons, 
1989, Sapienza, Manigart and Vermier, 1996). Additionally, this literature has 
also been concerned with evaluating the activities in order to ascertain their 
relative importance to each other and to the performance of ventures, with 
widely mixed results. 
Strategic interactions are described as “providing financial and business 
advice and functioning as a sounding board” (Sapienza, Manigart and 
Vermeir, 1996, p.339). This covers provision of strategic information, ‘how to’ 
strategies of competing in the marketplace, and discussions on strategic 
issues which generate more informed strategic decisions (Barney, 1991, 
Buzenitz, Fiet and Moesel, 2004). It is generally assumed in the literature 
that strategic value add activities “would be related positively to 
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improvements in venture performance” (Buzenitz, Fiet and Moesel, 2004, p. 
792). However, empirical results have been quite varied. For example, when 
surveying VCs across the US and three largest markets in Europe (the UK, 
the Netherlands and France), the strategic role has been identified as the 
most important and valuable (Sapienza, Manigart and Vermeir, 1996). Yet, 
tracking long term effects of VC intervention across a large number of 
ventures, another study found “the offering of advice and information on 
strategic issues by VCs did not improve the chances for venture success” 
(Buzenitz, Fiet and Moesel, 2004, p.788). At the same time, it has been 
reported that wrong strategic advice provided by VCs could also, in fact, 
hinder the growth of ventures (Gomez-Mejia, Balkin and Welbourne, 1990, 
Steier and Greenwood, 1995). Such variation can be explained that strategic 
type of interaction might “add relatively more value” in specific 
circumstances, for example, when uncertainty is very high meaning “for 
ventures in the earliest stages” or, on the opposite side of the spectrum, in 
later stages, when the venture is performing really well and there are clear 
opportunities to capitalise on such growth along with operational excellence 
(Sapienza, Manigart and Vermeir, 1996, p.440).  
VC’s operational value-add interactions are defined as “helping to manage 
the ventures they invest in” (Buzenitz, Fiet and Moesel, 2004, p.788). The 
activities here include helping with resolving organisational issues, such as 
for example, implementing company policies and processes, employee 
practices or supplier relationships among others. The operational value-add 
has been identified as the most common type of VC intervention alongside 
the strategic type of involvement (MacMillan, Kulow and Khoylian, 1989). 
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However, although VCs consider their operational contribution as important, 
the view of Founders on this is mixed, as they consider such activities more 
interventionist and counterproductive than needed (Gomez-Mejia, Balkin and 
Wlbourne, 1990). 
Interpersonal or supportive value-add is defined “as mentor and confidant to 
CEO” (Sapienza, Manigart and Vermeir, 1996, p.339). Mentoring first time 
young founders, i.e. supporting, motivating, encouraging, has also been 
argued as one of the most important contribution of the VCs specifically in 
early high tech ventures (Wasserman and Boeker, 2005). Since mentoring 
activities are linked to accelerating founder learning, the literature has also 
linked mentoring to the improvement of venture performance (Perry, 1988, 
Fried and Hisrich, 1995). The interpersonal aspects of this type of value-add 
have also been found as crucial to developing a positive relationship among 
VCs and Founders (Fried and Hisrich, 1995). This is significant because the 
VC-Founder relationship is also considered to be an “important antecedent of 
future performance” (Barney et al., 1996, p.267).  
Networking type of value-add relates to providing “contacts to other firms 
and professionals” including potential partners, customers and suppliers 
(Sapienza, Manigart and Vermeir, 1996, p.440). Also often referred to as 
‘opening doors’, this activity has been found to leads to “useful networking 
assistance” (Sapienza, Manigart and Vermeir, 1996, p.444). It becomes most 
valuable when VCs are able to effectively leverage their vast networks and 
connect the venture to important large customers or influencers, thus 
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rendering the networking value-add as a relatively important driver of early 
growth (Colombo and Grilli, 2009, Dutta and Folta, 2016).  
In summary, the studies in the second stream of value add literature have 
built rich data knowledge about VC value-add interactions and their potential. 
The inconsistency in findings when it comes to measuring the relative worth 
of the activities and connecting any specific type to the value or performance 
of the company has been explained by methodological factors since most 
studies measured value add activities using perception of VCs and Founders 
of the value they brought. Perception of value is, of course, highly subjective 
and can be influenced by many factors. For example, this perception can be 
influenced and biased by a successful or a failed performance of the venture.  
Other inventive proxies have also been used, for example Sapienza (1992) 
measured the value add as perceived effectiveness of the involvement 
weighted by its perceived importance by CEOs and VCs. By the admission of 
the author, this was also highly subjective and led to conclusion that 
perception-based measures had proved inadequate when quantifying value 
add (Sapienza, 1992). Overall, studies provided useful insights but failed to 
establish any significant correlation between the performance of the venture 
and the perception of value add (Rosenstein et al., 1993, Barney et al., 
1996).  
Nonetheless, studies in this stream suggested that the extant knowledge can 
be usefully expanded by examining the conditional determinants of the value 
add in order to explain the significant variation in VCs involvement 
(Sapienza, 1992). After all, the most useful practical contribution of the 
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literature into value add activities would be to have recognisable and 
actionable set of determinants or conditions under which venture boards 
provide high quality value-add. It would also be useful to understand reasons 
and obstacles in situations where desired value add is not forthcoming. This 
study offers such analysis through the emergent grounded theory of 
Optimising for Growth. The differences in the dimensions of the emerged set 
of categories will result in a different set of board dynamic and variations in 
director interactions.  
During the analysis of Behaving Bigger stage, VC Director value add 
emerged to have quite a wide meaning of ‘more than just a job spec’, as 
described by a participant: 
“they come, they also work behind the scenes, they open doors, they 
help solve issues, they deal with complex stuff and governance. 
Basically, they add something which is more than just a job spec” 
(VC6) 
Further, a set of distinct value add activities have emerged: Opening Doors, 
Providing Strategic Input, Dealing with Issues, Sounding Board, Focussing 
on the Bigger Picture and Mentoring Founder. Whilst these activities align 
with the main value add categories found in the extant literature (MacMillan, 
Kulow and Khoylian, 1989, Sapienza and Timmons, 1989, Sapienza, 
Manigart and Vermier, 1996), the analysis has shown that they also align to 
the distinct challenges faced by the company and founder during this stage.  
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Thus, venture challenges of Commercialisation and Performance were 
addressed by strategic activities Sounding Board and Providing Strategic 
Input: 
“I like to listen to what people are thinking about, are worried about 
and then talk through the problems” (VC3) 
People Issues were helped by operational type value add of Dealing with 
Issues: 
“often we are talking about the team, so the board can then help with 
recruitment” (VC7) 
The inevitable further Funding issues were addressed by a networking type 
activity of Opening Doors: 
“continuing of help to the CEO of the company through the informal 
requests for help. Like, do you know X, Y, Z at this VC fund because 
I’d really like to speak to them” (VC7) 
First time founders Self-Doubt was supported by interpersonal value add 
Mentoring: 
“he became a very effective Chief Executive under his watch, under 
his mentoring. So, he really likes to sort of try and help people achieve 
their own potential” (VC7)  
Strategic value add activity Focusing on the Bigger Picture facilitated 
relieving Founders’ Tunnel Vision: 
“I think a really important function for the board is to help with, you 
know, raising your eyes to the horizon and you look further out. 
Because of course you always have got challenges to deal with on a 
daily basis, but you know, if you are not looking further ahead, you are 
constantly being surprised by things” (VC5) 
Table 27 summarises the alignment between value add activities and 
venture challenges as emerged in this study and their typology according to 
the extant literature. 
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Table 27. Value Add Activity Link to Venture Challenge 
Type of Value Add 
Activity emerged in 
this study 
Type of Value Add Activity in 
extant Literature 
Corresponding Venture 
Challenge emerged in 
this study 
   
Venture Challenge 
 
Sounding Board Strategic (Sapienza, Manigart 
and Vermeir, 1996, Barney et al., 
1996)  
Performance 
Providing Strategic Input Strategic (Sapienza, Manigart 
and Vermeir, 1996, Barney et al., 
1991) 
Commercialisation 
Dealing with Issues Operational (Buzenitz, Fiet and 
Moesel, 2004, MacMillan, Kulow 
and Khoylian, 1989) 
People Issues 
Opening Doors Networking (Sapienza, Manigart 
and Vermeir, 1996, Colombo 
and Grilli, 2009) 
Funding  
   
Founder Challenges 
 
Mentoring  Interpersonal (Sapienza, 
Manigart and Vermeir, 1996, 
Fried and Hisrich, 1995) 
Self Doubt 
Focussing on the Bigger 
Picture 
Strategic (Sapienza, Manigart 
and Vermeir, 1996, Barney et al., 
1996) 
Tunnel Vision 
Source: Table Developed by the Author, 2020 
Overall, in extant literature the value add activities have been found 
especially important for early stage ventures, first time founders and product-
market commercialising strategies (Timmons and Bygrave, 1986, Sapienza 
and Timmons, 1989, Hellmann and Puri, 2000). The grounded theory 
Optimising for Growth offers a novel insight into the understanding of board-
founder interactions by linking specific venture challenges and value add 
activities emerged in this study. By and large, this insight into the relationship 
between value add activities and specific needs of the founder and their 
venture contributes to the understanding the complexity of the VC-Founder 
interrelations. However, in pursuit of specifying, ranking and quantifying 
value add, the extant literature admittedly misses out on an opportunity to 
shed the light on how the value add is provided (Sapienza, Manigart and 
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Vermier, 1996). This study therefore also sheds light on the dimensions of 
the process, by distinguishing several behaviours such as Proactive Value 
add vs Not Forthcoming, being instructive by Telling What To Do and Being 
a Coach.  
There are several sides to the value add interactions. The extant literature on 
value add has placed much of its attention on examining the VC Director side 
as opposed to the Founder’s or NED’s side (Sapienza, Manigart and 
Vermier, 1996). Largely this research shows that VC assistance tends to 
vary from venture to venture (MacMillan, Kulow and Khoylian, 1989). To 
some degree, his variation is explained by the type of VC firm (Barney et 
al.,1996). Nevertheless, it has also been recognised that when VCs do 
engage in meaningful value adding activities, they are likely to make an effort 
and spend time with the venture in order to “develop a deep understanding” 
of it (Buzenitz, Fiet and Moesel, 2005, p.272). Such knowledge then allows 
VCs to better tailor their input to the needs of the venture, thus providing a 
better value add (Perry, 1988). Similarly, it is also acknowledged in literature 
that VCs invest in a portfolio of companies and consequently they may lack 
time that can be devoted to gain the deep understanding of all of them 
(Gorman and Sahlman, 1989). Therefore, VCs have to be selective with how 
they spend this time. The variation in VC assistance has also been explained 
in the extant literature by other conditions, including, among others, company 
performance, expectations for return and founders experience.  
However, while informative, these only give a partial picture of the board-
Founder interaction (Barney et al., 1996, Sapienza, Manigart and Vermier, 
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1996). Findings from this study align with the literature in two ways. First, 
they too showed that gaining a Deep Understanding forms part of VC’s 
proactive helping. They revealed touch-basing, i.e. frequent and regular 
communication, and avoiding surprises, hearing the bad news while they 
arise and not waiting until the board meeting, as strategies used by VCs to 
acquire the necessary knowledge about the venture. Second, they too 
showed that VCs have a Portfolio Mindset, an attitude that is formed as a 
result of the nature of the VC business where only a few investments bring 
desired multiple returns. Hence VCs do tend to focus on the winners and cut 
out the support to others. Thus, the study aligns with the extant literature in 
providing the understanding of the multi-faceted role of the VC-side of the 
value add interaction, explaining the reasons for the fluctuation in VC 
assistance and its quality from venture to venture (Barney et al., 1996).  
However, the literature on value add has very little to say about the Founder 
side of the interaction.  Whilst some studies suggest that “unless the 
entrepreneur is receptive to VC advice, no value added can be achieved 
through VC involvement” (Sapienza, Manigart and Vermier, 1996, p.444, 
Barney et al., 1996), there remains an opportunity to explore the Founder-
side further and this study offers several insights. Indeed, the study also 
shows that the profile of Founder’s mindset lays the important foundation for 
the value add interaction. Hence the Founders who are coachable, open to 
advice and have a positive susceptibility to value board, would be inherently 
predisposed to seek and receive the value add, as opposed Founders with 
Mindset characteristics that are not coachable, resisting advice and have a 
negative susceptibility to value board. Still, it emerged in this study that VCs 
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themselves hold a much more complex view of the role the Founders play in 
the value add activities besides the receptiveness of their mindset. It 
emerged VCs regard it as the responsibility of the Founders to instigate and 
pro-actively use the board for the value add.  
Outcomes of this study also show that as Founders develop from the first 
time entrepreneur into a fully-fledged CEO, there is noticeable difference in 
how they seek the value add. Evidently, Founders become much more 
selective and specific about what they want the VCs or board members to 
help them with. Having a very precise request comes from the more matured 
ability of founders to understand the needs of their venture and from their 
better knowledge of capabilities and networks of their board members. Thus, 
by providing novel insights into Founder-side of the VC-Founder value add 
interaction, this study extends the previous work and allows for better 
understanding of the complex processes of how value is evoked.  
The literature acknowledges that most studies look into monitoring board role 
without sufficiently considering the value add activities that boards are 
involved in (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2001). Moreover, there seems to be a 
“traditional theoretical division” of board role and value add activities and 
“inherent tension” between the two roles (Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 2005, 
p.S5). This means that with a few exceptions such as Sapienza Manigart and 
Vermier (1996), the extant literature examines VCs value add roles quite 
independently from their monitoring role. The outcomes of this study suggest 
that although early venture boards have a strong monitoring authority 
mandated by investment agreements, they are meant to be structured to 
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provide strategic help and add value. Monitoring is therefore a default or a 
background activity of more effective venture boards, whereas providing 
strategic help is prioritised.  
Section Summary 
This section has positioned concepts of Behaving Bigger stage within the 
extant corporate governance literature on value add. The outcomes of the 
study have been deemed as broadly aligned with this literature, however 
they also contribute by offering several insights into the relationship between 
value add activities and challenges faced by ventures. Table 28 summarises 
the contribution. 
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Table 28. Contribution to Corporate Governance 
Literature on Value Add 
Area of 
Contribution 
 
Supported Added Challenged New 
Corporate 
governance 
literature on 
value add 
 
• Study aligns 
with the 
literature in 
providing the 
understanding 
of the multi-
faceted role of 
the VC-side of 
the value add 
interaction, 
explaining the 
reasons for the 
fluctuation in VC 
assistance and 
its quality from 
venture to 
venture (Barney 
et al., 1996) 
• Added to the 
understanding 
of value add by 
offering the 
conditional 
determinants 
of the value 
add in order to 
explain the 
significant 
variation in 
VCs 
involvement 
(Sapienza, 
1992 
 
• Added 
Founder 
Mindset as 
important 
foundation for 
the value add 
interaction 
 
• VCs/board 
expectation 
that Founders 
instigate and 
pro-actively 
use the board 
for the value 
add 
 • Offered novel 
insight into the 
understanding of 
board-founder 
value add 
interactions by 
linking specific 
venture 
challenges and 
value add 
activities.  
 
• Showed the 
novel insights of 
how value is 
added 
 
• Founder 
Becoming CEO 
characteristics 
offer insight into 
a difference in 
seeking value 
add between 
new founders 
and more 
experienced 
founders. 
 
• This study 
suggest 
monitoring is a 
background 
activity whereas 
providing 
strategic help 
should be 
prioritised by 
boards 
 
Source: Table Developed by the Author based on Scott (2007) 
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5.2   More Formal Substantive Theory 
The previous section has reviewed relevant extant literature, where 
relevance was determined by the nature of the emerged grounded theory 
Optimising for Growth and its components. As part of this review, the 
researcher identified areas of convergence, i.e. where this study supported 
and added to the literature, and areas of divergence, i.e. where the study 
challenged or added to the literature.  
This review located the emerged grounded theory Optimising for Growth in 
the extant body of knowledge, i.e. a multidisciplinary cross-over of corporate 
governance, corporate finance, entrepreneurship, management cognition 
and leadership literature.  
The purpose of this section is to refine and abstract the substantive theory to 
a more formal grounded theory. According to GT method, this is done via a 
theoretical integration, a “process of comparing the substantive theory with 
other, previously developed, theories” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, Lehmann 
and Myers, 2010, p.369). Generating a more formal substantive theory 
contributes towards enhancement of extant formal theories (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967, Eisenhardt, 1988, Urquhart, 2013). 
While most investor-backed venture form a board as a result of receiving the 
first investment, the experiences of directors, founders, NEDs and VC 
Investor Directors, vary significantly from board to board. The grounded 
theory method used in this study allowed the development of a set of 
concepts which suggested that the variation can be explained by the process 
of Optimising for Growth. Specifically, variation is explained by the extent of 
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efforts to achieve cognitive and structural alignment among the founder, the 
board directors and the company, for the purpose of providing strategic help 
and adding value, as opposed to monitoring.  
Whilst this study has yielded a grounded theoretical framework of what 
happens on early venture boards between receiving a first VC investment 
and growing to achieve the next investment, it is possible to take a broader 
view and further abstract the substantive theory using the extant literature 
review presented in the previous chapter.  
One clear finding of the study is that the process of Optimising for Growth 
represents a complex relationship between the venture board and the 
venture performance, where board is involved in the two-stage process of 
optimising in order to achieve venture growth, which has emerged as a proxy 
for traditional measure performance during early stages of company 
development. In corporate governance literature, this relationship is at the 
forefront of enquiry, and it is often depicted by integrative theoretical models 
linking three essential variables: board attributes, such as board composition, 
director attributes, board norms, board roles, such as monitoring and 
strategic help, and company performance, such as share price or a proxy of 
it (Zahra and Pearce, 1989, McNulty, Zattoni and Douglas, 2013).  
Based on the review of theoretical perspectives, which were briefly 
discussed in Chapter 1, Zahra and Pearce (1989) offered an “integrative 
model that synthesizes past research and specifies relationships between 
board variables and company performance”, as shown on Figure 12. 
  
245 
 
Figure 12. Model of Board Attributes and Roles 
 
Source: Zahra and Pearce (1989) 
As Zahra and Pearce (1989, p.305) explain:  
“The Model builds on past research, and, perhaps more importantly, 
advances specific links among board variables and their influence on 
company performance… 
In combination, internal and external contingencies determine the mix 
of board attributes, and, in turn, a board’s performance in its three 
roles, and ultimately, on company performance”. 
Through this model Zahra and Pearce (1989) recognise that the relationship 
and effect of boards and performance would be significantly different in 
mature companies, established organisations compared to young startups in 
in an innovative new market.  
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In the light of this model and the literature review, the substantive theory of 
Optimising for Growth can be further abstracted and restated in a more 
formal way, using the three variables depicting board-performance 
relationship as underpinning, as follows: 
• Board attributes of early venture boards such as board composition, 
structure, director attributes and board norms, are a result of venture 
board formation, evaluating and structuring process. This study found 
two novel board attributes - founder mindset attributes (Mitchell et.al, 
2002, Eggers and Kaplan, 2013) and alignment of collective director 
mindset (Wirtz, 2011); as important characteristics that explain 
variation in board experiences. The study suggests these novel 
attributes are just as important to consider as director demographic 
characteristics and board processes.  
• Early venture boards prioritise the board role of strategic help, as 
opposed to monitoring. The extant literature on corporate governance 
often argues that the undertaking of the board role is determined by 
board attributes (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Thus, boards attributes 
are considered as antecedents of company performance. However, 
since this study examined nascent and early board experiences, the 
outcome suggests that the relationship between the board role and 
board attributes is more inter-dependent. The study proposed that the 
degree of board fit for the purpose of providing strategic help shapes 
its ability to optimise for growth. In other words, in early ventures, 
board role influences the structuring of board attributes. 
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• The outcome of the process of optimising is a set of growth 
characteristics. In the context of early venture, these growth attributes 
are more relevant measures of company performance as opposed to 
traditional companies’ performance metrics. The study revealed that 
growth characteristics include not only company growth attributes but 
also Founder Becoming CEO behavioural attributes, thus providing a 
novel insight into the nature of performance of early ventures.  
Figure 13 illustrates the refined, more formal substantive theory, novel 
concepts and relationship proposed as an outcome of this study are 
highlighted in red. 
Figure 13. More Formal Substantive Theory 
 
Source: Figure Developed by the Author, 2020, based on Zahra and Pearce (1989) 
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Boards operate behind closed doors and early venture boards are no 
different. Some boards are better fit to boost the growth performance of the 
venture, whilst others are not (Garg, 2013). The refined theory of Optimising 
for Growth provides a fresh take on the relationship between board 
attributes, board role and company performance. Novel board and 
performance attributes, originating in other disciplines, have been suggested. 
The inter-dependent nature of the relationship between board role and board 
attributes highlighted in this theoretical framework explains variations in 
experiences on early venture boards.    
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5.3   Chapter Summary 
This chapter has refined the emerged substantive theory of Optimising for 
Growth into a more formal grounded theory. This was achieved by relating 
and locating the nascent theory and its concepts in the extant body of 
knowledge. The relevant literature was multi-disciplinary and included 
corporate governance, corporate finance, entrepreneurship and relational 
leadership fields of research. 
First, the process of optimising for growth was located and discussed in 
relation to the concept of professionalising from the extant corporate finance 
literature. Since studies on professionalising are mainly concerned with the 
effects of VCs, this research provided the insight into the process itself, 
specifically during the early stages of venture development. This research 
also proposed that the outcome of the process includes not only company 
performance but also a transformation of first-time founders into fully-fledged 
CEO.  
Second, concepts of emerged Evaluating and Structuring Stage were located 
in corporate governance literature, specifically the literature on board 
attributes, director characteristics, board composition, and the role of boards. 
The study revealed a fresh perspective on the link between board roles and 
board attributes, suggesting this relationship is inter-related and that during 
early stages the board role shapes board attributes. Additionally, comparing 
the study’s outcomes and the extant literature has allowed to bring in 
concepts of founder and board collective mindset from entrepreneurship and 
cognition literature as a novel and relevant board attributes. 
250 
 
Third, activities of Behaving Bigger Stage were reviewed in relation to the 
corporate governance literature on value add. This provided novel insights 
into the relationship between types of value add activities and challenges 
faced by founders and their ventures. 
Thus, by relating the key categories of the emerged theory (i.e. the process 
of Optimising, Evaluating and Structuring and Behaving Bigger) with the 
extant literature has allowed for the integration of the findings with the 
existing body of knowledge.  
The discussion highlighted similarities and differences between the findings 
of the study and the existing body of knowledge in order to bring deeper and 
novel insights into the interrelationships on early venture boards and 
conceptualisation of value add using the experiences of venture directors on 
boards of UK tech startups. This also revealed the study’s contribution, which 
is discussed in more detail in the concluding chapter. 
Finally, this chapter has used the basic variables of integrative theoretical 
models in corporate governance theorising as underpinning for abstracting 
the emerged substantive theory, thus arriving at a more formal interpretation 
of the theory. 
The following final chapter of the thesis presents study’s conclusions and its 
contribution to theory and practice, suggesting avenues for further research.  
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Chapter 6 Conclusions 
6.0   Introduction 
This doctoral study explored the experiences of directors on boards of the 
UK early technology ventures backed by venture capital firms. It developed a 
grounded theory of Optimising for Growth, offering an integrative framework 
to better understand what is happening on boards and to explain variations 
in these experiences. 
This is a concluding chapter of the thesis. First, the chapter reviews the 
achievement of aims and objectives set out for this study in Chapter 1. Brief 
summary the main argument is also offered. Second, the chapter specifies 
the study’s contribution to knowledge and professional practice. Third, 
considerations are given to the study against the evaluative criteria of classic 
grounded theory method, demonstrating that the developed substantive 
theory has achieved fit, relevance, workability and modifiability (Glaser, 
1998). The chapter culminates with a discussion of limitations and 
opportunities for further research. 
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6.1   Review of Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this study, as set out in Chapter 1, was two-fold: 
1) to understand what happens on early venture boards, and  
2) to develop a theoretical framework for the complex relationship 
between directors’ attributes and behaviours, board’s role and 
processes, and venture performance during the critical early stages of 
development.  
The study has achieved this aim and accompanying specific objectives by 
developing a grounded theory of Optimising for Growth, as follows: 
• Objective 1: To understand what happens on early boards by allowing for 
the emergence of the main concern of directors on early venture boards. 
This thesis evidenced how the theory development focused on the main 
concern of directors on early venture boards. Thus, the main concern of 
Growth was allowed for the emerge, and, as depicted in Table 16. Main 
Concern Category - Growth, it was defined by participants in terms of 
Growth Curve Gradient (Rate of Growth, Speed and Volatility), Company 
Indicators (Investment Round, Company Size) and Becoming CEO 
Indicators. 
• Objective 2. To learn how directors go about resolving their main concern, 
thus discovering the core category. 
The recognition of the ultimate concern of directors as a very specific type 
of Growth (i.e. high rate, high speed) provided a basis for the 
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understanding how this concern was being resolved, i.e. the core category 
of Optimising, fulfilling objective 2.  Optimising was developed as a 
complex two stage process. 
• Objective 3. Based on the emerged concepts and the relationships 
between them, to develop a substantive theory explaining how directors 
are resolving their main concern.  
The substantive theory of Optimising for Growth was developed as a set 
of relationships between 6 concepts, which emerged from data: Growth, 
Stage 1 Evaluating and Structuring Stage, Stage 2 Behaving Bigger 
Stage, Degree of Fit for Purpose Board, Venture Challenges and Gaps, as 
illustrated in Figure 10. Emergent Substantive Theory of Optimising for 
Growth and Section 4.5   Summary of the Emergent Theory of Optimising 
for Growth. 
Thus, in order to resolve the main concern of achieving Growth, directors 
are involved in a complex two-stage process of Optimising the board’s 
role, company processes, directors’ adding value behaviours and 
founder’s director attributes, depending on the identified structural and 
cognitive gaps and unique challenges facing the early venture. 
• Objective 4. To clarify how the emerged theory explains variations in 
experiences of directors on early venture boards. 
Optimising process emerged to contain a set of structural and cognitive 
concepts relating to director attributes, board role and director adding 
value activities. These concepts emerged with sub-properties and 
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dimensions capturing variations. For example, Founder Mindset’s property 
of Coachability had dimensions of Coachable/Not Coachable. Variation in 
Board Mindset Alignment was captured by dimensions 
Aligned/Misaligned. Another example, the variation in Quality of 
Information was captured by dimensions High/Low. Altogether, these 
dimensions captured variations in structural and cognitive concepts 
relating to director attributes, board role and director adding value 
activities. This enabled the theory of Optimising for Growth to explain 
variations in experiences of directors on early venture boards, thus 
achieving objective 4. For example, it emerged that the variation in value 
adding activities depended on the degree the board was fit for purpose. 
Factors such as board’s role and whether the board is indeed fit for that 
role, the alignment of directors’ collective mindset, or the quality board 
meetings, among other identified categories, contribute to the variations in 
experience.  
• Objective 5. To contribute to the knowledge base and the director practice 
in the context of early venture boards. 
The substantive theory of Optimising for Growth was integrated with the 
extant literature, identifying points of convergence and divergence. These 
have been captured as contributions to the knowledge (Section 6.3 
below), and their implications, as contributions to the professional practice 
of directors on boards of early venture boards (Section 6.4 belwo), thus 
achieving objective 5.  
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6.2   Summary of the Thesis Argument  
This study has argued that on early venture boards directors are involved in 
a complex process of Optimising in order to resolve their main concern of 
achieving exponential Growth. Classic grounded theory method has been 
employed to explore experiences of directors on early venture boards in the 
UK. A substantive theory of Optimising for Growth has been developed. The 
theory provided a deeper understanding of what happens on early venture 
boards by uncovering the process of optimising as the first step in the 
boards’ longer-term efforts to professionalise the startup into a company able 
of delivering investors’ exit via IPO. Having captured variations and the 
relationship between director attributes, board roles, board processes, value 
adding and company performance, the theory of Optimising for Growth also 
explained the differences in director experiences on early venture boards. 
The findings suggest the key difference arises when the early venture boards 
are fit for the purpose of monitoring as opposed to providing strategic help. 
Moreover, the substantive theory has also been developed as a more formal 
integrative theoretical framework of the relationship between director 
attributes, board roles, board processes and company performance in 
context of early venture boards. New director and board cognitive attributes, 
such as Founder Mindset and Board Mindset Alignment, offer fresh insights 
into the relationship since they have not yet been considered as part of the 
director and board attributes by the current corporate governance literature. 
Emergence of those attributes is important because they capture that 
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director and board attributes are inter-changeable in their nature and over 
time. 
The structure of the argument of the thesis is summarised as follows: 
Chapter 1 explained that the motivation for this study came from the personal 
professional experience of the author as investor-observer on early venture 
boards. It discussed the importance to improve the understanding of what 
happens on early venture boards since early boards shape the growth and 
the future of ventures. The chapter set the aims and objectives for the study, 
as well as the rationale in the context to the wider literature on corporate 
governance. 
Chapter 2 provided further background and critically discussed the distinct 
context that early venture boards operate in. Thus, it was established that 
early venture boards differ from traditional corporation in ways they are 
formed and composed, their directors have to deal with a unique set of 
conflicts since there is a lack of separation of ownership and control, and 
they operate in under conditions of extreme uncertainty, fast changing 
environments and unstable business models where traditional measures of 
performance are useless (Garg, 2013). By discussing these issues, the 
chapter offered a contextual foundation for the study. 
Chapter 3 positioned the study as a grounded theory investigation carried out 
from interpretivist philosophical perspective. The chapter offered a rationale 
for employing classic, or Glaser, grounded theory approach to data 
collection, analysis and theory building. Based on the review of ethical 
considerations and the board access issues, the investigation was designed 
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as a pilot and a main study. Having considered the results of the pilot, which 
found little access problems and established VC perspective as the most 
rational starting point for the main data collection, the chapter culminated 
with a summary of approach to the main data collection. 
Chapter 4 developed the substantive theory of Optimising for Growth from 
data using grounded theory’s approach to analysing, namely open coding, 
selective coding and theoretical sampling, and theoretical coding. The 
chapter showcased how these coding procedures were implemented. Thus, 
open coding stage identified the main concern and how it is being resolved, 
i.e. the core category, culminating with a set of open codes generated in the 
process. Coding continued selectively only for codes relating to the core 
category. Selective coding stage developed open codes further into selective 
codes. Theoretical sampling was used to collect to ensure completeness of 
the selective codes. Selective codes were then advanced further into 
theoretical codes, culminating in a set of theoretical codes representing 
relationships and thus depicting the substantive theory of Optimising for 
Growth. The emerged theory was interpreted as a complex process taking 
place over two stages involved a transformation of the early venture’s board, 
structures, processes, director and board attributes to meet growth attributes 
as a pre-curser of the new investment round. Essentially, chapter4 presented 
the findings of this study – the emerged from data concepts and the 
interpretation of the relationships between then as a substantive theory of 
Optimising for Growth. 
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Chapter 5 refined the emerged theory by comparing it to the extant literature. 
The theory was located across several disciplines, including corporate 
governance, corporate finance, entrepreneurship and relational leadership. 
This review enabled a more abstract interpretation of the theory and its 
refinement into a more formal substantive theory integrating director 
attributes, board roles, value adding processes and company performance. 
The current chapter, Chapter 6, reflects on the study’s aims and objectives. It 
offers contributions to knowledge and practice. Here, the developed theory is 
also considered against the classic grounded theory’s own evaluative 
framework. The chapter concludes with an acknowledgement of the 
limitations of the study and proposes opportunities for further research.  
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6.3   Contribution to Knowledge  
The development of a substantive grounded theory of Optimising for Growth 
has been evidenced in this thesis. Based on the findings in Chapter 5, the 
following four contributions are offered: 
• Contribution 1 – Optimising for Growth as Integrative Model 
• Contribution 2 – Optimising for Growth as the First Stage of 
Professionalising 
• Contribution 3 – Novel Board Attributes and Their Fit with Board’s 
Role 
• Contribution 4 – Linking Value Add and Venture Challenges 
These contributions are first summarised in Table 29 and then individually 
discussed. The table presents the contributions as a useful evaluation 
against the existing literature, identifying specific areas that the findings 
supported, added to, challenged or offered as a new insight, as initially 
outlined in the previous chapter, Chapter 5 (Scott, 2007): 
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Table 29. Summary of the Contribution to Knowledge 
Area of 
Contribution 
Supported Added Challenged New 
Contribution 1 – 
Optimising for 
Growth as Integrative 
Model 
 
Contribution to 
corporate 
governance literature 
   • Substantive theory of 
Optimising for Growth 
offers novel insight into 
the relationship between 
director attributes, board 
roles, board processes 
and company 
performance in context 
of early venture boards 
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Area of 
Contribution 
Supported Added Challenged New 
Contribution 2 – 
Optimising for 
Growth as the first 
stage of 
professionalising 
 
Contribution to 
corporate finance 
literature 
on professionalising 
of startup firms 
backed by VCs 
 
• Early ventures are under 
pressure to professionalise 
as early as possible (Jones, 
2017), conceptualised in this 
study as Behaving Bigger 
stage 
 
• In early ventures HR base is 
professionalised by 
introducing experienced 
NEDs to boards (Filatotchev 
and Wright, 2005) 
• Unlike professionalising 
where VC’s main 
concern is exit 
(Bonnet, Wirtz and 
Seville, 2013), during 
early stages of 
investment and when 
optimising, VC directors’ 
main concern is growth 
since without it, the 
startup and the 
investment simply fails 
to reach the next stage  
 
• This study challenges that 
founder replacement is as a matter 
of ‘when’ as opposed to ‘if’ 
(Hellmann and Puri, 2002a). 
Because during the early stages, 
founders are indistinguishable 
from the venture 
 
Study offers founder 
Becoming CEO attributes, 
used by VCs to judge if founder 
get replaced (this is also a 
contribution to practice) 
 
• Since founders are eventually 
replaced, it might be counter-
productive for VCs to invest in 
founder development 
This study challenges this and 
offers Optimising for Growth as 
framework for the effective VC-
Founder-Board relationship 
• Professionalising is a 
‘black box’, (Hellmann 
and Puri, 2002a) 
Optimising is offered 
as the first stage of 
professionalising 
process, linking it to 
stages in investment 
rounds and in 
company development 
lifecycle 
 
• Extant literature 
equated boards with 
VCs, this study offers 
boards to have an 
important role in the 
optimising and 
professionalising 
process 
 
• The process of 
Optimising for Growth 
is a relational process 
(Uhl-Bien, 2011). 
Company growth is not 
the only outcome of 
this process but 
Founder Becoming 
CEO is its additional, 
more novel, outcome 
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Area of 
Contribution 
Supported Added Challenged New 
Contribution 3 – 
Novel Board 
Attributes and Their 
Fit with Board’s Role 
 
Contribution to 
corporate 
governance literature 
on board attributes 
and board role 
• Founders’ attitude, 
unwillingness to reflect and 
adapt undermines their 
learning capacity (Mintzberg 
and Westley, 1992). 
 
• Board outcome is “cognitive 
in nature” (Forbes and Milliken 
1999, p.492, Wirtz, 2011) 
 
• Board mindset is path 
dependent in relation to board 
processes (Wirtz, 2011). 
 
• Cognitive and structural 
characteristics are 
connected and play an 
important role  
(Wirtz, 2011) 
• Mindset influences 
founder’s 
interpretations of the 
environment, shaping 
the way they respond 
to challenges (Lant, 
Milliken and Batra, 
1992, Ocasio, 1997, 
Reger and Palmer, 
1996) 
• Challenged: monitoring is the 
most important role, on boards of 
early ventures. Providing 
Strategic Help is a more 
appropriate role for this stage and 
for achieving growth 
 
Thus, if boards are structured to 
monitor, they are not fit for the 
purpose of strategic help, and 
are not able to meaningfully add 
value to get the startup to growth 
and the next investment round 
 
• Founder Mindset  
emerged as important 
and novel director 
attribute. 
Founder Mindset and 
Board Mindset 
Alignment play 
important role in the 
overall process of 
Optimising for Growth - 
Misalignment of 
mindsets and the 
board’s purpose, is a 
novel explanation of 
variation in the 
experiences of early 
venture boards 
 
• Novel attribute 
Founder Becoming 
CEO offers better 
understanding of the 
change from Founder 
to CEO. 
This transformation is 
relational in nature 
(Uhl-Bien, 2011). It is 
the outcome of the 
interrelations of 
directors through the 
process of Optimising. 
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Area of 
Contribution 
Supported Added Challenged New 
Contribution 4 – 
Linking Value Add 
and Venture 
Challenges 
 
Contribution to 
corporate 
governance literature 
on value add 
• Literature on the role of the 
VC-side of the value add 
interaction, explaining the 
reasons for the fluctuation in 
VC assistance and its quality 
from venture to venture 
(Barney et al., 1996) 
• Added to the 
understanding of value 
add by offering the 
conditional 
determinants of the 
value add in order to 
explain the significant 
variation in VCs 
involvement 
(Sapienza, 1992) 
 
• Added Founder 
Mindset as important 
foundation for the 
value add interaction 
 
• VCs/board expectation 
that Founders 
instigate and pro-
actively use the board 
for the value add 
 • Offered novel insight 
into the understanding 
of board-founder value 
add interactions by 
linking specific 
venture challenges 
and value add 
activities.  
 
• Showed the novel 
insights of how value 
is added 
 
• Founder Becoming 
CEO attributes offer 
insight into a difference 
in seeking value add 
between new founders 
and more experienced 
founders. 
 
• This study suggest 
monitoring is a 
background activity 
whereas providing 
strategic help should 
be prioritised by 
boards 
 
Source: Table Developed by the Author based on Scott (2007) 
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6.3.1 Contribution 1 – Optimising for Growth as Integrative 
Model  
The study’s main contribution to knowledge is the substantive theory of 
Optimising for Growth as a theoretical framework for understanding early 
venture boards and uncovering the explanatory factors behind the 
variations in the board experiences. Whilst there has been some work on 
the inner workings of venture boards, there is lack of understanding of 
boards during the critical early stages of the venture’s development 
lifecycle. This study contributes to this gap. 
In its more formal way, the theory of Optimising for Growth extends Zahra 
and Pearce (1989) integrative theoretical framework of interrelations 
among board variables and their influence on company performance to 
the context of early venture boards.  
6.3.2 Contribution 2 – Optimising For Growth as the First Stage 
of Professionalising 
The study’s second contribution is to the corporate finance literature on 
professionalising investor-backed startups. Such startups are under 
pressure from their investors to professionalise as early as possible due 
to a limited timeframe available for investor exit (Jones, 2017). Since 
professionalising in the extant literature is mainly concerned with causes 
and effects, Optimising for Growth is offered as an insight into the 
professionalising process. Thus, the study suggests the process of 
professionalising is distinctly linked to stages in investment rounds and in 
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company development lifecycle and suggests Optimising for Growth is 
relevant to the first early stage post first investment. 
Whilst during the professionalising process the literature identifies exit as 
VC’s main concern (Bonnet, Wirtz and Seville, 2013), this study offers an 
additional insight. This study discovered that during early stages of 
investment, the main concern of VC directors is growth, since without it, 
the startup and the investment simply fails to reach the next stage, where 
exit becomes possible. 
This study challenges the assertion in the extant literature that founder 
replacement is as a matter of ‘when’ as opposed to ‘if’ (Hellmann and 
Puri, 2002a). Findings show during the early stages, founders are 
indistinguishable from the venture. The study offers novel founder 
Becoming CEO attributes shedding light on what investors are looking for 
when considering whether founder are capable of leading the company 
through to the next stage of development. Additionally, recent trends 
show that in private venture-backed companies reaching a status of 
unicorns, i.e. achieving valuations of at least $1bn, founders actually 
retain majority control as opposed to investors (Harrison and Mason, 
2019, Pollman, 2019).  
Furthermore, whilst extant literature acknowledges professionalising 
includes introducing experienced NEDs to boards (Filatotchev and 
Wright, 2005), it prioritises the role of investors, thus neglecting boards or 
not distinguishing between investors and boards. This study finds boards 
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to have an important role of providing Strategic Help in the efforts of 
optimising. 
It was also shown that the process of Optimising for Growth is a relational 
process (Uhl-Bien, 2011). And it is offered as framework for the effective 
VC-Founder-Board relationship. 
Chapter 1 brought into a sharp focus the need for a better understanding 
of what happens on early and even nascent venture boards in order to 
have a more informed view of their micro-foundational role in company’s 
growth and governance. By uncovering concepts and relationships that 
account for variations in experiences of startup board directors, the 
developed theory of Optimising for Growth, thus, contributed to this 
agenda. 
6.3.3 Contribution 3 – Novel Board Attributes and Their Fit with 
Board’s Role 
The third contribution of this study is to the corporate governance 
literature on board attributes and roles. Founder Mindset is offered as a 
novel attribute of founder-director (Wirtz, 2011). Originating in the 
psychology literature and being developed in the entrepreneurship 
literature, this is an important crossover into the corporate governance 
literature. Findings support early corporate governance research 
suggesting mindset influences founder’s interpretations of the 
environment, shaping the way they respond to challenges (Lant, Milliken 
and Batra, 1992, Ocasio, 1997, Reger and Palmer, 1996, Forbes and 
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Milliken, 1999). This study offers Founder Mindset defined by 
Coachability, Receptiveness to advice and Susceptibility to value board 
as important novel director attribute, showing that: founders’ attitude, 
unwillingness to reflect and adapt undermines their learning capacity 
(Mintzberg and Westley, 1992). 
Collective Board Mindset Alignment also emerged to play an important 
role in the overall process of Optimising for Growth. This shows early 
boards’ outcome is “cognitive in nature” (Forbes and Milliken 1999, p.492, 
Wirtz, 2011). However, board mindset is path dependent in relation to 
board processes (Wirtz, 2011). 
This study challenged whether monitoring is the most important role of 
the board during the early stages, suggesting that strategic help is a more 
appropriate role. Thus, if boards are structured to monitor, they are not fit 
for the purpose of strategic help.  
Misalignment of mindsets and the board’s purpose is a novel explanation 
of variation in the experiences of early venture boards. Cognitive and 
structural characteristics are inter-connected and play an important role 
(Wirtz, 2011) 
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6.3.4 Contribution 4 – Linking Value Add and Venture 
Challenges 
The fourth contribution of this study is to the corporate governance 
literature on value add. Whilst the study aligns with the literature on the 
multi-faceted role of the VC-side of the value add interaction (Barney et 
al., 1996), it adds to the understanding by offering the conditional 
determinants of the value add in order to explain the significant variation 
in VCs involvement (Sapienza, 1992). Additionally, novel insight is 
proposed into the link between value add and specific challenges that 
ventures face during the early stages. 
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6.4   Contribution to Practice 
The research explored the perspective of VC Investor Directors and 
contextualises it by examining more widely the experiences of Founder 
Directors and independent Non-Executive Directors. The study has 
opened up the black box of boards, uncovering the link between director 
attributes, board role and value add in the relentless pursuit of venture’s 
growth. It is important to consider the implications of the above-
mentioned contributions to knowledge to the professional practice of 
directors on early venture boards. 
6.4.1 Contribution 5 – Optimising for Growth as a Diagnostic 
Tool 
The study’s integrative framework can be used by directors, especially 
founders, on early boards to diagnose and better understand how to build 
and develop a strong and effective relationship with their boards to be 
cognitively aligned and structurally enabled.  
For example, founders can reflect on the mindset attributes and consider 
their internal capabilities as a coachable individual, accepting or resisting 
advice and their susceptibility to value boards.  
At the same time, directors can evaluate whether the collective mindset of 
the board is aligned to provide strategic help as opposed to monitor and 
whether their board processes effectively support the implementation of 
that role.  
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The study confirmed the relationship between board attributes and board 
roles but opened up a fresh way of thinking about the role of early venture 
boards. The traditional thinking places an emphasis on board attributes 
as antecedents of board role and, as consequence, firm’s performance. 
This study’s findings suggest that in order to be effective in the process of 
optimising, venture boards must be fit for purpose of providing strategic 
help, as opposed to a more traditional role of monitoring. The specific 
practical implication of this is the necessity to structure and compose the 
board in such a way so it is fit for that purpose of providing strategic help. 
This is where the novel concept of alignment of mindsets and mindset 
attributes is particularly useful in evaluating the gaps in the directors’ 
understanding of the board’s role and their attitude and willingness to 
engage. 
The findings also give founders a perspective of behavioural attributes of 
an emerging CEO, as evaluated by investors at point of the next 
investment round. This is a very important insight for first time founders 
as, statistically, most of them get replaced by professional CEOs pre-IPO 
(Hellman and Puri, 2002a).  
Prior to making an investment, VCs engage in due diligence, evaluating 
technology, business and the team among other factors, against their 
criteria for investment. Incorporating the evaluation of founder mindset 
attributes, could indicate founder cognitive development needs. In turn, 
this could be used to influence the recruitment of independent NEDs to 
join the board, so that their skills and experience could contribute not only 
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to the development of the business but also to the development of 
founder.  
This study also informs VCs director practice to pay attention to the board 
role when composing boards and bringing in external NEDs, since during 
the critical early stages the board needs to focus on providing strategic 
help as opposed to just monitoring.  
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6.5   Evaluating Theory of Optimising for Growth 
This study used classic grounded theory for data collection and analysis. 
This research approach comes with its own evaluative framework, as 
developed by Glaser (1967, 1978, 1998). Glaser (1998, p.16-17) 
contended that a grounded theory “does not have to be legitimised”, and 
that “the proof is in the outcome”. This is because “grounded theories 
have ‘grab’ and they are interesting” (Glaser, 1978, p. 4). By ‘grab’, 
Glaser means the theory has a “significant explanatory power” of what is 
happening in the substantive area of investigation (Schreiber, 2001, 
p.74). Thus, he suggests the researchers evaluate their developed 
grounded theories using the four criteria: fit, relevance, workability and 
modifiability, which have been introduced in Chapter 3. This is done by 
asking the following questions (Glaser, 1998, p.17): 
 “Does the theory fit the substantive area?” 
 “Does it have relevance to the people in the substantive field?” 
“Does the theory work to explain relevant behaviour in the 
substantive are of research?” 
“Is it readily modifiable as new data emerge?” 
These criteria for evaluating a grounded theory “are based on achieving 
skill at each stage of the grounded theory package” (Glaser, 1998, p.17). 
This section evaluates the emerged Theory of Optimising for Growth 
against the four criteria, thus demonstrating due diligence and 
commitment to the tenets of the classic grounded theory approach 
throughout the research process.  
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6.5.1 Fit 
“Fit is another word for validity” (Glaser, 1998, p.18). It means “that the 
categories of the theory must fit the data” (Glaser, 1978, p.4). Practically, 
it is about ensuring that the names for codes and categories derive 
directly from the data, as opposed to pre-existing concepts from extant 
literature or pre-conceived names from the researcher’s previous 
knowledge.  
Chapter 4 demonstrated how Fit was attained. First, raw data incidents 
were grouped together using constant comparison technique. These 
groups of data were given in-vivo names where possible. This is 
evidenced in in Section 4.3 by illustrating how initial codes were 
generated from the interview excerpt. The further development of initial 
open codes based on new raw data is evidenced in  
These examples of raw data incident groupings and their subsequent 
development demonstrated a close connection between the concepts and 
the data, showing due diligence through the research project to derive the 
theory from data, as opposed to concepts being pre-conceived and 
influenced by prior knowledge or literature. 
During the initial stages of the coding, the fit between the data and codes 
is more obvious than during the later stages. This is because the 
researcher amasses a huge amount of codes and categories and their 
naming does not stay static. Glaser (1978, p.4) notes: “categories emerge 
so fast, it is important to constantly refit them to the data as the research 
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proceeds”, highlighting that “categories are not precious… the analyst 
should readily modify them as successive data may demand”. The 
transformation of early open codes into final codes is demonstrated in 
Table 11. List of Early Open Categories, Table 12. Initial Set of Selective 
Codes and Table 15. Evolution and Abstraction of Selective Codes, 
whereas Table 10. Emerging Themes of Open Codes shows an early 
grouping of codes into themes, which subsequently been refitted.  
The criterion of Fit assesses whether developed concepts have 
adequately expressed the patterns of data incidents and it has been 
demonstrated above and throughout examples in Chapter 4, how fit has 
been achieved in this study. 
6.5.2 Relevance 
The theory’s relevance is demonstrated by the extent it focuses on the 
main concern of participants and their core resolution of it. Thus, by 
focusing on the participants’ concern, the relevance criteria “makes the 
research important” to the professional practice (Glaser, 1998, p.18) 
Chapter 4 demonstrated the search for the main concern. Memo provided 
in Figure 4. Memo Discovering the Main Concern of Participants 
, showed reflections and analysis of several codes as candidates for the 
main concern. It was demonstrated how a concept of Growth has 
emerged as the main concern of participants, because it served as a 
determinant of ability of the company to raise further funding thus moving 
to the next stage of venture development, or fail. 
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In line with grounded theory, identifying the main concern signalled 
moving to selective coding stage and theoretical sampling, thus focusing 
on the development of codes and categories relating to the main concern 
and its resolution, as it was demonstrated in Chapter 4. Optimising was 
identified as core category, a category representing how participants 
resolved their main concern of venture Growth. It was illustrated through 
Section 4.3 how identified core category “is a central integrative scheme” 
bringing together all other categories and accounting for all that was 
happening in data (Glaser and Kaplan, 1996, p.111, Glaser, 1978). 
The criterion of relevance was further demonstrated as the subsequent 
analysis focused only on concepts relevant to the main concern and the 
process for its resolution. Therefore, the resulting theory of Optimising for 
Growth is relevant to the “action in the area” (Lomborg and Kirkevold, 
2003, p.191). Expanding interviews from VC Investor Directors and 
sampling from other types of participants including Founders and NEDs, 
further made the theory relevant to “the people in the substantive field” 
(Glaser, 1998, p.17) 
The demonstration of how the theory explains what was happening in the 
substantive area was presented in Chapter 5. 
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6.5.3 Workability 
Grounded theory is workable, if it “able to explain… and interpret what is 
happening in an area of substantive enquiry” (Glaser, 1978, p.4). This is 
achieved when the core category accounts for much of the variation in 
data and demonstrates the resolution of the main concern with as fewer 
categories as possible.  
The developed core category Optimising is a process-type category, a 
type which is noted for explaining “a considerable portion of the action in 
the area” (Glaser, 1978, p.5). Chapter 4 demonstrated due diligence and 
evidence how Optimising emerged as a very complex, two stage process 
consisting of Evaluating and Structuring Stage and Behaving Bigger 
Stage. Categories within each stage have largely emerged several 
dimensions, which meant that altogether Optimising accounted for much 
of the variation in data (Glaser, 1978). Section 4.4 demonstrated that they 
theory of Optimising for Growth was interpreted in as few as 5 categories: 
of Gaps, Evaluating and Structuring, Behaving Bigger, Fit for Purpose 
Board, and Venture Challenges. Thus, Optimising for Growth explained 
the inner workings of the early venture boards, sufficiently accounting for 
variations in patterns of data incidents. For example, the developed board 
attributes, board roles and value add behaviours, each consisting of 
insightful dimensions that helped explain the differences in the director 
engagement in the process of Optimising. This leads to conclude that the 
study has met the criterion of workability. 
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6.5.4 Modifiability 
According to Glaser (1998, p.19), modifiability is a “very significant” 
criterion because it shows the capacity of the substantive theory to be 
“modified by new data”. Glaser (1978, p.6) writes: the “generative nature 
always takes it beyond the substantive theory being studied.” Chapter 4 
showed evidence how categories were connected and related, 
demonstrating that this process had several changes, varying codes as 
the new data emerged, thus achieving modifiability. It was noted on 
several occasions that there were multiple ways to group emerging 
concepts together, at the end the groupings reflected their relationship to 
the core category of optimising.  
 “A substantive theory invariably has formal theory or general 
implications” Glaser (1978, p.6). Thus, this study of optimising board 
processes and director characteristics of early stage ventures, naturally 
leads to a more formal theory of optimising board role in other company 
contexts, as demonstrated in Section 5.4. 
The theory’s modifiability is a “significant” outcome, because it 
corroborates the ability of the theory to reflect the dynamic nature of 
social reality (Glaser, 1998, p.18, Lomborg and Kirkevold, 2003). This 
section demonstrated how the theory of Optimising for Growth achieved 
this criterion. 
In summary, Chapter 3 has introduced the criteria, summarising it in 
Table 2 Linking Evaluative Criteria and Research Stages and showing 
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how it should be evidenced and demonstrated during the research 
process. Table 30 below extends Table 2, by adding the summary of the 
evidence of meeting the criteria and carrying out due diligence throughout 
the research process. 
Table 30. Evidencing Evaluation Criteria 
Criteria Demonstration as 
part of Research 
Process 
Link to Data Analysis 
and Coding Stages 
How Criteria has 
been Evidenced in 
this Study 
Fit 
“Does the theory 
fit the substantive 
area?” (Glaser, 
1998, p.17) 
 
• Demonstrate how 
codes and 
categories emerge 
from collected 
data, not literature 
or previous 
knowledge 
• Use of constant 
comparison and 
memoing 
• Fit is achieved 
gradually - use of 
three coding 
techniques of open 
coding, selective 
coding theoretical 
coding 
Open coding stage 
(chapter 4, section 4.2) 
Selective coding stage 
(chapter 4, section 4.3) 
Theoretical coding 
stage (chapter 4, 
section 4.4) 
Emergence of codes 
evidenced by 
examples in Table 
7.Open Coding. 
Illustration of Initial 
Generation of Codes  
Table 8. Illustration 
of Developing Open 
Categories and 
Properties.  
Figure 3. Illustration 
of Initial Memo and 
its Development 
Table 11. List of 
Open Categories 
As well as Tables 
15-25 
 
Relevance 
“Does it have 
relevance to the 
people in the 
substantive 
field?” (Glaser, 
1998, p.17) 
• Demonstrate the 
process of 
determining the 
main concern of 
participants, detail 
its emergence 
• Demonstrate how 
the theory explains 
what is happening 
in the substantive 
area  
Open coding stage 
(chapter 4, section 4.2) 
demonstrates the 
process of emerging of 
the main concern. 
Theoretical coding 
(chapter 4, section 4.4) 
demonstrates how the 
theory of Optimising 
for Growth explains 
what is happening in 
the substantive area.  
Chapter 5 adds to the 
explanation. 
Figure 4. Memo 
Discovering the Main 
Concern of 
Participants 
Table 9. Emerging 
Main Concern 
Table 16. Main 
Concern Category – 
Growth 
Chapter 5 
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Criteria Demonstration as 
part of Research 
Process 
Link to Data Analysis 
and Coding Stages 
How Criteria has 
been Evidenced in 
this Study 
Workability 
“Does the theory 
work to explain 
relevant 
behaviour in the 
substantive are of 
research?” 
(Glaser, 1998, 
p.17) 
• Demonstrate the 
resolution of the 
main concern with 
as fewer 
categories as 
possible 
• Demonstrate how 
core category 
accounts for much 
of the variations in 
patterns of data  
• Demonstration the 
abstraction of 
categories 
Selective coding 
(Chapter 4, section 
4.3) shows the 
resolution of the main 
concern using 5 
categories. 
Appendix 5 From Data 
to Concepts illustrates 
variation captured 
within categories 
Chapter 5 section 5.4 
further abstracts the 
theory in light of the 
integration with the 
extant literature.  
Tables 27-31 
demonstrate the 5 
categories and 
variations within 
each. Figure 10. 
Emergent 
Substantive Theory 
of Optimising for 
Growth 
demonstrates how 
core category 
accounts for others  
Figure 13. More 
Formal Substantive 
Theory - 
demonstrates 
abstraction 
Abstraction of 
categories also in 
Table 15. Evolution 
and Abstraction of 
Selective Codes 
Modifiability 
“Is it readily 
modifiable as new 
data emerge?” 
(Glaser, 1998, 
p.17) 
• Demonstrate 
capacity for being 
altered if and when 
new relevant data 
is sought 
• Demonstrate how 
study can be 
extended into other 
contexts or, if 
necessary, used to 
move from a 
substantive theory 
to a more formal 
theory 
Codes and categories 
are modifiable 
throughout all three 
coding stages, open, 
selective and 
theoretical, as the new 
data emerged 
(Chapter 4). 
6.7   Opportunities for 
Future Research 
discusses how the 
theory is likely to apply 
to board contexts other 
than ventures 
Modifiability is 
evidenced in Table 
11. List of Open 
Categories 
Table 10. Emerging 
Themes of Open 
Codes 
Table 12. Initial Set 
of Selective Codes 
Table 14. Additional 
Selective Codes 
Section 6.7 
Opportunities for 
Further Research 
discussed  how the 
theory is likely to 
apply to board 
contexts other than 
ventures 
Source: Table Developed by the Author based on Glaser (1998) 
The evaluation of the grounded theory of Optimising for Growth 
demonstrated that it has met the four criteria of the Glaser’s evaluative 
framework (1998).  
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6.6   Limitations 
Previous sections argued this research has met its aims to offer a better 
understanding and a theoretical framework of what happens on early 
venture boards. Whilst this study has offered several contributions to 
knowledge and practice, it is just as important to clarify its limitations. As 
with many studies, these limitations help shape further research 
opportunities as discussed in the next section. 
First, the understanding and the theoretical framework have emerged 
directly from data, using classic grounded theory method for data 
collection and analysis (Glaser, 1978). Consequently, the research and 
its conclusions remain provisional since testing them was not in the scope 
of the study.  
Second, whilst the research unveiled several novel concepts, such as 
Founder Mindset and Board Mindset Alignment, these were only explored 
in the context of early venture boards. There is an intriguing possibility to 
investigate whether these novel concepts offered in this study, have a 
role in a more traditional corporate board environment.  
Third, the theoretical framework is unlikely to apply to other organisational 
contexts which are not experiencing similar internal and external 
challenges characterised by uncertainty of survival, rapid changes in the 
business, potentially huge misalignment of interests among directors and 
relatively inexperienced CEO (Garg and Eisenhardt, 2017). However, 
whilst the context of board inner-working in other types of companies may 
be not be as volatile as in startups, the current political and trade climate 
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have created conditions of extreme uncertainty of survival, forcing many 
CEOs and boards rethink and experiment with their business models (De 
Ville and Siles-Brugge, 2019). The non-profit charity sector in the UK is a 
good example of a type of organisation finding itself in such situation. 
Next section offers a research opportunity to extend the process of 
Optimising as a framework for the transformation process which 
organisations, their boards and CEOs can use in order to make sense of 
their experiences.  
Fourth, during the integration of the substantive theory in the extant body 
of knowledge, it emerged that the process of Optimising takes place as 
part of professionalising efforts to get the venture to IPO. During this 
journey ventures get multiple investments and grow in size and turnover 
(Hellman and Puri, 2002a). New investors get board seats, and data 
indicated that they begin re-evaluating structural and cognitive gaps, 
effectively re-starting stage 1 of the Optimising process. However, since 
this was no longer a nascent board and no longer an early stage venture, 
these experiences were used to define the boundary of the process the 
process of Optimising, but were not explored further.  
Altogether, these four limitations are framed as research opportunities in 
the next section.   
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6.7   Opportunities for Future Research 
The discussed above contributions and limitations of this study have also 
shaped several opportunities for future research. Specifically, four 
opportunities emerged as potential avenue for further investigation. 
First, there is an opportunity to empirically test the proposed relationships 
between emerged concepts of the theory of Optimising for Growth. This 
study has offered an integrative theoretical model consisting of novel 
director attributes, board role, value adding processes and venture 
performance. Testing the effects of the novel attributes, alongside 
traditional attributes would further add to the understanding of early 
venture boards. 
Second, a further investigation on the role of the novel concepts 
developed in this study in the more traditional corporate board 
environment, could yield new insights.  It is widely recognised that studies 
of board and director attributes and their effects on company performance 
have failed to produce conclusive results (Daily and Johnson, 1997, Van 
Ees, Gabrielsson and Huse, 2009). Using novel director and board 
attributes may offer an opportunity to re-frame board-performance 
relationship.  
Third, this research has investigated boards that are composed of parties 
with conflicting interests and operate in the context of extreme instability 
and rapid change. Process of Optimising was developed to explain how 
directors deal with their concern for the growth of the company. 
Essentially, Optimising was defined as a transformation process that 
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ventures, their boards and CEOs go through in their pursuit of 
exponential growth. Whilst this theory was developed for this specific 
substantive area, the application of the theory as a framework for the 
transformation process of organisations under conditions of extreme 
uncertainty and change, is another area that could be explored by future 
research.  
It might be particularly useful to extend it to companies where directors 
face similar concern of growth or survival and in contexts that share 
similar board and challenge characteristics. For example, non-profit 
charity boards are often composed of stakeholder representatives, with 
conflicting interests. At the same time, non-profits in the UK are currently 
going through a period of rapid and radical change to their funding 
structures with public sector funds being withdrawn rapidly (Glennon, 
Hannibal and Meehan, 2017). Charities, as a sector, face immense 
pressure and challenge to go through transformation in order to run self-
sustainably (Hyndman, 2017). This requires changes in mindsets of 
people running them. Such challenges and context are similar in nature to 
ventures’ challenges and context. Further research into the different 
context would broaden the application of the substantive theory. 
Fourth and final opportunity is to extend the theory to the entire process 
of professionalising. This research has focused on director experiences 
on early boards, formed post first VC investment. It yielded an indication 
that the process of Optimising restarts with the follow-on investment, as 
data suggested new investors re-evaluate and structure the company, its 
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board and founder. Since boards and ventures change significantly 
throughout their development period between startup and IPO, it is 
suggested that further research investigates different venture 
development cycles to discern changes in structural, cognitive, 
processual and behavioural components at each stage linked to VC 
investment cycle and professionalising efforts. This work would give 
insights into the full process of professionalising startup ventures 
(Hellmann and Puri, 2002a).  In particular, this would align with the latest 
calls for a “framework for startup governance” and offer insights on 
whether “corporate law principles should be applied differently in the 
startup context in recognition of their special features” (Pollman, 2019, 
p.1). 
  
285 
 
6.8   Chapter Summary 
This study has brought early boards of investor-backed ventures into a 
focus as an important and relevant topic both for the research field and 
professional practice. 
Over the past decade, investor-backed private ventures have become 
economically significant and theoretically important (Garg and Furr, 
2017). Their boards have often been associated with success and 
growth. However, since boards operate behind closed doors, very little is 
known about how they work. It seems their conduct is revealed only when 
serious failures come to light. Even less is known about the nascent 
venture boards during the critical early stages of company development. 
This study provided a rich and novel understanding of the inner workings 
on early venture boards. Having gained access to speak with VC Investor 
Directors, Founders and Non-Execs about their experiences, it developed 
an empirically-grounded substantive theory of Optimising for Growth, 
which explained directors’ chief concern of achieving exponential growth 
and the process they use to resolve it, whist accounting for variations. At 
a more formal level, the study offered an integrative model of director 
attributes, board role, value adding processes and company performance 
in the context of early venture boards. Overall, the study provided a novel 
perspective and proposed several contributions to knowledge and 
professional practice as well as opportunities for further research. 
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Appendix 4 Interview Guides 
Approach to interviews has been fully detailed in Chapter 3, Section 3.8 
Interviews; it has followed the GT procedures: 
• Carrying out Initial interviews in order to discover the participants’ 
emergent main concern and how they resolved it (core category); 
• Hold subsequent interviews based on theoretical sampling 
principle, i.e. to saturate categories only relating to the emergent 
core, sampling on analytical grounds for the data and its source 
(Glaser, 1998).  
Approach to Initial Interviews  
As per GT procedures, initial interviews were designed to explore director 
experiences as openly as possible, allowing participants to steer the 
direction of the interview so that the researcher could develop an 
understanding of key issues of concern they face (Glaser, 1998, Bryant 
and Charmaz, 2010). 
The interview questions were open-ended and designed to learn as much 
as possible about directors’ experiences, their possible concerns, 
reactions, observations and thoughts. 
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Guide to Initial Interviews  
INTRODUCTION 
• Thank you for taking part 
• Introducing research into early venture boards 
• Research issues, importance of better understanding what 
happens on venture boards, research question 
• Caveat the research is not writing up any individual, company or 
VC cases, but about patterns in experiences. Any names, 
potentially identifying information, will be removed prior analysis. 
Confidentiality  
• Introducing the Northumbria University’s Ethics Policy and the 
necessity to obtain written consents (as previously emailed), 
highlighting the participant’s right to withdraw at any time 
• Reminding about audio-recording of the interview to manage 
data 
PART 1. EXPERIENCES  
Approach Interview Questions 
In the first instance the 
interviews opened with 
‘tell me about your 
experiences on boards’, 
thus ‘instilling the spill’ 
(Glaser, 1992).  
Picking up on experiences 
mentioned, several 
prompts followed 
1. Please tell me about your experiences 
on boards of investor-backed 
startups? 
2. Could you tell me about any other 
experiences you had as director on 
startup boards? 
Prompts: 
• You mentioned situation x, could 
you tell me more about this 
experience? 
• Was this situation resolved in any 
way? 
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PART 2. ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE AND HOW THEY GOT 
RESOLVED 
Approach Interview Questions 
The second part picked 
up on specific examples 
of issues within 
participants’ experiences. 
Repeating what was 
mentioned and delving 
into what happened, how 
issues were addressed 
and resolved. 
Prompting for illustrative 
examples of reactions to 
the actions from other 
board members 
(Urquhart, 2013). 
3. What seems important and significant 
for you as director on boards, what’s 
the most significant? 
Prompts: 
• Why, could you tell me more about 
this?  
• How did you go about addressing 
this?  
• Could you tell me more about how 
this got resolved? 
• Please tell me about the reaction of 
other directors? 
 
PART 3. CHANGE IN BEHAVIOUR OVER TIME 
The third part explored 
experiences of 
differences, what stands 
out and lessons 
Participants were 
prompted to provide 
examples from their 
experiences across 
current and past relevant 
boards. All participants 
were encouraged to 
speak about their own 
specific experiences, 
providing real situational 
examples where possible, 
rather than giving out an 
opinion or making general 
statements.  
4. When you look at your experiences, 
any boards stand out? 
Why? 
Could you give me an example of 
something that this board/directors do 
differently?  
Could you tell me more about that? 
5. What seem/ed important or significant 
for you as director on this board? 
Why? Could you tell me more about 
this? 
How do/did you go about 
addressing/resolving this? 
What happened? What was the 
outcome 
6. Could you please describe the most 
important lessons you learnt through 
your experiences? How did you 
discover that? Have your views 
changed over time? 
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Prompts: 
• You mentioned xxx/situation – could 
you tell me more about this 
experience? 
• You mentioned issue – what 
happened? How did it get resolved? 
What was the outcome for 
everyone? 
• You mentioned situation x – what 
was it like when this happened? 
 
WRAP-UP 
• Is there anything else you think I should know to better 
understand what happens on boards of investor-backed tech 
startups?  
Could you tell me more about that? 
 
• Is there anyone else you can think of that I should be talking to 
about their experiences on boards of investor-backed tech 
startups? 
• Is there any feedback you could give me? 
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Approach to Interviews via Theoretical Sampling 
As soon as the main concern and its resolution (core category) have 
emerged during the analysis, the cycles of data collection and analysis 
progressed into selectively coding for categories relating to the emergent 
core and sampling theoretically for necessary data determined on analytic 
grounds (Glaser, 1998).  
In line with the canons of grounded theory, the interview questions 
became increasingly focused according to the needs of the emerging 
concepts and theory (Bryant and Charmaz, 2007).  
The details of the progression of the requirements for questions and 
sampling are provided in Chapter 4, Section 4.3   Selective Coding .  
Guide to Interviews via Theoretical Sampling 
INTRODUCTION (The same as Initial Interviews) 
• Thank you for taking part 
• Introducing research into early venture boards 
• Research issues, importance of better understanding what 
happens on venture boards, research question 
• Caveat the research is not writing up any individual, company or 
VC cases, but about patterns in experiences. Any names, 
potentially identifying information, will be removed prior analysis. 
Confidentiality  
• Introducing the Northumbria University’s Ethics Policy and the 
necessity to obtain written consents (as previously emailed), 
highlighting the participant’s right to withdraw at any time 
• Reminding about audio-recording of the interview to manage 
data 
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PART 1. EXPERIENCES and BACKGROUND 
Approach Interview Questions 
To establish rapport, ask about 
experiences on boards of investor-
backed startups 
• Please tell me about 
your experiences on 
boards of investor-
backed startups? 
PART 2. THEORETICAL SAMPLING 
Approach - Requirements for theoretical sampling have been 
determined based on clusters of unsaturated categories. 
Clusters of 
Unsaturated 
Categories 
Requirements for 
Theoretical Sampling 
Example Questions and 
Prompts 
Becoming CEO 
Evolved CEO 
Getting Rid of 
Founder/CEO 
Details of CEO 
characteristics at the 
point of the next 
round of funding 
Saturate the process 
by which CEO is 
evolving, i.e. 
Becoming CEO and 
what happens if 
founder hasn’t 
‘evolved’ and 
replaced.  
Data can be sampled 
from sources 
/interviewees with a 
broad range of 
experience on boards 
at later stages, post 
next round 
 
• You mentioned CEO 
[characteristic], could 
you tell me a little bit 
more about that? How 
do you know – when it 
changes? (Interview with 
VC7, VC11, NED4, 
NED5, NED6) 
• Could you give me an 
example of what 
happens when startup 
achieves some sort of 
exponential growth? 
(Interview with VC8, 
VC11, NED6) 
• Could you give example 
of founders that done it 
very well, to scale up, to 
become a professional 
CEO? (Interview with 
VC8, NED6) 
Director 
Behaviours 
 
Saturate dimensions 
of a range of director 
behaviour patterns 
Provide further data 
on the catalysts of 
change in behaviour 
patterns 
• Directors help CEOs to 
focus their mind on exit - 
is this something you 
see happening on your 
startup boards? 
(Interview with VC7) 
• Could you give me an 
example of directors 
gaining a deep 
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Data could come from 
a very experienced 
director 
understanding of the 
business so the know 
exactly where they can 
help? (Interview with 
VC7,8) 
• Could you give me an 
example of achieving the 
balance of challenging a 
founder and the board 
and kind of not pushing 
it too far? (Interview with 
VC8, NED4) 
• Could you give me an 
example of engaging 
into proper strategic 
debate at the board 
meeting and the role of 
preparation of 
CEO/directors (Interview 
with VC8, VC11, NED4) 
• You mentioned in the 
beginning some of the 
board members were 
forceful, could you 
expand on that? 
(Interview with VC9, 
NED4) 
• How did you evaluate 
the situation? (Interview 
with VC10) 
Communication 
Approach and 
Style 
Contact 
Trust 
Director 
Relationships 
Saturate and clarify 
complex 
relationships 
between 
Communication, 
Contact, Trust and 
Director 
Relationship, shaped 
by properties such 
as Effectiveness and 
Changing.  
This data could come 
from any type of 
director. 
• Could you tell me about 
director styles, styles of 
how people behave on 
boards? (Interview with 
VC7, NED4, NED5, 
NED6) 
• Regarding having a 
proper debate, are there 
any processes or 
structures that you have 
seen enable that? 
(Interview with VC8, 
NED6) 
• You mentioned trust and 
the importance of trust. 
In what way you have 
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seen trust develop? 
(Interview with VC8, 
VC10, NED4, NED6) 
• Could you tell me about 
communication on your 
boards? (Interview with 
VC8,10, 11, NED4, 
NED6) 
• Could you give me an 
example of something 
that could shift the 
communication pattern? 
(Interview with VC8) 
• You mentioned you 
struggled to get other 
directors onboard, could 
you please expand on 
that? (Interview with 
VC11, NED4) 
Adding Value  
CEO Reaction 
Helping 
 
To saturate the 
context, causes and 
effects of Added 
Value so it could be 
better located in the 
stages of the 
process of 
optimising.  
This data could come 
from any type of 
director. 
• I’d like to ask about the 
process of adding value 
to the CEO, how does 
that normally happen? 
(Interview with VC7, 
NED5) 
• In your experience do 
founders tend to ask for 
this help or directors see 
it and steer it? (Interview 
with VC7) 
• Does it happen during 
board meetings, or 
outside? (Interview with 
VC7, VC10) 
• What are the conditions 
of the situations where 
helping actually 
happens? (Interview with 
VC7, NED6) 
• How do you mentor and 
develop the CEO, 
especially if this is a first 
time founder? (Interview 
with VC8, NED4, NED5) 
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• Could you give me a 
specific example of 
founders dealing with 
feedback? (Interview 
with VC10, VC11, 
NED4) 
WRAP-UP (The same as Initial Interviews) 
• Is there anything else you think I should know to better 
understand what happens on boards of investor-backed tech 
startups?  
Could you tell me more about that? 
 
• Is there anyone else you can think of that I should be talking to 
about their experiences on boards of investor-backed tech 
startups? 
• Is there any feedback you could give me? 
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Appendix 5 From Data to Concepts 
 
 
 
 
CATEGORY GROWTH 
Selective 
Code Open Codes Dimensions Illustrative quotes 
Growth Curve 
Gradient 
Rate of 
Growth 
High/Low when we started to see it grow it was 
very satisfying and actually from 
memory it finally achieved its growth 
curve VC1 
 
it was still profitable, you know, but 
ultimately its growth curve was less 
steep than it had been VC4 
 
Speed High/Low get as big as you can as fast as you 
can F2 
it could always go faster. Investors 
are never happy F5 
 
Volatility n/a he has built that business from 0 to 
£20m, to 0 and now we are down to 
£3m, so we’ve been up and down a 
yo-yo with that business NED4 
 
Growing 
Company 
Indicators 
Taking Large 
Investment 
Round 
n/a build the business to the point where 
it could do a true Series A round. 
When I say Series A, we are talking 
about £3-5m fundraise VC4 
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CATEGORY GROWTH 
Selective 
Code Open Codes Dimensions Illustrative quotes 
Company Size n/a when you go into the office e and it is 
suddenly like a grown-up company. 
There are all these people here, and 
you don’t know what they do.  VC3 
 
the company called [NAME], is, you 
know, it is quite a grown up business 
now, turns over £15m, has 
18employees in 4 different countries, 
has a very strong team NED3 
 
Becoming 
CEO 
Attributes 
Being Explicit 
with Asks 
n/a they will ask for very specific help 
because they can manage most 
things themselves because they’ve 
done it before. VC7 
 
absolutely clear statements what 
they would like from their board VC8 
 
Taking 
Ownership 
 [it] is for the CEO to use the 
experience of directors to optimise 
the decision making of the company 
VC3 
What you can’t have is the CEO that 
doesn’t align internally and 
externally, they have to be a 
custodian of everything that is 
happening. VC6 
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CATEGORY STAGE 1 EVALUATING AND STRUCTURING STAGE 
Selective 
Code Open Codes Dimensions Illustrative quotes 
Evaluating 
Gaps 
Post 
Investment 
n/a My focus from day one is obviously 
get in there and work out whether it 
is going to be fit for purpose” VC4 
 
each executive team has different 
strengths and weaknesses and I 
think it is important to fill out the 
board in a way that is 
complimentary to the executives 
around the table VC1 
 
At Next 
Investment 
Restructuring 
Boards 
when we raised £1.5m they wanted 
a proper paid Chair who had 
experience in our sector F5 
 
when you raise more money from 
different types, growth funds, from 
larger VC funds, you will then get 
Investor Directors onto the board 
who have experience of later stage 
funds. So that tends to work quite 
well, they tend to have different 
experience to the early stage 
investors. And its key that you get 
that step, that step is quite normal 
as your percentage holding in the 
company falls you would expect 
your board seat to eventually go 
and it gets replaced by investors 
who are more experienced at stage 
the company is at now VC7  
 
Getting Rid of 
Founder/CEO 
certain people, for example, can 
probably run a business from 0 to 
£1m turnover and then they get 
beyond their skills set. VC4 
 
it was time professionalise the 
executive team away from the 
founders VC1 
 
Composing 
Boards 
Bringing 
NEDs 
NED Profile we normally would try and use our 
board seat to bring in an external 
third party individual VC1 
 
looking outside just investors for 
non-execs is a very valuable thing 
to do, because obviously any 
director including a VC director has 
a responsibility for the company but 
they are all obviously are acting on 
behalf of their own firm whereas a 
truly independent non-exec is a 
very valuable in that they don’t 
have that loyalties skewed. They 
317 
 
are responsible to the board and to 
the company and the shareholders 
and aren’t influenced by valuations 
in the same way as it is for the 
investor. So I think making sure 
there are independent non-execs 
on the board is very important. VC5 
 
Filling Gaps Having Templates we have templates and things like 
that VC4 
 
they should just give us a template 
employee handbook, things like 
that, contracts, as well F1 
 
NEDs Role in 
Founder’s 
Mindset 
I’ve gone and had a coffee and a 
chat with [CHAIR] and he’s like look 
this is why they are saying that and 
this is why that’s happening, that’s 
why they are asking for this F2 
 
we’ve been trying to get us 
someone to get us a mentor that 
we can look up to from a point of 
view of, someone who we think has 
done this before like similar to us 
F3 
 
Balancing n/a We had a right blend of skills VC4 
 
different human nature at the 
board, which is good because you 
want a diverse board with everyone 
brining, if you can, a slightly 
different skill-set to the board VC7 
 
Founder 
Director Profile 
“First Time 
Everything” 
Experience of 
‘First Time 
Everything’ 
n/a I am a first time founder F1 
 
they are often first-time 
entrepreneurs VC4 
 
Mindset Coachability 
(positive/negative) 
you can normally tell quite early on 
before you make the investment 
how coachable the CEO is VC7 
 
if they are pig headed and set in 
their ways and they want to do it. 
VC4 
 
Receptiveness to 
Advice 
(positive/negative) 
usually they listen and usually they 
take the advice NED3 
 
CEO for at least three consecutive 
months went on quite a tirade 
where he was hugely defensive that 
we were attaching the way he was 
doing it that he didn’t agree the 
industry was changing. We all sat 
there dumbfounded and at that 
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point we all realised this is not 
going to be sustainable NED1 
 
Susceptibility to 
Value Board 
(positive/negative) 
a CEO who understands that the 
board is important and values the 
board and the board value, you 
know, good board members, and 
[…another code, preparing] is going 
to get a lot out of it VC3 
 
And very quickly I kind of got to the 
point where they were not going to 
embrace the relationship  VC4 
 
VC Director 
Profile 
Right to 
Board Seat 
n/a You often have investor directors, 
they would be someone like me, we 
invested in the company and that 
gains us a seat at the table. VC7 
 
We join the boards as a condition of 
our investment. Generally, not in all 
cases but in most cases, we’d take 
a board seat. VC1 
 
Experience Large number of 
boards 
I’ve been on about 20 boards of 
those investor-backed startups as 
independent director and as a 
Venture Capitalist myself VC3 
 
Not sure how many businesses I’ve 
sat on, probably in the region of 15 
to 20, different boards VC4 
 
Full Cycle 
Experience 
I have seen companies from doing 
a first of investment round to exit 
and others where we had multiple 
funding rounds and I have seen 
that process as well VC7 
 
Portfolio 
Mindset 
Inherent Conflict 
Fund vs Venture 
an investor director will always 
have one eye on the investors and 
the funds they serve whereas as a 
director you act for the company 
first not the investment. VC6 
 
Focusing on the 
Winners 
you worked in a VC environment, 
you know what’s it like, you’ve got a 
big portfolio of companies and you 
can only spend so much time with 
them. NED3 
 
95% of a VC’s job is to pick the 
winners in the first place rather than 
try and manage the winners so that 
they can win VC3 
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CATEGORY GAPS 
Selective Code, 
Property Open Codes, Properties Illustrative quotes 
Structural  Systems and Processes Gaps in terms of its systems, processes 
and controls, it was still very much a 
small company VC4 
 
from the point of view of governance, 
formality, we were not very formal F4 
KPIs Gaps what are the right metrics that are 
going to give you advance 
notification of, you know, are we 
looking like we are going to be on 
track or not VC5 
 
He examined the KPIs and he 
decided whether they were the right 
KPIs VC4 
 
The ones that are self-aware enough 
to go and do some research 
themselves about what are the right 
metrics to be tracking VC5 
Skills and Experience Gaps Each executive team has different 
strengths and weaknesses and I 
think it is important to fill out the 
board in a way that is complimentary 
to the executives around the table, 
making sure you are filling any skill 
gaps or if someone is young and 
inexperienced, make sure there is 
some..., one there who can be a 
chair, mentor type of person, if it 
someone that doesn’t have industry 
experience, make sure there is 
someone on there with good 
networks and into the industry that’s 
relevant. It’s working out what the 
board needs to complement the 
executives. The executives, 
generally, they are what they are, so 
it is a matter of building the board to 
fit around VC1 
Then we are going to really get down 
by doing the jobs about where the 
gaps are, so we know we need a 
non-exec with marketing experience, 
so we started looking for that type of 
person, and then we are just starting 
to look at wider mix of people F5 
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Cognitive Understanding Governance The number one priority is to make 
sure the CEO understands what’s the 
function of the board is and a lot of 
them don’t VC3 
In the very early stages a lot of the 
CEOs don’t really value the board 
meetings and the input of the board 
VC3 
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CATEGORY FIT FOR PURPOSE BOARD 
Selective Code, 
Property 
Open Codes, 
Properties Dimensions Illustrative quotes 
Board Purpose Monitoring n/a the governance part of it, is really 
directors and shareholders 
checking up that the company has 
been doing a good job and the 
CEO has been doing a good job, 
which is the governance part of it 
VC3 
 
But those investor positions are 
really about monitoring the 
performance of the company itself 
VC8 
 
Strategic Help - making sure it’s being more 
strategic, making sure the 
companies are thinking 
occasionally strategically rather 
than just tactically all the time. 
VC3 
 
So the business was always 
focused on the strategy always 
focused on the direction VC4 
 
Board Mindset 
Alignment 
- Aligned- 
Misaligned 
a common understanding on 
board that they are there to help, 
rather than to check up what’s 
happening. And if you manage to 
achieve that you’ve probably got a 
very effective board VC3 
 
I think what’s most detrimental is 
where the members of the board 
are not properly aligned VC5 
 
Board Meeting 
Quality 
Getting Board 
Pack Right 
Quality of 
Information 
High-Low 
they’ve actually have got really 
good reporting systems in place 
VC5 
 
In other words I don’t get landed 
with 400 pages of excel monthly, 
which nobody is going to read. 
VC8 
 
Notice Period 
Timely-Late 
Obviously providing information 
well in advance and clear terms 
VC8 
 
poor notice period in order to read 
it, a lot of detail does not get read 
it at all VC3 
 
Level of 
Preparation 
Prepared-
Unprepared 
The best ones are the ones that 
do their home work VC6 
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I try to avoid the boards where it 
is what I call a ‘wine and cheese’ 
non-execs who just turn up once 
a month, they read the papers if 
you are lucky, the day of the 
meeting and if you are unlucky, 
actually during the board meeting 
itself VC6 
 
Strategic 
Discussion 
Quality 
High-Low  
 
all over sudden the quality of the 
board and the quality of the 
discussion is really good VC4 
 
There was no quality discussion, 
again linking directly back to how 
poor the information was and how 
untimely it came out, they would 
just talk from an operational 
perspective, so it was very much 
a management meeting only.  
VC4 
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CATEGORY STAGE 2 BEHAVING BIGGER STAGE  
Selective 
Code Open Codes 
Dimensions/ 
Properties Illustrative quotes 
Adding Value Quality of 
Value Add 
High/Low someone is being proactive, and 
opened doors and brought 
something and done something 
and it is measurably beneficial to 
the company. There is over and 
above what you would expect. 
VC6 
 
When we did do that what we 
found was the other people 
around the table didn’t necessarily 
have more than a common-sense 
view in terms of they also didn’t 
have any experience F5 
 
Type of Value 
Add 
Opening Doors continuing of help to the CEO of 
the company through the informal 
requests for help. Like, do you 
know X, Y, Z at this VC fund 
because I’d really like to speak to 
them VC7 
 
Providing Strategic 
Input 
strategic things, they are basically 
when the CEO needs to tap into 
the experience of the board and 
making sure they optimise the 
company for success VC4 
 
Dealing with Issues helps with services like recruiting 
or they are doing education for a 
team and that kind of thing VC5 
 
Challenging I kind of welcomed it, the 
business needed that degree of 
challenge VC4 
 
Sounding Board And it works very well with him, 
we just chat very informally. He 
tell me what’s going on and along 
the way, I will offer advice if I’ve 
come across a scenario like the 
one he is coming across. Quite 
often the problems that he is 
facing, I’ve seen these problems 
before in businesses, either in 
ones I’ve been involved in the 
past or the ones I’m involved with 
now. So that’s quite informal 
NED3 
 
Focussing on the 
Bigger Picture 
it forces you to look beyond the 
immediate day to day and look at 
the big picture with people who do 
spend time looking at other 
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companies and you know have a 
wider industry experience NED1 
 
if I’m looking at it what would I like 
from a Chair, is when you are in a 
very small company, the reality is 
are over 80% operational so the 
job of that person in my eyes has 
always been to grab me by the 
stuff of my neck, pull my head out 
of the detail and then start 
focusing on the big issues and 
then to support with the agenda in 
terms of ‘I think these are the 
main three things you need to talk 
about’. F5 
 
Mentoring Founder I think probably the biggest role 
we played, kind of, mentors to the 
executive team, sorting out issues 
as they arose VC1 
 
Personally I see my job as more 
of a coach VC3 
 
Delivery of 
Value Add 
Not telling what to 
do / Telling what to 
do 
you’ve got to let them get on with 
it. Because if you interfere you are 
just interfering.  You might as well 
run it yourself, and that’s not what 
I do anymore NED3 
 
that was under the guidance of 
the board, telling us that we 
should very much focus now on 
one person, and we kind of 
stopped servicing some of the 
other customers F1 
 
Obtaining the 
Value Add 
Sought/ Not Sought one of the key skills for any 
founder is how to use his or her 
board to the best possible effect, 
because sometimes founders 
don’t really tell their directors what 
they want from them. VC8 
 
Communicating During the 
Board 
Meeting 
n/a most VCs, I think it is the truth to 
say, don’t really operate like that, 
they tend to want board meetings. 
VC3 
 
the only real interaction once you 
are on board, is at the board 
meeting. NED3 
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Ongoing 
Basis 
Touch Basing [CHAIR] calls in on a regular 
basis. At least once a week, or we 
pop for a coffee or anything like 
that. It’s strange, we even talk 
about our [ACTIVITY], you know, 
cos he [KNOWS IT] as well, we’ll 
talks half about the business and 
half about our own [ACTIVITY]. 
F2 
 
Avoiding Surprises if you are in touch with the CEO, 
you don’t get surprised VC3 
 
One of the key things we always 
tell our founders is we don’t want 
bad news and we’d rather hear as 
soon as they arrive. And that’s, 
good founders know that 
communication with their board 
early is the best way for early 
stage businesses because you 
know that business plans are not 
going to survive contact with 
reality VC8 
 
Deep 
Understanding of 
the Business 
what I’m trying to do is to have a 
deep enough understanding VC3 
 
just knowing that little bit of detail 
about what we are going to do 
you know gives me a bigger 
insight and then I can use that 
detail and relate it to my past 
experiences and hopefully I can 
give them proactive cost-effective 
advice. Well, it’s very cost-
effective because I never get paid 
for it NED3 
 
Trust n/a we’ve got a very trusting 
relationship F2 
 
this is, you know, two way 
relationship, it is not only them 
with you, but it is also you with 
them as well. And I think there 
has to be trust and I mean you 
have to trust them if you want to 
get something out of that. 
Because if there is not then you 
are always going to be ‘playing 
defence’ and you know, you are 
not making the most out of it VC4 
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CATEGORY VENTURE CHALLENGES 
Selective Code, 
Property Open Codes, Properties Illustrative quotes 
Challenges 
Characteristics 
Similar A lot of the things that you and I have 
seen as venture capitalist, we seen 
time again as we are exposed to many 
different companies that the same 
things come up VC6 
 
especially for a startup, that is facing 
all sorts of challenges VC8 
 
Inevitable There will be problems in a startup, 
that’s what being a startup’s like, it’s 
difficult, it’s hard, and there are a lot of 
problems to be resolved VC3 
 
there are a lot of moving parts, there 
are a lot of things that can change, the 
strategy can fundamentally change F5 
 
Company 
Challenges 
Performance we were growing very very quickly and 
revenues don’t always line up and 
projections are always wrong F6 
 
wasn’t part of a business plan in the 
beginning, so they change it because 
we are currently not growing quick 
enough F3 
 
Commercialisation struggled to commercialise it and turn 
it into revenue. VC1 
 
Over and above that growth 
companies will simply need to get new 
customers VC6 
 
People Issues when I saw there was a dissent 
brewing in the different direction NED1 
 
there was a particular investor that 
didn’t see eye to eye with the chair. So 
he was trying to undermine him behind 
his back. Then always do this text or 
send this very emotional emails to a 
couple of people, but he would never 
say this face to face. So he was very 
political, didn’t like, although he would 
create, what’s the good way to 
describe this, people that don’t like 
confrontation but cause confrontational 
issues but can’t deal with them 
because they don’t have the 
confidence to have the discussion 
themselves F5 
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Funding it finally achieved its growth curve after 
nearly running out of money, so it was 
a big relief to be honest VC1 
 
we ended up having to do faster and 
smaller round. Which ended slightly as 
a down round if you like F2 
 
Founder 
Challenges  
Self-doubt I am a first time founder, so a lot of the 
time I am wondering whether I am 
even putting my attention in the right 
things right now F1 
 
didn’t want to look a fool, and so look 
to [CHAIR] to kind of ‘what do you do, 
do I need to just’, I really did, cos you 
can’t help but have that self sort of 
doubt can you F2 
 
Tunnel Vision You know the team is involved every 
day [bad reception] Get a lot of tunnel 
vision in terms of the short term VC5 
 
hey are loosing sight of what they are 
trying to achieve VC4 
 
 
